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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The first part of this thesis offers a study of the phenomenon of fascination as it was 
understood in early modern England—specifically in its relation to magic, demonology and 
witchcraft.  It examines fascination’s place within cultural traditions, and its operation within 
perception theory and the psychophysiology of the early modern medical understanding.  It 
also examines some ways in which fascination operates within a theatrical context, and 
encounters the discourse of early modern “anti-theatricalists.”  The second part of the thesis is 
an analysis of the Shakespearean tragic hero’s encounter with elements of fascinating 
bewitchment, and the problems of discerning reality through the mesmeric pull of 
misperception.  The specific subjects of the dramatic analysis are Othello and Macbeth. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
FASCINATION AND TRAGEDY 
 
 
 This dissertation was inspired by a discussion of what makes great tragedy ―great.‖  It 
does not claim to solve that puzzle, rather this paper is a small attempt to explore one 
significant aspect of the inquiry: what influences a person of noble principles or virtue to 
commit acts that he knows are condemned by those same principles, to the extremity of his 
own ruin?  One often hears phrases such as ―it was a tragedy that could have been avoided,‖ 
or, ―it was a tragedy waiting to happen.‖  In a modern sense, tragedy can include in its 
definition the idea that ruination and calamity are avoidable circumstances, if the persons 
involved act to prevent them with sufficient grace, alacrity, wisdom, and courage.  To the 
ancients, the avoidance or prevention of tragic events (which many times were the will of the 
gods, or a particular god) was often not possible, and therefore was a defining element in the 
drama—suffering nobly through catastrophe to show obedience to the divine will.  In the 
early modern period of Europe, there was a new aesthetic that explored the question: how 
much control do individuals truly have over their own destiny?  The ideas of tragic expression 
in the late-Renaissance drama of England began to evolve to include a sense that an 
individual, working from personal motivations, could become a primary influence on tragic 
events.  
While the deities (and demons) were still powerful beliefs in the public consciousness, 
human actions and intentions became more important, not only for the tragic hero on the 
stage, but for the edification of the audience as well.  In Reformation Europe, and especially 
Calvinism, concepts of ―election‖ and the free grace of God through the following of the 
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Christ-example refined Protestant doctrine regarding behavior and ethics.  As B.A. Gerrish 
summarizes in ―The Place of Calvin in Christian Theology:‖  
For Calvin, as (he thinks) for Augustine and Bernard, the condition for moral 
responsibility is not free choice but voluntary action—doing what, in fact, one wills to 
do. (295)   
 
The classic notions of fate and divine will were sharing the English stage with concepts 
studying the force of human will and a greater investigation into the internal negotiations that 
prompted an individual‘s choice of action. 
The scientific discoveries of the Renaissance were showing the depth and complexity 
of the material Creation, inspiring individuals to explore the possibilities of such miracles as 
perpetual motion, aviation, and combustion technology.  At the same time, other 
experimenters were investigating the areas of alchemy, astrology, physiology and even the 
beginnings of psychology.  Mankind was seeking power in increasingly complex ways, to 
combat ignorance and improve the quality of lifestyles.  In Elizabethan England, one of the 
most interesting developments of the early modern period was taking shape in the new 
Protestant configuration of the church.  This change in the state religion, effectively 
consolidating the powers of church and government in the English throne and the attendant 
restructuring of both ecumenical and political powers did not come easily—it continued 
through and past Shakespeare‘s lifetime.  It was, by its very mandate, unsettling to the 
previous ways of religion and society and continued to focus thought upon the many themes 
within the conflict of order versus chaos.  It also sought to cast its moray over the theatre, but 
was met with some resistance, some subversive arguments and in some cases, like Macbeth 
and Othello, a rich and multi-faceted study on the nature of volition and the presence of evil. 
The early Tudor dynasty might have overseen a period of the restoration of domestic 
harmony after the tempestuous contention between the houses of York and Lancaster and the 
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upheavals of the fifteenth century.  But Henry VIII‘s active participation in the Reformation 
movement‘s break with Rome, by creating a separate English Christian church, put order and 
stability under pressure once again.  Through Edward VI‘s short reign, Queen Mary‘s 
unsuccessful attempt at a Catholic counter-reformation, and the early part of Elizabeth‘s 
succession to the throne, domestic harmony was anything but certain.  The strife born of 
Catholic vs. Protestant beliefs, rapid commercial expansion‘s influence on individual class 
and status concepts, and the questions of the rights and responsibilities of rulership, were all 
societal contentions that Shakespeare was born into and that found expression in his drama.  
The context of the contentions is succinctly described by Robert Watson in ―Tragedies of 
Revenge and Ambition:‖ 
Tragic contradictions were everywhere in Shakespeare‘s London, provoking  
exalted ambitions and then taking revenge on those who pursued such  
ambitions.  Protestant theology—the most obviously pressing cultural  
innovation—at once told Christians to aspire to direct communication with  
God, and told them to despair of ever knowing anything about Him; told them  
to focus obsessively on their prospects for eternal salvation, and to recognize  
that those prospects were beyond their power to control or even comprehend;  
to seek desperately, and yet to mistrust utterly, an inner conviction of divine  
favour.  The terrifying instability of the new urban capitalist economic  
system—whose essence was to encourage but also punish ambition—was  
matched by the terrifying instability of this new belief system, which left many  
true believers vacillating wildly between a faith that God‘s love would exalt  
them beyond all comprehension, and a fear that God‘s just anger at such  
presumptuous sinners would damn them beyond any redemption. (164) 
 
There is little hard evidence to support assertions as to what Shakespeare specifically 
believed, though he offered conspicuous evidence that he was interested in presenting 
eloquently considered views of the profound questions of his day through his art.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to illuminate a particular phenomenon which influences the 
perception of some of these questions.  It shows its features in, amongst other of his plays, 
Othello and Macbeth, centering upon themes such as the problem of perception, threats to an 
established order and some of the powerfully seductive influences that precipitate the fall of a 
 4 
tragic protagonist.  In the Elizabethan and the Jacobean age‘s microcosm of the stage, these 
plays reflect the catastrophic consequences of engendering the chaos of misguided personal 
will—not only upon the individual, but also upon his place and influence within the state. 
In choosing the title ―The Fascination of Evil,‖ I am attempting to arrange the 
discussion around those ―bewitching‖ elements of the dramatic scenarios that invite the 
characters to exchange their understanding of reality for a belief in appearances, initiating a 
causal train of events that enable chaotic elements to dominate thought.  In the challenges of 
knowing what is true, there seems to be a distinct phenomenon at work that is largely mental 
in its origin and operation and that has a binding power over the victim‘s will, which is all but 
unshakeable until his ruin has been effected.  The compounding tragedy of this influence is 
that the victims in these examples are people of great power and prestige: a noble Moor who 
is the Commander-in-Chief of the Venetian army and the son-in-law to a Senator, and a noble 
Thane of Scotland who is a hero of the realm and a possible successor to the throne.  When 
men of this level of greatness fall, they bring down whole governments with them.  They, like 
Shakespeare, Elizabeth I, and James I, live in volatile times; yet the playwright gives us more 
access to the causal phenomena than we might perceive in our everyday existence.  In the 
plays we see the heroes wrestle with the challenges of maintaining the lines of personal virtue 
against the assaults of vice and temptation.  This study is an examination of the mesmeric 
influence of those assaults from temptation, or the fascination of ―evil‖ possibilities presented 
to the tragic hero. 
The objective is not so much to adhere strictly to the forms of a given critical 
perspective, though by its nature this study is phenomenological in its essence, but instead to 
use points of view that create a kind of dialogue with the early modern beliefs and 
conventions examined herein.  The ongoing critical study of what Gail Kern Paster describes 
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as early modern ―psychophysiology‖ (Humoring the Body, 12) is still uncovering new 
elements of the mind / body concept of the period and its role in defining ―self‖ and 
awareness of ―inwardness.‖  In addition, authors such as Stuart Clark explore several aspects 
of early modern occult beliefs and the expanded understanding of this period resulting from a 
re-evaluation of their impact.  His comprehensive Thinking with Demons: The Idea of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe, presents the beliefs of witchcraft and demonology both 
as influences upon individuals and ―to make them more intelligible in themselves…to shed 
light on the larger intellectual histories to which they belonged" (ix).  Nathan Johnstone‘s 
recent book The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England offers some very valuable 
insights into Protestant concepts of personal conduct and the struggle with the phenomenon of 
inner temptations.  Here too, the discussion of forces of mental influence continues the critical 
dialogue of early modern forms of bewitchment.  These are but a few of the authors currently 
exploring notions of early modern inwardness and there are others who contribute to the 
development of the ideas that invite discussion about an issue such as fascination or mesmeric 
suggestion. 
This is currently a rich field in which to work, yet to my knowledge there is little work 
being done on the phenomenon of fascination, and nothing specifically applying it to 
Shakespearean drama.  Exploring the background for something like mental malpractice has 
been, to employ an appropriate synonym, ―overlooked‖ to a large extent.  In light of this fact, 
my attempt will be to examine the essence of the phenomenon both in the early modern 
concept and in its development beyond its classical associations with ―the evil eye.‖  The first 
section of the thesis will undertake this task while the second section focuses on the 
phenomenon‘s presence and influence within the causal events of Macbeth and Othello.  In 
citing texts, the main intent has been to find passages from original or facsimile editions of the 
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selected works.  With regard to biblical citations, the main source is the 1560 edition of the 
Geneva Bible which was popular enough to posit that Shakespeare may have formed some of 
his understanding of the bible from that version.  This is not to say that he turned exclusively 
to the Geneva for study; but as a source text, it provides excellent support for this thesis.  
With regard to citations from Shakespeare, the Oxford Complete Works: Original Spelling 
Edition is the main source.  An examination of various folio and quarto versions of Othello 
and Macbeth finds that for the purposes of this argument, the lines recorded in the Original 
Spelling edition provide both an inspiring source for general textual interpretation and an 
elegant visual consanguinity with texts from Shakespeare's era—especially the Geneva Bible.   
As editors Stanley Wells, Gary Taylor, John Jowett and William Montgomery assert: 
Shakespeare‘s power over generations later than his own has been transmitted in part 
by artists who have drawn on, interpreted, and restructured his texts as others have 
drawn on the myths of antiquity; but it is the texts as they were originally performed 
that are the sources of his power, and that we attempt here to present with as much 
fidelity to his intentions as the circumstances in which they have been preserved will 
allow. (xiii)  
 
  One problem to be surmounted in the first section involves the early modern 
scepticism of witchcraft‘s efficacy in the late sixteenth century.  For a phenomenon such as 
fascination—―bewitchment‖—to have an influence, it must by necessity have potency.  Yet 
witchcraft sceptics such as Reginald Scot largely denied the power of occult devices, and such 
scepticism has proven itself to be the fact as modern science has advanced.  From whence, 
then, did such bewitching phenomena obtain their power?  I propose to trace a causal line of 
―mind into matter‖ using Renaissance understandings of the mind / body relationship and 
sense theory, supported by a brief application of perception theory and susceptibility and 
suggestion theory. I shall present a representative model of an early-modern-style process 
whereby ―maleficium,‖ mentally entertained or directed, can produce an effect upon a 
material situation by its subsequent governance of human action. 
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The model should be useful as a tool in the analysis of the second section.  Though 
different groups during Shakespeare's day might have argued for agency in the application of 
the power of something like fascination, this study will concentrate mainly on the mechanics 
and context of the phenomenon.  Diabolical agency, revenge theory and other important 
elements within the examination of this period and of the culture, must be left to future 
writings in order to adhere to the spatial limitations governing this particular study.  The 
primary focus here is the illumination of the phenomenon and how it might have been 
perceived in a dramatic context. 
The aggressively mental elements of the attacks upon the tragic hero‘s psyche seem 
readily apparent to me in the selected dramas.  When examined in light of the early modern 
understanding of the phenomenon‘s operation and the additional weight of the cultural 
traditions surrounding demonology and Christian practice, a deeper understanding and a finer 
appreciation of the scope of Shakespeare‘s interrogations becomes very clear.  Shakespeare 
may or may not have intended it, but the power of his tragic constructs are made all the more 
devastating when the audience perceives that there is a possible and readily available means 
of  salvation at hand for the hero.  To watch as a great one falls because his thought is bound, 
fixed to an unshakeable and subtly introduced misperception or crafted ambiguity of truth is 
certainly a blatant overtone of Shakespearean tragedy, if it is not one of its central elements.   
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PART ONE 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
ORDER VS. CHAOS AND FASCINATION DEFINED 
 
 
 
Order vs. Chaos 
When Elizabeth Tudor ascended to the throne of England in 1558, she inherited a 
chaotic mix of religious upheaval, cultural transformations, and political uncertainty.  From 
the manuscripts and publications of the sixteenth century, it is apparent that, while the 
thinking of medieval moral treatises carried over into the Elizabethan period, writers and 
scientists like Niccolo Machiavelli and Copernicus added new dimension and alternatives to 
the accepted order.  Like the medieval period, the early modern period was very preoccupied 
with the tension between order and chaos. 
Chaos, in the Greek creation myths, was the primordial void from which the earth was 
formed and represented unrestricted potential and randomness—a lack of unity that 
surrounded everything in material creation: the earth, the seas and the heavens.  Before 
monotheism and its concept of the omnipresence of God, chaos was seen as a force that 
massed outside the created world ready to push through any available opening.  In a more 
figurative aspect, it coincided with daily human activity, entering in whenever reason and 
virtue lacked sufficient strength to keep it out.  In an early modern Christian context, it found 
agency in the idea of the Devil, where chaos was not a simple absence of God‘s presence—a 
vacuum with no influence—it was a counterforce to God‘s goodness, providing a foil to deific 
sovereignty and a cosmic tension in which man and Nature existed. 
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In Arthur Golding‘s 1567 translation of the Metamorphoses, Ovid describes the 
disordered mass out of which the ―Creator‖ was later to separate land, sky and sea: 
Before the Sea and Land were made, and Heaven that all doth hide, 
In all the worlde one onely face of nature did abide, 
Which Chaos hight, a huge rude heape, and nothing else but even 
A heavie lump and clottred clod of seedes togither driven 
Of things at strife among themselves for want of order due. 
 
No kinde of thing had proper shape, but ech confounded other. 
For in one self same bodie strove the hote and colde togither, 
The moyst with drie, the soft with hard, the light with things of weight. 
This strife did God and Nature breake, and set in order streight. 
The earth from heaven, the sea from earth he parted orderly, 
And from the thicke and foggie ayre, he tooke the lightsome skie, 
Which when he once unfolded had, and severed from the blinde 
And clodded heape, He setting ech from other did them binde 
In endlesse freendship too agree. (21)   
 
Many of the dominant philosophical and religious postulates of the Elizabethan age 
were drawn from ancient Greek and Roman philosophers and from the collection of Jewish 
and Christian writings gathered in the Bible.  The core beliefs of the Protestant English church 
included the idea that man and the animal kingdom existed in an environment called Nature, 
which was a direct result of a divine creation event.  John (Jean) Calvin introduces a 
conveniently apt metaphor when he describes the biblical Creation in his 1559 Institutes of the 
Christian Religion: 
Meanwhile, being placed in this most beautiful theatre, let us not decline to 
take a pious delight in the clear and manifest works of God.  For, as we have 
elsewhere observed, though not the chief, it is, in point of order, the first evidence of 
faith, to remember to which side soever we turn, that all which meets the eye is the 
work of God, and at the same time to meditate with pious care on the end which God 
had in view in creating it. 
…God, by the power of his Word and his Spirit, created the heavens and the 
earth out of nothing; that thereafter he produced things inanimate and animate of every 
kind, arranging an innumerable variety of objects in admirable order, giving each kind 
its proper nature, office, place, and station; at the same time, as all things were liable 
to corruption, providing for the perpetuation of each single species… (156)   
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In the ancient pagan model this creation event was generated out of a state of chaos 
(which, interestingly, had primacy) through an act of divine will.  The world appeared as an 
ordered whole, as the Metamorphoses goes on to describe it: 
Now when he in this foresaid wise (what God so ere he was) 
Had broke and into members put this rude confused masse: 
Then first bicause in every part, the earth should equall bee, 
He made it like a mighty ball, in compasse as we see. (21)  (I, 33-36) 
 
In the sixteenth century, England was wracked with dissent and turmoil, a legacy of 
the impact of the Reformation.  The stability and prosperity of English society relied heavily 
upon the population‘s adherence to the order of the established social hierarchy, the laws of 
the land, the laws of God (as interpreted by the Church of England), and the recognition that 
this order (from the Creation event to the present era) was supported by divine right.  
However, the upheavals that preceded Elizabeth‘s succession made it difficult to maintain a 
national harmony and hegemony.  In ―Religion and Shakespearean Tragedy,‖ Huston Diehl 
lists some of the challenges that English society faced in the following passage: 
Although the doctrinal controversies debated by theologians, the biblical scholarship 
produced by reform-minded humanists, and the political struggles waged between the 
English monarchs and the Pope were far removed from most people‘s daily lives, the 
Reformation profoundly altered the English people‘s devotional and ritual practices, 
putting an end to Roman Catholic traditions that had endured for more than a thousand 
years.  It changed how they worshipped their God, how they confessed their sins, how 
they buried their dead, how they celebrated their holy days (holidays), how they 
practised charity, how they constructed their relationships to their families and 
communities, how they organized their days and ritual year, how they viewed the 
physical world, and how they understood their place in the cosmos. (87)  
 
In 1559, Elizabeth signed the Act of Uniformity and also published the first of a series 
of ―Injunctions‖ to encourage both uniformity and conformity to her own personal brand of 
order. Elizabeth was right to be concerned about the volatile state of her nation and the 
uncertain state of her sovereignty.  According to the Papal Bull issued in 1570, she was not 
only formally excommunicated from the Catholic Church, but as Kate Aughterson records the 
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documentation from the Holy See in The English Renaissance, she was declared ―a heretic 
and favourer of heretics" (37).  In seeking to exert its authority in the religious and political 
power struggles of sixteenth-century Europe, the Vatican went even further in the following 
denunciations of Elizabeth: 
4. And moreover [we declare] her to be deprived of her pretended title to the aforesaid 
crown and of all lordship, dignity and privilege whatsoever. 
5. And also [declare] the nobles, subjects and people of the said realm, and all others  
who have in any way sworn oaths to her, to be forever absolved from such an oath and 
from any duty arising from lordship, fealty and obedience; and we do, by authority of 
these presents, so absolve them and so deprive the same Elizabeth of her pretended 
title to the crown and all other the abovesaid matters. (qtd. in Aughterson, 37) 
 
In spite of the tribulations and difficulties, however, her reign was spectacularly successful in 
most respects and she put her stamp on an age that saw the blossoming of a national poetic art 
form in one of the most remarkable and fertile periods in human history. 
Elizabeth‘s Injunctions Given by the Queen’s Majesty (1559) were an attempt to bind 
her subjects to a paradigm that was at once traditionally Christian, but also reconstituted in the 
newly Protestant forms.  With Anglican Christianity at its center, English society was tethered 
and accountable to the moral code of the Bible—as interpreted by the Church of England.  Of 
particular note in the Injunctions are: 
 Item, that no man shall wilfully and obstinately defend or maintain any 
heresies, errors, or false doctrine contrary to the faith of Christ and his Holy Scripture. 
Item, that no person shall use charms, sorceries, enchantments, witchcraft, 
soothsaying, or any such like devilish device, nor shall resort at any time to the same 
for counsel or help… 
Item, that no man shall talk or reason of the holy scriptures rashly or 
contentiously, or maintain any false doctrine or error, but shall commune of the same 
when occasion is given reverently, humbly and in the fear of God, for his comfort and 
better understanding. (qtd. in Aughterson 5)  
 
This new order from Elizabeth placed an onus on English subjects that was essentially the 
same onus placed upon the adherents of St. Paul‘s early church establishments: to 
demonstrate reason over passion, knowledge over supposition, and righteousness over 
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iniquity.  These admonitions echoed the mission of Paul as Elizabeth advanced her cause to 
maintain the faith of a predecessor, her father, during a time when adherents to the new 
church were faced with manifold temptations either to return to the old ways, or to abandon 
them entirely to follow the ways of the flesh. 
The second item in this passage from the Injunctions brings to light an interesting 
phenomenon of early modern society: the perception that there existed ―devilish devices‖ that 
could be resorted to for ―counsel or help.‖  This indicated, perhaps, that there were still 
apparent difficulties in marshalling individuals to follow the admonitions of basic Christian 
doctrine: to rely on divine guidance rather than personal will and occult practices.  The 
society over which Elizabeth began her reign must have resembled, in some respects, that 
primordial chaos out of which she was impelled to create, or rather maintain, a cohesive 
kingdom bound, as Ovid would say, ―In endlesse freendship to agree" (21).  Her methods 
attempted sweeping and pervasive control as Kate Aughterson notes in her introduction to The 
English Renaissance: 
This document is a comprehensive and fascinating social and political text: in a short 
space it encompasses, delineates and sets up ways of controlling all social, religious, 
political, intellectual and educational life…The Injunctions are therefore one of the 
most central texts of the period: marking, as they do, the birth of the modern 
State…(1)   
 
If ―devices‖ such as witchcraft and sorcery were deemed seditious and unrighteous in 
Elizabeth's Christian state (enough of a threat to warrant a royal injunction), and if such 
phenomena truly possessed a power that could, say, render monarchs, peers and knights 
helpless and subservient to an agency that could use their bodies, minds or offices to serve the 
cause of iniquity, it would be a force to be feared as much as high treason or a direct invasion.  
 Certain elements of the new church, such as the Puritans, were vehemently opposed to 
anything that would operate in violation of scriptural authority.  The absolute centrism of 
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scriptural authority to the Puritan ethic (as well as to Anglican Conformism) helped to 
reinforce a marked intolerance towards the support of superstitious practices amongst those 
who embraced them yet still considered themselves ―faithful.‖  Under a general movement 
towards an orthodoxy that worked to separate itself from Catholic doctrine, there was special 
emphasis placed not only upon the Mosaic Law and the Gospels, but upon the Pauline 
writings as well.  John S. Coolidge notes, in The Pauline Renaissance in England that, 
―conversion to faith in Christ takes the form of the reapprehension of the scriptures in their 
vital Pauline unity" (143), but that sometimes the resultant understanding of faith ―is bound 
up with scripture in a way that Paul himself could never have foreseen, even though it evolves 
out of his work" (143).   
 Though the Puritans were more extreme in their practices than the general populace, it 
is safe to say that the exempla of Paul, especially that which is found in his Epistle to the 
Romans, formed a fundamental platform of the evolving sense of morality.  Wulfert de Greef 
claims, in ―Calvin‘s Writings,‖ that ―the Pauline model remains an important principle for the 
way in which Calvin orders his material" (44).  As such, those seeking a higher sense of 
order—or a more prominent status within the moral dialogues—in Elizabethan society did not 
need to go much further than the books of the Bible for their justifications in teaching, 
preaching and legislating against what were considered to be chaos-inducing magical or 
superstitious practices. 
Occult practice seems to be a widespread, yet misunderstood element of early modern 
society.  Books, sermons, pamphlets and plays described the different classifications of these 
practices, which were categorized anywhere from ―natural philosophy‖ to ―witchcraft.‖  
Though many of the practices might be familiar by name to individuals in the Renaissance, 
few could speak with expertise as to how they operated.  Perhaps this was due largely to the 
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fact that occult practices, which departed from what we now recognize as scientific processes, 
did not actually work.  Or if they seemed to have an effect, it was due more to misplaced 
belief, the operations of outright fraud, or other more psychological causes.  These 
psychological effects, what an early modern thinker might term ―imaginings,‖ are of special 
interest to a study of mental phenomena that were anciently believed to captivate a person‘s 
will, or do damage to his property and person.  Outside of the spells, incantations and charms 
of ―orthodox‖ witchcraft there existed under the names of ―bewitchment‖ and ―fascination,‖ a 
type of purely mental malpractice.  Though bewitchment signified a variety of superstitious 
elements and magical practices, fascination described a largely mental and mesmeric 
influence against another person or their property.  In 1584, John Veron‘s Dictionary in Latin 
and English glossed the term ―fascinatum‖ as: ―to bewitch.‖  At that time the two terms were 
virtually synonymous, though fascination was more commonly a word that had associations 
with the ancient superstition of the ―evil eye,‖ and hence implied a more non-corporeal type 
of malicious subversion than the more tangible or material concepts of bewitchment.  Even 
today, the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary shows the synonymy of the two 
terms while detailing the aggressive mental nature of fascination‘s perceived power: 
bewitch 
 
1. trans. To affect (generally injuriously) by witchcraft or magic.  Sometimes with  
complemental phrase defining the result. 
2. fig. To influence in a way similar to witchcraft; to fascinate, charm, enchant.   
Formerly often in a bad sense; but now generally said of pleasing influences. 
 
bewitchment 
 
1.  The fact or power of bewitching; ‗fascination, power of charming.‘ J. 
 
bewitched, ppl. a. 
 
1.  Influenced by witchcraft; under, or having, magical influence. 
2.  fig. Under a fascination; fascinated. 
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fascinate, v. 
 
1.  trans. To affect by witchcraft or magic; to bewitch, enchant, lay under a spell. Obs. 
2.  a. To cast a spell over (a person, animal, etc.) by a look; said esp. of serpents.  b. In 
later use disconnected from the notion of witchcraft: To deprive of the power of 
escape or resistance, as serpents are said to do through the terror produced by their 
look or merely by their perceived presence. 
3.  fig. a. To enslave (the faculties), the judgment of (a person) (obs.).  b. To attract 
and retain the attention of (a person) by an irresistible influence. 
 
Whatever terminology might be used, the ―fascination,‖ or binding power of evil was 
thought to be one of the most ―devilish devices‖ that might assail the true English Christian.  
As will be shown later, the belief in the power of evil influence predated and postdated 
Shakespeare‘s society.  Although the method of its operation may not have been clearly 
understood in the early modern period, what was of great concern was the malice intended 
towards the victim and any subsequent damaging effects. 
In the late Elizabethan/early Jacobean period a shift in the definitions of fascination 
began to take place.  While Shakespeare was alive, the understanding of the term generally 
remained in the realm of magic and mysterious occult phenomena, but it gradually came to be 
known as a completely mental action of the senses and the imagination.  Contemporary 
scepticism began to doubt any material causation within the phenomenon, yet it acknowleged 
some physical effects.  Once the material cause began to be discounted, a newer focus on the 
belief in the malignant power of evil forces gave fascination its only influence, as it seemed to 
have little intrinsic force outside of belief.  Yet tangible effects resulted from mere belief, and 
from enthralled perception.  Descartes‘s famous ―cogito ergo sum‖ might be extended to 
include the idea that if thinking is a signifier of existence, then it is possible to consider that 
thoughts connote the separate ―realities‖ of human experience.   
Perception, while it might not obtain primacy in Cartesian existentialism, is 
fundamental to the concept of personal identity and the individual‘s relationship to his world.  
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Any phenomenon or event, until it is seen in its true light—seen for what it actually is, rather 
than what it is believed to be—can appear distorted in the experience of the perceiver and 
thereby distort the sense of identity, or ―self.‖  A fixation upon an illusory context, a 
suggested reality artificially imposed upon the perceptive faculties, subsequently changes the 
individual‘s relationship to his world.  The less harmful effects of some of these distortions 
can provide plots for the laughing comedies of the public theatres.  The larger, more 
devastating consequences of misperception provide the foundations of tragedy.  
Fascination as a specific term appears in various court documents, religious treatises 
and notably in Sir Francis Bacon‘s Advancement of Learning.  It is also found in Veron‘s 
Dictionary of Latin and English, Reginald Scot‘s Discoverie of Witchcraft, Ben Jonson‘s 
Every Man in His Humour, continuing a discussion of the phenomenon that has apparently 
been a part of the human belief system throughout the ages.  St. Paul uses the Greek verb for 
bewitchment, baskaino, in his letter to the churches of Galatia.  Baskaino also denotes the 
specific phenomenon recognized as ―the evil eye.‖  In the Geneva Bible, Paul asks the 
following question: 
O Foolish Galatia[n]s, who hathe bewitched you that ye shulde not obey the trueth,  
to whome Iesus Christ before was described in your sight, & among you crucified? 
(Gal. 3:1) 
 
In the Vulgate Bible, the phrasing is as follows—translating the Greek verb into the Latin 
"fascinavit:"  ―O insensati Galatae, quis uos fascinauit, ante quorum oculos Iesus Christus 
praescriptus est, crucifixus?" (Gal. 3:1).   
Frederick Elworthy, in The Evil Eye, regards the use of this word as pointed and 
intentional when he considers Paul‘s specific choice of terms: 
The imputation by St. Paul, that the foolish Galatians had been spellbound, meant that 
some evil eye had ―overlooked‖ them and worked in them a blighting influence.  It 
was an apt allusion to the then, and still, universally prevalent belief in that power of 
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―dread fascination‖ which the writer of the Epistle so well knew they would 
comprehend, and he therefore used it as a striking metaphor. (5)   
 
This view is supported with colloquial flair by The Interpreter’s Bible as it explains: 
In the papyri the verb έβάσκαυευ, ―slander,‖ ―envy,‖ ―bewitch,‖ is employed in 
manipulating charms against ―the evil eye.‖  Paul uses it figuratively, meaning 
―pervert,‖ ―confuse,‖ ―lead astray,‖ as if man‘s perennial quest for cheap and easy 
salvation were not sufficient to victimize the Galatians without the aid of a Pied Piper 
of Hamelin! (vol. 10, 496) 
 
To break the enchantment of the Galatians, Paul reminded them of God‘s way of 
bestowing his Spirit, and of their own deep joy when they first heard the gospel… 
Paul‘s gospel still makes sense.  The central matter is not the attainment of a catalogue 
of virtues or skills.  The question of destiny is: To whom am I attached?  Beyond all 
else, a man‘s attitude toward the Cross answers that question.  Men‘s eyes are 
bewitched when they are removed from that center.  The Cross is therefore the point 
of spiritual and social hope. (vol. 10, 497)   
 
Paul emphasizes this last point in chapter three, verse three when he asks, in this passage from 
the Bishop Bible (1595): ―Are ye such fooles, that after yee haue begun in the spirit, yee 
would nowe ende in the flesh?" (Gal. 3:3).  
 Fascinating powers are seen by Paul to have the capacity to undermine the individual 
and the state by diverting thought from the operation of reason and judgment and by 
permitting thought and action to be driven by destructive passions and propensities.  These 
seductive influences are at odds with, as Calvin says, the ―work of God, and … the end which 
God had in view in creating it" (156).  In a further observation on the Pauline epistle, J. Louis 
Martyn describes a motive behind Paul‘s choice of terms.  In doing so, Martyn touches one of 
the main points of concern for Elizabeth‘s authority—the leading of a people astray from 
organized (and state controlled) religion, to unregulated superstition.  In his commentary on 
the Galatian epistle in The Anchor Bible, Martyn asserts that Paul, 
 
…believes that in order fully to identify the [Galatian] Teachers‘ seductive wiles he 
must reach into the vocabulary of magic, for these people are not only frightening the 
Galatians; they are also leading them astray by casting a spell over them.  Given the 
Gentile aversion to circumcision, the Teachers must indeed have been virtual 
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magicians to have made the Galatians long to come under the Law.  With his 
rhetorical question Paul thus suggests that by listening appreciatively to the Teachers‘ 
gospel, the Galatians are in fact leaving the realm of faith for that of superstition. (282-
283)   
 
In Elizabethan England, the church manifested a very strong desire to keep religion at 
the center of the affections—especially during the emergence of a new secular performance 
aesthetic which itself had enormous power to shape the perceptions of the culture.  In 
Anthony Munday‘s Retrait from Plaies (1580), the fascinating power of the public theatre and 
its poets and players is decried, attesting to the profound potential of its influence: 
Manie haue ben intangled with the webs of these Spiders, who would gladlie haue 
bene at libertie when they could not.  The webs are so subtillie spun, that there is no 
man that is once within them, that can auoide them without danger.  None can come 
within those snares that maie escape vntaken, be she maide, matrone, or whatsoeuer; 
such force haue their inchantements of pleasure to drawe the affections of the mind. 
(96-97) 
  
While Elizabeth and her government pursued censorial control over the theatres to hedge their 
influence, she simultaneously employed the nascent magic of theatre to enhance the authority 
and eminence of her administration.  Stephen Greenblatt elaborates on Elizabeth‘s 
understanding of the usefulness of the fascinating elements of monarchial theatrics in 
Shakespearean Negotiations by noting that Elizabeth was, 
…a ruler without a standing army, without a highly developed bureaucracy, without 
an extensive police force, a ruler whose power is constituted in theatrical celebrations 
of royal glory and theatrical violence visited upon the enemies of that glory… 
Elizabethan power,…depends upon its privileged visibility.  As in a theater, the 
audience must be powerfully engaged by this visible presence and at the same time 
held at a respectful distance from it.  ―We princes,‖ Elizabeth told a deputation of 
Lords and Commons in 1586, ―are set on stages in the sight and view of all the world.‖ 
(64)  (Greenblatt cites Elizabeth from J.E. Neale‘s Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 
1584-1601.  2 vols. (London: Cape, 1965), 2: 119.) 
 
Fascination is only a useful tool when it becomes a powerful state of thought.  The 
enthralling qualities, the ―inchantements of pleasure to drawe the affections of the mind" 
(Retrait from Plaies 97), that fix the individual‘s thought upon certain objects or endeavors 
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are not good or evil in themselves; they are merely the phenomena of a powerfully binding 
influence. For example, something like glue is, in itself, not an evil nor a good substance; it is 
a fixative that performs the function of adhesion.  Positive or negative associations and 
perceptions stem more from the intent and results of the application of that adhesion.  In 
serving causes like Elizabeth‘s majesty and political security, a benign intent behind the 
fascinating influence can be a decided asset, but the danger of fascinating bewitchment lies in 
its use as an aggressive, ―devilish device‖ in an attempt to fix thought upon counterfeits of 
truth.  St. Paul points out, in the 1560 version of the Geneva Bible, how constant the struggle 
with sinful suggestion and temptation can be in the Epistle to the Church at Rome: 
For I knowe, that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to wil is present 
with me: but I finde no meanes to performe that which is good. 
 
For I do not the good thing, which I wolde, (n) but the euil, which I wolde not, that do I.  
          (Rom. 7:18,19) 
 
 The marginal note in the above passage, ―n,‖ adds: ―The flesh stayeth euen ye moste 
perfect to runne forwarde as the spirit wisheth.‖  Also in Romans is found Paul‘s warning 
against false teachers, like those in Galatia, who for various personal reasons are liable to lead 
the faithful away from righteousness: 
Now I beseech you brethren, marke them diligently which cause diuision and offences, 
contrarie to the doctrine which ye haue learned, and auoide them. 
 
For they that are suche, serue not the Lord Iesus Christ, but their owne (d) bellies, and 
with (e) faire speache & flattering deceiue the hearts of the simple. 
 
For your obedie[n]ce is come abrode amo[n]g all: I am glad therefore of you: but yet I 
wolde haue you wise, vnto that which is good, and simple concerning euil.   
          (Rom. 16: 17-19) 
  
The marginal notes again further the illumination of the text by observing: 
 
 (d) These be markes to knowe the false Apostles by. 
(e) The worde signifieth him that promiseth muche & performeth nothing, who seemeth 
also to speake for thy profite, but doeth nothing lesse.  (Ibid.) 
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Shakespeare provides Elizabethan and Jacobean drama with examples of just this kind of 
struggle.  The daily effort to choose the good and avoid the evil is made that much harder 
when an individual‘s reasoning faculties and sense of piety or honor are conspired against by 
forces that would ―bewitch…that ye shulde not obey the trueth‖ (Gal. 3:1). 
 In the time of Elizabeth it might be argued that the struggle for righteousness was no 
less difficult than it was in Paul‘s era.  In an age where science and philosophy were steadily 
eradicating long-held misconceptions about man and the universe, the dramatic poets of the 
English stage were taking up contemporary issues in a decidedly captivating secular style in 
London‘s professional theatres.  Here moral questions and aspects of order, chaos, evil and 
virtue could be viscerally represented and considered in a manner more compelling, perhaps, 
than pulpit or pamphlet.  The physical representation and exploration of the consequences of 
defying order—of indulging "sinful" behaviors, treason, insurrection, seduction—were all 
graphically imprinted on the imaginations of the theatre goers, for good or ill.  In Elizabeth‘s 
situation, it was prudent to assert control over the emerging English drama, because it had the 
potential to be a popular and motivating influence.  From the point of view of any 
government, seductive forces, controlling forces that could possibly lead to sedition and 
insurrection, would demand close supervision to neutralize any potential threat. 
 A state-controlled theatre, essentially bound to an Anglican ethic, would necessarily, 
as Greenblatt says, enter into complex negotiations within its society in the course of doing 
business: 
Artists in a time of censorship and repression had ample reason to claim that they had 
taken nothing from the world they represented, that they had never dreamed of 
violating the distance demanded by their superiors, that their representations only 
reflected faithfully the world‘s own form…In some exchanges the object or practice 
mimed onstage seems relatively untouched by the representation; in others, the object 
or practice is intensified,…The mistake is to imagine that there is a single, fixed, mode 
of exchange; in reality, there are many modes, their character is determined 
historically, and they are continually renegotiated. (8) 
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One of the interesting negotiations observed in this study is Shakespeare‘s representation of 
corruption and self-justification expressed in the tragedies, and viewed through the influence 
of aggressive mental suggestion.  Though he worked within a censorial policy that was strict 
in its exclusions, there seemed to be room to write on a variety of levels.  Greenblatt remarks 
further on the privileges of the early modern playhouse, in which 
…virtually everything represented on the stage was at least potentially dangerous and 
hence could be scrutinized and censored.  The Elizabethan theater could, within limits, 
represent the sacred as well as the profane, contemporary as well as ancient times, 
stories set in England as well as those set in distant lands.  Allusions to the reigning 
monarch, and even to highly controversial issues in the reign, were not necessarily 
forbidden (though the company had to tread cautiously);…The theater is marked off 
from the ―outside world‖ and licensed to operate as a distinct domain, but its 
boundaries are remarkably permeable. (19) 
 
Shakespeare took advantage of this privileged ―license,‖ and avoiding the prison terms 
and punishments that some of his fellow poets suffered, managed to present consistently 
dramatic arguments that were both emotionally moving and acceptable to the established 
authority, yet in many ways were permeated with ambiguously intriguing elements.  In the 
tragedies selected for this study, one particular type of subversive influence will be examined: 
mental malpractice through the fascination of aggressive and malicious suggestion.  The 
overall intent of the investigation is to pursue the essence of the Pauline question: who has 
bewitched you that you should not obey the truth? 
 Othello and Macbeth show us that truth is a difficult thing to perceive fully.  These 
plays show the elusive nature of the pursuit—encumbered by the convictions and fixations of 
each tragic hero.  Their understanding of reality depends heavily upon their perception of 
events and their subsequent interpretation, balanced against what they think they already 
know and what they are being led to believe.  Hamlet's remark to Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so," (7.1180-81) 
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highlights the difficulty of discerning the meaning of an event because a shift in perception 
can change the evaluation of the significance of that event.  It also serves as a reminder that 
despite the best efforts of some writers to frame issues in black/white and good/evil 
dichotomies, much of what we know of the early modern period benefits from the evolution 
of thought on certain events and contemporary theories.  In pursuing this topic, I do not 
propose to offer the definitive interpretation of the phenomenon of fascination, but rather to 
identify it as a belief of Shakespeare's era and to examine its presence as one of the many 
themes in both Macbeth and Othello. 
In support of that intent, the structure of this study will begin by exploring what 
―fascination‖ might have meant to Shakespeare‘s contemporaries and some of the beliefs 
attendant upon it.  Though the phenomenon was deemed an offence serious enough to bring 
an alleged practitioner of it to trial, early modern scepticism towards it cast some doubt as to 
how it was able to achieve its perceived effects.  By illustrating some contemporary 
understandings of psychophysiology, I shall offer a theoretical mechanical model of how an 
aggressive mental suggestion might translate into a physical manifestation.  The phenomenon 
also invites further exploration once it is realized that bewitchment/fascination is the 
progenitor of the later concepts of mesmerism and hypnotism.  To that end, it seems 
reasonable to briefly explore correlative ideas from the phenomenology of perception theory 
and suggestion theory.  While these may be more modern developments, they do in fact shed 
light on the body of related concepts of fascination entertained in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. 
 The scientific schematic does not provide the complete picture, however, and the 
cultural elements and influences of early modern demonology must be considered as well.  
The devil and his agents were not only major players in the cultural pageant of early modern 
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England, they were popular characters upon the professional stages.  The link between 
demonology and fascination was the basis of societal and legal measures taken to ward off 
perceived chaotic incursions into the established order, and it provides a convenient segue to 
the interpretive analyses of the selected Shakespearean tragedies discussed in section two.  In 
this section the aesthetic manifestations of the phenomenon will be delineated and discussed 
from textual evidence in the plays, and in some cases it will examine possible effects that the 
staging of certain scenes might produce.  
 
Fascination Defined 
 
The term ―fascination,‖ in today‘s definition, is a much milder word than it was in 
Shakespeare‘s time.  We use this term with frequency, usually employing it to describe a state 
of high interest or intrigue.  Similarly, words like ―bewitching,‖ ―captivating,‖ and 
―enthralling,‖ have taken on this connotation of ―intense interest,‖ and lost some of the weight 
of their old properties of ―spellbinding,‖ ―taking captive,‖ and ―enslaving.‖  These terms 
suggested much darker meanings for the Elizabethans.  While fascination in itself was not a 
methodological genre of witchcraft, as demon summoning, divination and spell casting were 
believed to be, it was grouped within this domain because it was largely seen to be occult, 
inexplicable and fearsome.  Until it was conceived to be a purely mental phenomenon in the 
realm of mesmerism and suggestive influences upon the imagination, it was closely associated 
with the superstition of the ―evil eye,‖ or the state of being ―overlooked.‖  In sixteenth-
century England, ―fascination‖ was not a term that was as widely employed as 
―bewitchment,‖ but as an illustration of a focused kind of mental ―magic‖ it was a more 
specific descriptive term.  Bewitchment could include material elements in its processes—
potions, poisons or sympathetic magical items.  Fascination almost always implied a mentally 
or ―spiritually‖ produced form of influence.  The power of fascination was not the exclusive 
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art of witches, devils and demons; however, those who encountered it usually did so via an 
event or a person that evoked some sort of connection with otherworldly forces. 
Recalling one of the supporting items in the OED definition focuses attention not so 
much on agency, but upon the effect of fascination: 
 
2.a. To cast a spell over (a person, animal, etc.) by a look; said esp. of serpents.  b. In 
later use disconnected from the notion of witchcraft: To deprive of the power of 
escape or resistance, as serpents are said to do through the terror produced by their 
look or merely by their perceived presence.  3.a. To enslave (the faculties), the 
judgment of (a person) (obs.). b. To attract and retain the attention of (a person) by an 
irresistible influence. (741) 
 
This concept of enthrallment seems to be at the center of early attempts to define the source of 
its power.  In the eighteenth century, Dr. Samuel Johnson described the attributes of the 
phenomenon in his 1755 A Dictionary of the English Language as follows: 
 
To FASCINATE. v.a. [fascino, Latin.]  To bewitch; to enchant; to influence in  
some wicked and secret manner. 
There be none of the affections which have been noted to fascinate or 
bewitch, but love and envy.  Bacon, Essay 9. 
 Such a fascinating sin this is, as allows men no liberty of consideration. 
       Decay of Piety. 
 
FASCINATION.  n.s.  [from fascinate.]  The power or act of bewitching;  
enchantment; unseen inexplicable influence. 
He had such a crafty and bewitching fashion, both to move pity and to 
induce belief, as was like a kind of fascination and enchantment to those that 
saw him or heard him. Bacon. 
The Turks hang old rags, or such like ugly things, upon their fairest 
horses, and other goodly creatures, to secure them against fascination. 
      Waller. 
There is a certain bewitchery or fascination in words, which makes 
them operate with a force beyond what we can naturally give an account of.
      South’s Sermons. 
 
Johnson‘s use of the citation from Bacon‘s ―Essay 9‖ –―On Envy‖—is interesting as a 
generalization for how fascination might operate as a phenomenon in drama: love within the 
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comedies and envy within the tragedies.  As a passion, envy can be one of the most relentless 
and captivating of masters.  It very often ―allows men no liberty of consideration.‖  In Sir 
Francis Bacon‘s treatise, a definite relationship is presented between the ―affection‖ of envy 
and fascination‘s association with the evil eye.  Bacon even includes a partial model of the 
way in which early modern thought conceived the operation of the phenomenon: 
There be none of the Affections, which have beene noted to fascinate, or bewitch, but 
Love, and Envy.  They both have vehement wishes; They frame themselves readily 
into Imaginations, and Suggestions; And they come easily into the Eye; especially 
upon the presence of the Objects; which are the Points, that conduce to Fascination, if 
any such Thing there be.  We see likewise, the Scripture calleth Envy, An Evill Eye: 
…So that still, there seemeth to be acknowledged, in the Act of Envy, an Ejaculation, 
or Irradiation of the Eye.  Nay some have beene so curious, as to note, that the Times, 
when the Stroke, or Percussion of an Envious Eye doth most hurt, are, when the Party 
envied is beheld in Glory, or Triumph; For that sets an Edge upon Envy; And besides, 
at such times, the Spirits of the person Envied, doe come forth, most into the outward 
Parts, and so meet the Blow. (27)   
 
The operative elements described above, in Bacon‘s opinion, work upon the more extreme 
edges of natural philosophy so that they might be considered occult phenomena: ―…As we 
said in the beginning, that the Act of Envy, had somewhat in it, of Witchcraft; so there is no 
other Cure of Envy, but the cure of Witchcraft:…" (32).  
 Johnson‘s second quote from Bacon, ―He had such crafty and bewitching fashion, 
both to move pity and to induce belief, as was like a kind of fascination and enchantment to 
those that saw him or heard him‖ could be an accurate summation of a character such as Iago.  
His success in using others stems somewhat from an ability ―to attract and retain the attention 
of a person by an irresistible influence (OED, 741).‖  The sheer audacity of his scheme and its 
execution can, in Bacon‘s estimation, generate a fascinating power upon an unsuspecting 
mind.  Bacon states, in another essay—―Of Boldnesse‖—that: 
 
There is in Humane Nature, generally, more of the Foole, then of the Wise; And 
therfore those faculties, by which the Foolish part of Mens Mindes is taken, are most 
potent…Boldnesse is a Childe of Ignorance, and Basenesse, farre inferiour to other 
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Parts.  But neverthelesse, it doth fascinate, and binde hand and foot, those, that are 
either shallow in Judgment; or weake in Courage, which are the greatest Part; Yea and 
prevailith with wise men, at weake times. (37)   
 
Using no potions or poisons (other than bewitching words and suggestions), Iago shows the 
audience, as Johnson cites from South’s Sermons, that ―There is a certain bewitchery or 
fascination in words, which makes them operate with a force beyond what we can naturally 
give an account of.‖  Bacon goes into greater detail when he specifically analyses the 
phenomenon in his 1605 The Advancement of Learning:  
 
 Fascination is the power and act of Imagination, intensiue vpon other bodies, 
than the bodie of the Imaginant; for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the 
Schoole of Paracelsus, and the Disciples of pretended Naturall Magicke, haue beene 
so intemperate, as they haue exalted the power of the imagination, to be much one 
with the power of Miracle-working faith: others that drawe neerer to Probabilitie, 
calling to their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the Contagion that 
passeth from bodie to bodie, doe conceiue it should likewise be agreeable to Nature, 
that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without 
the mediation of the sences, whence the conceits haue growne, (now almost made 
ciuile) of the Maistring Spirite, & the force of confidence, and the like.  Incident vnto 
this, is the inquirie how to raise and fortifie the imagination, for if the Imagination 
fortified haue power, then it is materiall to know how to fortifie and exalt it.  And 
herein comes in crookedly and dangerously, a palliation of a great part of Ceremoniall 
Magicke.  For it may bee pretended, that Ceremonies, Characters, and Charmes doe 
worke, not by any Tacite or Sacramentall contract with euill spirits; but serue onely to 
strengthen the imagination of him that vseth it; as Images are said by the Romane 
Church, to fix the cogitations, and raise the deuotions of them that pray before them.  
But for mine owne iudgement, if it be admitted that Imagination hath power; and that 
Ceremonies fortifie Imagination, & that they be vsed sincerely & intentionally for that 
purpose: yet I should hold them vnlawfull, as opposing to that first edict, which God 
gaue vnto man.  In sudore vultus comedes Panem tuum.  For they propound those 
noble effects which God hath set foorth vnto man, to bee bought at the price of 
Laboure, to bee attained by a fewe easie and slothful obseruances.  Deficiences in 
these knowledges, I wil report none, other than the generall deficience, that it is not 
knowne, how much of them is veritie, and how much vanitie. (105)   
 
In this brief passage Bacon attributes fascination‘s power to its effect on the imaginative 
faculties.  Though he is sceptical of magic, he cites the notion that this kind of phenomenon 
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might operate ―from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the sences;‖ however, he offers 
no further conjectures as to how that might be done through the imagination. 
In a work preceding The Advancement of Learning by nearly thirty years, John 
Veron‘s 1584 A Dictionary in Latin and English, defines the term ―fascinatum‖ as a verb: ―to 
bewitch.‖  A related word close by ―fascinatum,‖ on the same page, is the verb ―fasciatum‖—
―to swaddle, to tye, or bind with bandes.‖  This is the Latin root of the modern words 
―fascism‖ and ―fascist.‖  Later dictionaries, such as the Bullokar (1616), Cawdrey (1617), and 
Blount (1656) all define the term ―fascinate‖ as: "to bewitch."  
Andrew Hyperius offers another description of the contemporary understanding of the 
phenomenon in his 1581 Two Commonplaces.  His discussion suggests that the devil and his 
associates were ultimately behind these kinds of influences: 
Furthermore, bewitchinges, and iuglinges with the Hebrues, called Chaschias, in latine 
called Fuscinatores, & Praestigatores (which words are Exod. 7. Miche. 5. And Galat. 
3) are understanded, by the consente of all Interpreters, to be done when the sences of 
men are so hurte and illuded, that they all think, that certain unwonted thinges are 
broughte to passes, or els naturall thinges are chaunged.  And therefore with the 
wordes of bewitchinge or iuglinge, properlie is noted the formall cause, and the 
meane, whereby the deuill will satisfie the desires of men: or els, when as otherwise he 
is a lyar, and a deceauer, hee fayneth at the least wise, that he doth satisfie. (f2) (83) 
  
 Ben Jonson shows the humorous side of using fascination‘s perceived effects to shift 
the blame for insalubrious behavior in Every Man in His Humour.  Captain Bobadill, the 
essence of the stock character of the Braggart Soldier, justifies his cowardice and 
incompetence with: ―…I was fascinated, by Jupiter: fascinated: but I will be unwitched, and 
revenged, by law" (4.9.14-15).  Here he hides behind a power believed to be able to make him 
act contrary to his will, and, if the interpretation is pushed, there is also the implication that 
the gods are sponsors of this power.  Normally, the ―by Jupiter‖ is performed as an expletive, 
but another humorous interpretation might actually have Bobadill claim that his potentially 
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vigorous self-defense from Squire Downright‘s attack was prevented either by the planet‘s 
influence or by the chief of the gods himself. 
 Later in the play, the merchant Kitely has been introduced to the evils of suspicion—
not to the same degree that Othello has been, certainly, but the pathology of this ―poison‖ 
affects him in much the same way.  It is an interesting description of the manner in which 
thought can be captivated by no more than a mere suggested interpretation of facts.  What it 
can illustrate for us is how difficult it can be to resist something that appears as one‘s own 
judgment, and even more difficult to see the lie as separate from reality.  It is literally a ―dis-
ease‖ which destroys peace, health and harmony as Kitely describes below:   
KITELY   
A new disease?  I know not, new, or old, 
  But it may well be called poor mortals‘ plague: 
  For, like a pestilence, it doth infect 
  The houses of the brain.  First it begins 
  Solely to work upon the fantasy, 
  Filling her seat with such pestiferous air, 
  As soon corrupts the judgment; and from thence 
  Sends like contagion to the memory: 
 Still each to other giving the infection. 
  Which, as a subtle vapour, spreads itself 
  Confusedly through every sensive part, 
 Till not a thought, or motion, in the mind, 
  Be free from the black poison of suspect. 
 Ah, but what misery is it, to know this? 
 Or, knowing it, to want the mind‘s erection, 
 In such extremes?  Well, I will once more strive, 
 (In spite of this black cloud) myself to be, 
 And shake the fever off, that thus shakes me. (2.3.55-72) 
 
 Michel de Montaigne, in his essay, ―Of Constancie,‖ comments upon the difficulty of 
a challenge such as the one facing Kitely—grappling with the obsessive workings of a 
fascinated thought.  He cautions that the wise person should in ―no whit consent to his fright 
and sufferance" (58-59), and that someone who is less wise is vulnerable to ―perturbations‖ 
because: 
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...the impression of passions doth not remaine superficiall in him [one that is not 
wise]: but rather penetrates even into the secret of reason, infecting and corrupting the 
same.  He judgeth according to them, and conformeth himselfe to them.  Consider 
precisely the state of the wise Stoicke: 
Mens immota manet, lachrymae volvuntur inanes. 
Virg. AEn. iv. 449. 
His minde doth firme remaine, 
Teares are distill‘d in vaine. 
The wise Peripatetike doth not exempt himselfe from perturbations of the mind, but 
doth moderate them. (vol. 1, 59) 
   
Montaigne reflects here one of the central tenets of the neoclassical ethic: do not avoid the 
challenges to mental harmony, but rather embrace them, interrogate them perhaps, but  
certainly attempt to reconcile their provocations.  Hamlet again echoes a similar thought with 
Whether 'tis nobler in the minde to suffer 
The slings and arrowes of outragious fortune, 
Or to take Armes against a sea of troubles, 
And by opposing, end them. 
    (Hamlet, 8.1595-1598) 
 
If fascination and fixation work upon the seat of reason and it is misled or corrupted, the door 
 
is opened to a potentially destructive passion unless corrective measures are immediately  
 
applied.  It was deemed important to control, to "moderate" these passions as Montaigne 
 
suggests, in order that they not enslave the thought.  
 
Shakespeare‘s Cressida and Marc Antony comment on changeable and misleading 
perceptions.  Cressida realizes too late that one must exercise more than an ordinary effort to  
discern rightly and avoid ―turpitude:‖ 
The error of our eye, directs our mind, 
What error leads must erre: O then conclude, 
Mindes swayd by eyes are full of turpitude.  (Troilus and Cressida, 18.2938-2940)   
 
As Antony describes it, the discerning effort is complicated by evidence offered to the 
material senses.  Even physical elements can have a protean quality that must be constantly 
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evaluated, for they may shift and present a new perspective, or change their forms to the 
extent that it affects their perceived signification: 
 Sometime we see a clowd that‘s Dragonish, 
 A vapour sometime, like a Beare, or Lyon, 
 A towerd Cittadell, a pendant Rocke, 
 A forked Mountaine, or blew Promontorie 
 With Trees vpon‘t, that nodde vnto the world, 
 And mocke our eyes with Ayre… 
 That which is now a Horse, euen with a thoght 
 The Racke distaines, and makes it indistinct 
 As water is in water. (Antony and Cleopatra, 40.2350-2359) 
 
Such distortions can wreak havoc with an individual‘s sense of self.  Sorting out identity is 
enough of a challenge with the ordinary ambiguities and contradictions of human society.  To 
have that effort of self-realization subverted by an aggressively antagonistic or misleading 
influence is to make that process nearly impossible without some sort of counterbalancing 
insight.  That insight might have had to contend with elements floating around in the 
atmosphere—both mental and physical—as well.   
Until scientific scepticism disproved the so-called physics of the extromission theory 
of vision, and ―radios perniciosos,‖ there was thought to be a materially binding element from 
the ―beames and streames‖ produced almost involuntarily by the body.  Reginald Scot 
describes the belief in his 1586 The Discoverie of Witchcraft: 
This fascination (saith John Baptista Porta Neapolitanus) though it begin by 
touching or breathing, is alwaies accomplished and finished by the eie, as an  
extermination or expulsion of the spirits through the eies, approching to the hart of the 
bewitched, and infecting the same, &c.  Whereby it commeth to passe, that a child, or 
a yoong man endued with a cleare, whole, subtill and sweet bloud, yeeldeth the like 
spirits, breath, and vapors springing from the purer bloud of the hart.  And the lightest 
and finest spirits, ascending into the highest parts of the head, doo fall into the eies, 
and so are from thence sent foorth, as being of all other parts of the bodie the most 
cleare, and fullest of veines and pores, and with the verie spirit or vapor proceeding 
thence, is conveied out as it were by beames and streames a certeine fierie force; 
whereof he that beholdeth sore eies shall have good experience.  For the poison and 
disease in the eie infecteth the aire next unto it, and the same proceedeth further, 
carrieng with it the vapor and infection of the corrupted bloud: with the contagion 
whereof, the eies of the beholders are most apt to be infected.  By this same meanes it 
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is thought that the cockatrice depriveth the life, and a woolfe taketh awaie the voice of 
such as they suddenlie meete withall and behold. (399)  
 
Scot devotes pages to the debunking of witchcraft theory, but is still intrigued as to 
how the idea of fascination manifests its power.  Bacon and others who were sceptical of the 
ars occulta believed in differing forms of ―natural‖ phenomena, and it seems there was a 
resultant intellectual tendency to attribute those effects to naturally occurring explanations.  
So while witchcraft may have been ridiculed as causative in intellectual circles, there 
remained an open question as to how some phenomena continued to have efficacy and 
potency, as Keith Thomas discusses in Religion and the Decline of Magic: 
Many writers were sceptical about witchcraft, precisely because they were so 
credulous in other matters.  They accepted the possibility of sympathetic healing and 
action at a distance; they believed that stones might have hidden properties, that a 
corpse might bleed at the approach of its murderer, and that some men could 
‗fascinate‘ others by the emanations from their eyes.  Scot‘s scepticism was made 
possible by his commitment to this tradition, and it was no coincidence that John 
Webster was sceptical about witchcraft, but believed in the weapon-salve, astral 
spirits, satyrs, pigmies, mermaids and sea-monsters.  It was because these men 
accepted so wide a range of supposed natural phenomena that they were able to 
dispense with witchcraft as an explanation of mysterious happenings.  It was much 
easier for them to advance a ‗natural‘ explanation for the witches‘ maleficium than it 
was for those who had been educated in the tradition of scholastic Aristotleanism. 
(691-692) 
 
The sixteenth-century scepticism signified the initial turning point from acceptance of 
witchcraft superstitions, to an attempt to discover how something like fascination actually did 
its work—looking for the ―natural explanation‖ for projected maleficium.  Before 
suggestibility theory came into vogue, the early modern sceptics were already stripping away 
some of the ideas of what fascination could not be.  Thomas notes that Scot's Discoverie of 
Witchcraft was not exceptional in its scepticism, though it was somewhat prescient in its 
denial of the powers of the devil: 
There was, therefore, a continuing stream of scepticism throughout the whole 
period of witchcraft prosecution in England.  Scot‘s great work was probably no more 
than an elaborate application of a type of rationalist criticism already in vogue.  As 
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early as 1578 a Norwich physician, Dr Browne, was accused of ‗spreading a misliking 
of the laws by saying there are no witches‘.  Scot himself was deeply read in the 
literature of witchcraft and drew in particular upon the medical findings of the Cleves 
physician Johan Weyer, whose De Praestigiis Daemonum (1563) had urged that many 
supposed witches were innocent melancholics and that even the guilty ones were mere 
tools of Satan, incapable of doing harm by their own activities.  Scot took this position 
further by denying even Satan any physical power. (692-693) 
 
The scientifically inclined scepticism, however, was somewhat lost on another group 
of commentators who opposed the fascinating effect that a force such as the theatre had on the 
populace.  These zealous men of good works, in sermon and pamphlet, decried the ―webs of 
these Spiders,‖ i.e. players and playwrights, as Anthony Munday declaims from the pages of 
his explicitly titled 1580 monograph: A second and third blast of retrait from plaies and 
Theaters: the one whereof was founded by a reuerend Byshop dead long since; the other by a 
Worshipful and zealous Gentleman now aliue: one showing the filthines of plaies in times 
past; the other the abhomination of Theaters in the time present: both expresly prouing that 
the common-weale is nigh vnto the cursse of God, wherein either plaiers be made or, Theaters 
maintained.  The binding, fascinating power of the public theatre‘s influence on the human 
imagination is caught up, metaphorically, in Munday‘s conceit that the playhouse and/or the 
plays therein are inescapable snares of the mind: 
Manie haue ben intangled with the webs of these Spiders, who would gladlie haue 
bene at libertie when they could not.  The webs are so subtillie spun, that there is no 
man that is once within them, that can auoide them without danger.  None can come 
within those snares that maie escape vntaken, be she maide, matrone, or whatsoeuer; 
such force haue their inchantements of pleasure to drawe the affections of the mind. 
(96-97) 
 
Munday is supported by other ―anti-theatricalists‖ such as Stephen Gosson, who wrote in, 
respectively, Plays Confuted, and Schoole of Abuse that: 
The poets that write plays and they that present them upon the stage ... study to make 
our affections overflow, whereby they draw the bridle from that part of the mind that 
should be curbed from running our head, which is manifest treason to our souls and 
delivereth them captive to the devil.  (Plays Confuted F5v-7r) 
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…if you doe but listen to the voyce of the fouler, or joyne lookes with an amorous 
gazer, you have already made yourselves assaultable, and yeelded your cities to be 
sacked. (Schoole of Abuse 49) 
 
Once begun, this opposition to the bewitching effects of theatre remained a constant within 
the culture and the business of playing until the theatres were pulled down in 1649.  The 
resistance was more than simply a matter of taste; as Peter Lake explains in The Antichrist’s 
Lewd Hat: 
The very medium of theatrical performance was mendacious on still deeper 
levels, appealing, as it did, to the senses and the emotions in ways that undermined the 
sovereignty of reason, unmanned or effeminated even the most rationally masculine or 
masculinely rational of sensibilities and sent all sorts of subliminally corrupting 
messages directly through the senses to the soul.  For theatrical performance 
constituted a carefully orchestrated assault on all the senses. (445)  
 
Fascination is the counterfeit of inspiration.  It is only natural that those who purport 
to follow a virtuous lifestyle would oppose it as false seeming, false teaching and false 
guidance.  Yet it is one thing to oppose it in word, while it can be difficult to resist in practice.  
Munday acknowledges that even the good, yet malleable people in society are vulnerable to 
the theatre‘s ―showes and spectacles:‖ 
Manie of nature honest, and tractable, haue bene altered by those showes and 
spectacles, and become monsterous.  Mans minde, which of it selfe is proane vnto 
vice, is not to be pricked forward vnto wantonnes, but bridled: if it be left vnto it selfe, 
it hardlie standeth; if it be driuen forth, it runneth headlong. (93) 
 
Though he was not as influential to the early modern period as Montaigne or Bacon, St. 
Augustine succinctly states the dilemma in recounting his own personal, internal struggles in 
the following passage from his Confessions: 
 So many things then I did, when ‗to will‘ was not in itself ‗to be able‘; and I 
did not what both I longed incomparably more to do, and which soon after, when I 
should will, I should be able to do; because soon after, when I should will, I should 
will thoroughly.  For in these things the ability was one with the will, and to will was 
to do; and yet it was not done: and more easily did my body obey the weakest willing 
of my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to accomplish in 
the will alone this its momentous will.  Whence is this monstrousness?  And to what 
 34 
end?…The mind commands the body, and it obeys instantly; the mind commands 
itself, and is resisted. (160-61)  
 
As with any perceptual phenomenon, the primary conduits to the imagination are the 
eyes and ears—and while an audience at the Globe or Blackfriars might have perceived the 
play experience in terms of all five of the physical senses, the playwright generally had 
command of only the primary two: sight and sound.  Peter Lake notes the double threat 
theatre posed to the anti-theatricalists, because its iconography shared the same power to 
directly engage the imagination which, as will be detailed in a later chapter, is one of the first 
steps in circumventing the saving powers of reason and judgment.  Again, in The Antichrist’s 
Lewd Hat he argues that, 
Like popery, the theatre was particularly threatening as an enemy to true 
religion precisely because of its expertise in the manipulation of the senses, through 
sound, spectacle and gesture.  By these subliminal means all sorts of corrupting 
messages could be sent and all sorts of spontaneous responses evoked from the 
audience.  By appealing, through the senses, to the fleshly, fallen, sensuous and sexual 
aspects of human nature, the theatre, like the idolatrous shows put on by popish 
religion, could penetrate directly to the soul, bypassing the reason and plunging the 
audience into a cesspool of lustful and corrupting thoughts and sensations. (447)  
 
 From the denotative meanings of fascination to its situation within the material culture 
of early modern England, therefore, a picture emerges of a phenomenon that has a presence 
not just in the occult philosophy or societal superstitions of the population, but also as a 
tangible, yet elusively comprehended influence on an individual‘s imagination.  It was one of 
many ways of reaching the inwardness of the beholder.  The shared experience of the theatre 
brought a powerful and expanded dynamism to the understanding of the phenomenon.  The 
culture of playgoing mirrored the phenomenon‘s effect in the aesthetic world of the play by 
simultaneously producing its innate effects directly upon the audience.  Of all of the poets that 
Munday might call ―web spinners,‖ the art of theatrical fascination found a deep and 
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consistent expression in Shakespeare‘s plays.  Dame Frances Yates states this rather 
poetically in The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age:  
Though Shakespeare never wielded a wand, nor thought of himself as a magus, he is a 
magician, master of the spell-binding use of words, of poetry as magic.  This was the 
art in which he was supreme… (162) 
 
Many scholars acknowledge Shakespeare's command of the art, but some of his spell-binding  
 
theatrical effects resonate within another type of craft.  His use of the terms of this craft  
 
suggest that he had at least a passing familiarity with those traditions and saw the dramatic  
 
potential resident within those beliefs associated with bewitchment. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
FASCINATION AND WITCHCRAFT, THE EVIL EYE AND 
MESMERIC SUGGESTION 
 
 
 
Fascination and Witchcraft 
 
 
PORTIA 
Beshrow your eyes, 
They haue ore-lookt me and deuided me, 
One halfe of me is yours, the other halfe yours, 
Mine owne I would say: but if mine then yours, 
And so all yours; (The Merchant of Venice, 14.1294-1298) 
 
 
Bewitchment and witchcraft were major counterpoints to early modern Christianity, 
and were perceived as threats to the security of the person of the sovereign.  This was stated 
not only in Elizabeth's Injunctions Given by the Queen's Majesty, but was also reflected in the 
opinion of James I, who, after his accession to the English throne further instituted the belief 
in witchcraft‘s power to undermine the state, by enacting laws which reconfirmed Elizabeth‘s 
earlier prohibition.  Samuel Johnson, in his Miscellaneous Observations of the Tragedy of 
Macbeth, cites part of the edict, and comments on the fact that because the author of 
Daemonologie was now King of England, 
…the doctrine of witchcraft was very powerfully inculcated; and as the greatest part of  
mankind have no other reason for their opinions than that they are in fashion, it cannot  
be doubted but this persuasion made a rapid progress, since vanity and credulity co- 
operated in its favour.  The infection soon reached the Parliament, who, in the first  
year of King James, made a law by which it was enacted, chap. xii.  That ―if any  
person shall use any invocation, or conjuration of any evil or wicked spirit; 2. or shall  
consult, covenant with, entertain, employ, feed or reward any evil or cursed spirit to or  
for any intent or purpose; 3. or take up any dead man, woman or child out of the grave,  
—or the skin, bone, or any part of the dead person, to be employed or used in any  
manner of witchcraft, sorcery, charm, or enchantment; 4. or shall use, practise or  
exercise any sort of witchcraft, sorcery, charm, or enchantment; 5. whereby any  
person shall be destroyed, killed, wasted, consumed, pined, or lamed in any part of the  
body; 6. That every such person being convicted shall suffer death… 
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 Thus, in the time of Shakespeare, was the doctrine of witchcraft at once 
established by law and by the fashion, and it became not only impolite, but criminal, 
to doubt it;…(257-258)   
 
In England, there were three Acts of Parliament—1542 (repealed in 1547), 1563 
(repealed in 1604), and 1604 (repealed in 1736)—which forbade invocations or occult 
practices.  In fact, as Keith Thomas says in ―The Relevance of Social Anthropology to the 
Historical Study of English Witchcraft:‖ 
The 1604 Act made it a capital offence to covenant with, or to entertain, evil spirits, 
but it still displayed the earlier preoccupation with maleficium by making it a felony to 
kill anyone by witchcraft, while imposing a lesser penalty for less serious types of 
injury. (50) 
 
The specific inclusion of witchcraft here indicates the imagined potency and the elusive 
nature of the concept of murder by fascination or bewitchment.  Thomas further elaborates on 
the problems inherent in the enforcement of these statutes: 
How was damage by witchcraft thought to have been inflicted?  And does the 
English evidence justify the well-known anthropological distinction between 
‗witchcraft‘ (a psychic, imaginary, and often involuntary act) and ‗sorcery‘ (the 
employment of destructive spells, charms, and medicines)?  These are difficult 
questions to answer.  Contemporary witch trials suggest that the witch was believed to 
exercise her power in a variety of ways.  She could touch her victim, or give out a 
potent but invisible fascination from her eyes: in this case he was said to have been 
‗fascinated‘ or ‗overlooked‘.  She could pronounce a curse or malediction: then he 
would be ‗forespoken.‘(50) 
 
My over all impression is that contemporaries were less interested in the mechanics of 
the operation than in the fact of the witch‘s malice.  Once this was proved, it mattered 
less whether evidence of the means employed was forthcoming…(51) 
 
It was the ability of the witch to present a remote, yet fatal threat that caused the 
greatest concern.  In some respects, it resonated with concepts of the antichrist—purporting to 
have a destructive quality that opposed Christ‘s ability to heal at a distance.  If Jesus could 
heal the centurion‘s servant (Matt. 8: 5-13) and the son of the nobleman of Cana in Galilee 
(John 4: 45-53), without being physically present or using any methods other than what 
appeared to be spiritual (and consequently physical) regeneration through prayer and grace, 
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then the belief that a witch could exercise a similarly remote, but inverted, destructive power 
might play havoc with the views of social order and control.  How could a king be secure 
against such an attack, able to be effected by the lowest and most disgruntled members of the 
society? 
Phenomena that did not yield their secrets easily to scientific investigation sometimes 
appeared within the category of witchcraft or the occult tradition which some skeptical early 
modern English authors both investigated and eventually tried to debunk.  Powers that were 
imagined to have set themselves up in opposition to God‘s omnipotence were often believed 
to be real forces to be reckoned with here on earth; in some cases this was the sole axis upon 
which some medieval religious dramas turned—such as "The Temptation" from the York  
Plays.  The fact that Shakespeare and the other Elizabethan playwrights made consistent 
mention and dramatic use of the archetypal conflict of order against diabolic chaos testifies to 
the enduring attraction that it must have had on the imaginations of the Renaissance 
audiences.  Frances Yates confirms that 
The occult philosophy in the Elizabethan age was not a minor concern of a few adepts.   
It was the main philosophy of the age, stemming from John Dee and his movement.   
Dee‘s Christian Cabala lies behind the Cabalist Neoplatonism of Spenser‘s epic,  
whence the imagery flows through the age.  The fierce reactions against Renaissance  
occult philosophy are also most strongly felt in England… 
Shakespeare‘s great creations—Hamlet, Lear, Prospero—are seen as belonging 
to the late stages of Renaissance occult philosophy, struggling in the throes of the 
reaction. (163) 
 
Keith Thomas mentions that the ―mechanics of the operation‖ of occult malpractice were of 
less concern to an early modern court than the witch‘s malice.  In this study, the idea of the 
mechanics are of some interest and will be examined via a theoretical model in the succeeding 
chapters in light of the early modern concept of the interrelations of the senses, the mind and 
the body. 
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Credulity and uninterrogated belief in hexes, ―evil eye‖ fascinations and possessions, 
sometimes create in a person a suggestible mental state independent of any efficacy of the 
supposed magic.  This belief system, if it is powerful enough to hyperextend the imagination, 
can have the same coercive effect on the body as a magical spell might be supposed to have. 
In Shakespeare‘s dramatic creations, the Weird Sisters of Macbeth, Roger Bolingbroke and 
Margery Jordan from The First Part of the Contention of the Two Famous Houses of York and 
Lancaster (Henry VI, Part II), and Prospero in The Tempest, operate a visible, identifiable 
craft; whereas, for instance, Iago employs methods that seem to be more of the type of 
―natural fascination‖ to achieve his ends.  Often, the most insidious ensnarement happens 
when the victim has no idea that he is in the process of being bewitched.  Overt witchcraft 
was persecuted by church and state, but the subtler forms of enthrallment were harder to 
detect and harder to defend against. 
Practitioners of charms and enchantments did not always succeed with their victims, 
either because of the inherent inefficacy of the manipulations, or because the victim‘s 
enthralled thought became awakened or alerted and thereby activated in its own defense. 
Absolute truth can be the destroyer of the fascinated state.  But the problem has been and 
perhaps always will be the perception of ―absolute‖ truth.  Those familiar with perception 
theory might argue that the knowing of any "absolute" truth is impossible and we are forced, 
therefore, to rely on the assumptions generated by the available evidence from the limits of 
our perspectives.  These assumptions are vulnerable to error through misperception and 
misinterpretation.  Thomas Aquinas may have had little influence upon the thinking of the 
early modern Elizabethan citizen, but in one small area he describes the danger that an 
enlightened and active intellect presents to mesmeric suggestion—whether that ―persuasion‖ 
actually emanated from the Devil or not—in his treatise, ―On Evil:‖ 
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…although the devil according to the order of his nature could persuade man of 
something by enlightening his intellect as does a good angel, nevertheless he does not 
do this because the more the intellect is enlightened, the more it can guard itself 
against deception which the devil intends.  Hence it remains that the internal 
persuasion of the devil, and any revelation of his is not by illumination of the intellect 
but only by a kind of impression made on the internal or external sense powers. (119) 
 
This description of persuasions and suggestions relying on ―impressions‖ upon the sense 
powers points to the place where the phenomenon must operate: outside of the interrogation 
of reason.  Reason and logic are often quick to correct false impressions or at least to 
interrogate the source and thereby present a truer picture of the situation.  Here the Devil 
represents the idea of the act of deception requiring the avoidance of scrutiny and dependence 
upon the maintenance of a falsely perceived reality. 
Witchcraft, like so many other human inventions, does not come with guarantees, nor 
does it even require adept practitioners.  The Devil, who was often given credit as the ultimate 
author of the maleficium, theoretically could and would utilize any willing instrument 
according to witchcraft lore and tradition.  A lay person, wittingly or unwittingly responding 
to the Devil‘s urgings, could cause an unwary individual‘s conscious mind to be caught up in 
a web of misperceptions that could lead to ruination.  These ―persuasions‖ from the Devil 
were equally effective on the victim as well as any third party willing to believe them.  
Fascination did not need to be brought on by a learned practitioner; evil manipulations could 
proceed from anyone who could conceive, harbor and intend malice towards another.  The 
most powerful and pernicious of these manipulations wreaked havoc on the victim‘s 
imagination, fascinating thought by altering perceptions of reality.  Evil ―thought forms,‖ 
―eyes,‖ or ―tongues,‖ resisted most attempts at scientific explanation in a pre-psychologically 
conversant culture and therefore found many of their delineations in magic and demonology. 
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Fascination lies in a gray area between the occult and fraud.  To be fascinated, in the 
sense of being mentally enthralled, is to be largely conscious of the real world, yet remain 
mentally fixated upon an alternate perception of reality in such a way as to mistake good for 
evil, innocence for guilt, or even to fail in the distinctions thereof.  Hyperius notes a case of 
entrenched mesmeric suggestion which illustrates that superimposition of erroneous illusion 
over everyday reality in Two Commonplaces: 
And they properly vnto whome the deuill hath shewed by this meane, ye may to 
bringe to passe anye unwonted thinges, are sayde, to bewitche, and to iuggle to the 
deceauinge of the minds and sences of men.  Therfore of this sorte is that which is 
read in the life of S. Macarius.  Certaine Parentes supposed their daughter to be turned 
into a Cowe, because that their sences were so hurte by the bewitching of the deuill, or 
some ill persons, that they did see no other thing in their daughter, then ye shape and 
all the actions of a Cowe, and they thought plainly that she was a Cowe.  But 
Macharius, when they came to him with the supposed Cowe, saw a very wenche, 
rightly arrayed with all such apparralle as became a woman: because forsooth he could 
not be hurte with bewitching, the deuill hauing nor power upon him.  But when as hee 
had feruently called upon God, all the bewitching also was taken away from the 
Parents, and straightway they knew their daughter, such as before they did.  Neither 
was her shape of a wenche taken away from her, but onely the sences of the beholders 
were deluded, that they thought it to be taken away. (f3)  (85) 
 
 One reason to argue that fascination, in such an example as Hyperius relates, finds a 
place between the realms of simple deception and the occult is this element of the 
transformation of reality.  A cozener, deceiver or trickster can falsify facts or appearances but 
cannot actually change physics outside of the confines of normal reality.  The fascinated state 
allows for the exchange of the given norms of perceived reality for the superimposed 
supposititious imagery of the suggested reality.  Hyperius does not detail the cause of the 
parents' delusion, but the story argues that the superimposed reality is more pervasive than 
what might be accomplished by ordinary deception.  St. Macharius never saw the young 
woman as a cow, yet both of her parents were convinced by the testimony of their fascinated 
interpretation of what appeared before their imaginations that a cow stood before them, not 
their daughter. 
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 Fascination is a form of deception or cozenage.  But to make a more specific 
distinction for this study, it might be argued that fraud changes the interpretation of 
commonly held experiences, whereas fascination alters the actual perception of the shared 
experience.  At once, and in the same shared experience, Macharius and the young woman 
perceived the normal reality of a young lady present at the interview; the girl‘s parents 
perceived a suggested or received alternate reality—within the same physical 
circumstances—and saw a cow present.  According to Hyperius, this condition persisted until 
an enlightening of the parents‘s intellect occurred; in this case the intervention of prayer to 
God so that ―all the bewitching…was taken away from the Parents.‖ 
The concept of a ―lay‖ practitioner of bewitchment is something of a misnomer, 
because as the prohibitions against witchcraft implied, those who employed such arts were 
liable under the law.  The 1604 Act was not directed against witches or sorcerers, but against 
―any person.‖  Whether or not there was a formal pact with the Devil, those who practiced 
upon others with the intent to commit some sort of maleficium could be considered, by 
popular definition, a witch.  The technical distinction between lay figures like Iago and the 
―professionals‖ like the Weird Sisters, Roger Bolingbroke and Margery Jordan was the latter 
group‘s presumed commitment to an infernal pact in order to receive the secrets of the 
diabolic arts.  A true witch was believed to be a person who entered into a formal contract 
with the Devil in order to receive supernatural knowledge and powers.  This ―pact‖ was the 
specific sign, but as proof of such a contract was often difficult to determine, even the 
suspected practice of forbidden arts could suffice to label a person as a witch.  Thus, when 
Othello comes to the fatal realization that Iago‘s ―poisonous‖ mental malpractice has 
produced a powerful fascination of his thought, he looks directly at Iago‘s feet to see if they 
are the cloven hoofs of a devil: 
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 LODOUICO 
  Where is that Viper, bring the villaine forth. 
 OTHELLO 
  I looke downe towards his feet, but that‘s a fable, 
  (To Iago)  If that thou beest a deuill, I cannot kill thee. 
   He wounds Iago (15.3188-3190.1)   
 
And a few lines later, Othello acknowledges the power that Iago‘s work has had upon him, 
still referring to the diabolical nature of the effects, ―demand that demy deuill / Why he hath 
thus insnar‘d my soule and body?‖ (15.3204-3205). 
 As far as the text relates, Iago is not a true witch nor an actual demon.  But in 
Othello‘s mind, Iago‘s practice upon him brands Iago with more than just ordinary felonious 
conduct; Iago has practiced against Othello‘s soul.  As Iago is taken away, he is not only 
going to be questioned, but tortured with ―cunning cruelty, / That can torment him much, and 
hold him long‖ (15.3239-3240), which was a common treatment for one accused of 
witchcraft.  Iago offers no convenient confession indicating the existence of any infernal pact.  
Rather, it is implied that he acted as his own agent, even though what he does could be 
interpreted as the Devil‘s work. 
Wayne Shumaker outlines the prevalent understanding of the defining criteria of the 
practice of witchcraft in sixteenth-century England in The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance: 
These, then are the essentials of witchcraft: a meeting with the Devil (or a 
devil; the lack of an article in Latin, together with different conventions of 
capitalization, makes the distinction often impossible), a pact to deny God, the 
performing of evil deeds, and occasional or regular attendance at the Sabbat.  From the 
reports of trials one gathers that most of the witches really acted in secret, muttering 
their charms, mutilating their clay images, and dispensing their powders or potions 
without the knowledge of anyone except, perhaps, their own children, who could be 
forced by orders or threats to help (Hence it was concluded by the inquisitors that 
every child of a witch was almost certainly also a witch.)  (90) 
 
He then goes on to illustrate the more ―reality-based‖ view of the contemporary Elizabethan 
skeptics: 
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Occasionally two or more witches might co-operate to bring harm upon a common 
enemy, and more rarely still a larger number might congregate to cackle together, but 
as social outcasts—―loners‖—no doubt they usually hated and feared their rivals as 
well as their victims.  In the main, they were probably poor old women with foggy 
minds who felt themselves abused and tried to strike back at oppressors by hexing 
them. (90)   
 
The popular views of witchcraft were at odds with the ability of Renaissance science 
to prove their validity.  Though a sceptic like Scot was convinced that witchcraft was 
composed of varying forms of fraud, he concedes that a person‘s belief in deceptions will 
nonetheless procure the tangible effects—as he explains in Discoverie of Witchcraft: 
The common people have beene so assotted and bewitched, with whatsoever poets 
have feigned of witchcraft, either in earnest in jest, or else in derision; and with 
whatsoever lowd liers and couseners for their pleasures heerein have invented, and 
with whatsoever tales they have heard from old doting women, or from their mothers 
maids, and with whatsoever the grandfoole their ghostlie father, or anie other morrow 
masse preest had informed them; and finallie with whatsoever they have swallowed up 
through tract of time, or through their owne timerous nature or ignorant conceipt, 
concerning these matters of hagges and witches: as they have so settled their opinion 
and credit thereupon, that they think it heresie to doubt in anie part of the matter; 
speciallie bicuase they find this word witchcraft expressed in the scriptures;… 
Witchcraft is in truth a cousening art, wherin the name of God is abused, prophaned 
and blasphemed, and his power attributed to a vile creature…The maner thereof is so 
secret, mysticall, and strange, that to this daie there hath never beene any credible 
witnes thereof.  It is incomprehensible to the wise, learned or faithfull; a probable 
matter to children, fooles, melancholike persons and papists…(389) 
 
…who will mainteine, that common witchcrafts are not cousenages, when the great 
and famous witchcrafts, which had stolne credit not onlie from all the common people,  
but from men of great wisdome and authoritie, are discovered to be beggerlie slights  
of cousening varlots?…if such bables could have brought those matters of mischeefe  
to passe, by the hands of traitors, witches, or papists; we should long since have beene  
deprived of the most excellent jewell and comfort that we enjoy in this world.   
Howebeit, I confesse, that the feare, conceipt, and doubt of such mischeefous  
pretenses may breed inconvenience to them that stand in awe of the same. (391) 
 
That idea of standing ―in awe‖ to the ―mischeefous pretenses‖ hints that the mental 
acceptance of suggestion ―may breed inconvenience.‖  Scot, of course, does not accept that 
witching has any real power, but he does allow that the victim‘s mind, falsely engaged, can at 
least simulate the supposed power of a spell and work some sort of mischief.   
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Practitioners like Iago employed a form of bewitchment that seemed to be more potent 
than the cackled hex of a foggy mind.  Was there a distinction, within the terminology of 
witchcraft, between bewitchment and fascination?  Fred Gettings lists fascination, as well as 
related items, in his Encyclopedia of the Occult.  The relationships between the phenomenon‘s 
qualities of binding and controlling influences are made somewhat more distinct in the 
comparative definitions below: 
Fascinate A term from the Latin fascinare (‗to enchant‘) and used as a general 
term for the act of casting spells or (in particular) of throwing the EVIL EYE upon 
another.  In late-medieval literature a person ‗fascinated‘ was usually under the spell 
of a magician or witch.  See also fascinum under EVIL EYE. (89) 
 
Evil eye An important idea underlying the practice of witchcraft and black 
magic is that certain individuals have the power to cast evil spells or to project evil 
THOUGHT FORMS merely by looking at another person…The idea of this evil power in 
man is just about universal, and there exists in virtually every language an equivalent 
term—the boser Blick in German, malocchio in Italian, mauvais oeil in French; and 
from the Latin fascinum, which was originally connected with the idea of binding, we 
derive the English ‗fascinate‘, which was originally connected with such ideas as 
binding by means of diabolical powers or PACT.  The modern English ‗to overlook‘ is 
also connected with the evil eye.  Maclagan, who records numerous examples of the 
evil eye in Scotland, quotes a woman from Mull who says that the evil eye is ‗just an 
eye / with great greed and envy‘, and the remark by an old man that ‗it used to be said 
by old people that the greedy eye could split asunder the very rocks.‘  On a more 
exalted level the great medieval schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, lends his considerable 
authority to the belief that one mind may indeed influence another through forces 
which proceed from the eyes. (87-88) 
 
Spell  A word from the Old English spel (‗speech‘) and applied to the idea of 
a magical word or binding power which may be spoken or written down.  Just as the 
word ‗CHARM‘ was originally involved with the idea of song, so a spell was 
something which arose from the spoken word, as an incantation or a formula of power.  
The idea is that the spoken phrase puts into a single verbal charge of energy the wishes 
of the magician—whether evil or beneficent. (207) 
 
Charm A magical formula.  The etymology of the term, which is from the 
Latin carmen (song) points to the origin of charms—they were originally magical 
formulas intended to be sung or recited to propitiate a spirit or to bring about some 
desired effect…a charm is the means by which influences (for good or bad) are 
induced into an object or person. (52) 
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 The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology by Rossell Hope Robbins glosses 
fascination in a similar manner and adds the following observations: 
Of the various magical folk beliefs which were incorporated into the theological  
framework of witchcraft, fascination or the ―evil eye‖ was one of the most primitive  
and extensive.  Every civilization has believed that evil can be effected merely through  
hostile looks;… (193) 
 
The superstition was enshrined in the Bible: ―From within, out of the heart of 
men, proceed evil thoughts…an evil eye‖—Mark vii.  Matthew made the link between 
the evil eye and the evil person or witch: ―If thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be 
full of darkness.‖…Del Rio in 1599 finally summarized the accepted views: 
―Fascination is a power derived from a pact with the Devil, who, when the so-called 
fascinator looks at another with an evil intent…he infects with evil the person at 
whom he looks.‖ (194)  
 
Those who did formally enter into the Devil‘s service by way of an alleged pact were 
theoretically entitled to an impressive array of powers, according to the early modern concept 
of witchcraft.  The authors of the 1486 Malleus Maleficarum detail a long list of evils that 
witches could engage in once they had made an infernal pact with diabolical entities.  This 
credulous and quite popular book—literally, the ―hammer of the witches‖ by ―Henricus 
Institorius‖ (i.e. the Dominican friars Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger)—catalogued an 
incredible number of occult theories and activities, and in turn had a significant influence 
upon the later European witch-hunts.  The most powerful class of witches, apparently those 
who can both injure and cure (but choose mostly to injure), are able to ―perform every sort of 
witchcraft and spell, comprehending all that all the others individually can do‖ (99 [II, i, 2]).  
Within the book‘s comprehensive list of abilities are the following: 
…they can bring about a great trembling in the hands and horror in the minds of those 
who would arrest them; they can show to others occult things and certain future 
events…; they can see absent things as if they were present; they can turn the minds of 
men to inordinate love or hatred; they can at times strike whom they will with 
lightning, and even kill some men and animals; they can make of no effect the 
generative desires, and even the power of copulation, cause abortion, kill infants in the 
mother‘s womb by a mere exterior touch; they can at times bewitch men and animals 
with a mere look, without touching them… (99)  
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Ironically, however, despite the fact that they have contracted with the supposedly 
formidable powers of the underworld and can ―cause all the plagues which other witches can 
only cause in part, that is, when the Justice of God permits such things to be‖ (99)—the Devil 
may use them as he pleases.  He may promise a witch unbridled power, but the truth 
(according to the Christian doctrinal theory found in the Malleus) was that all things were still 
under the control and will of God.  A witch was not a completely free agent.  The magus who 
signed a pact with a devil, or a god of the underworld, was bound to that power.  Yet that 
demonic power only operated under license from the Almighty.  Instead of generating his own 
puissance, the witch merely invoked powers granted to the devil/god, and tried to direct it or 
obey it to achieve his or her ends.  The authors assert that by showing ―the method used by 
this chief class in their profession of their sacrilege, anyone may easily understand the method 
of the other classes‖ (99).  
Once the witches have done their work (with God‘s permission supposedly), the 
maleficium cannot, surprisingly, be undone—conforming to the belief that ―no witchcraft can 
be removed by any natural power‖ (161).  The only way to be free from witchcraft was from 
the direct intervention of God Himself—Hyperius‘s tale of St. Macharius conveniently 
emphasizing this particular point.  As for the creation of witches, the Malleus claims that they 
can be drawn into the craft, or they can be born into it: 
… in times long past the Incubus devils used to infest women against their wills, as is 
often shown by Nider in his Formicarius, and by Thomas of Brabant in his book on 
the Universal Good…, 
But the theory that modern witches are tainted with this sort of diabolical 
filthiness is not substantiated only in our opinion, since the expert testimony of the 
witches themselves has made all these things credible; and that they do not now, as in 
times past, subject themselves unwillingly, but willingly embrace this most foul and 
miserable servitude. (111) 
 
To reconcile the paradox that evil can be committed upon mankind with God‘s permission, 
the mitigation follows two steps: that good and ill descend upon man from the will of God for 
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man‘s benefit, and that devils and witches are sometimes agents in this cleansing process.  
This was a generally accepted Christian doctrine which the Malleus summarizes below: 
…everything which God permits to happen to us, whether it seem to be sorrow or  
gladness, is sent for our good as from a pitying Father and a merciful Physician.  For  
the devils are, as it were, schoolmasters of humility, so that they who descend from  
this world may either be purged for the eternal life or be sentenced to the pain of their  
punishment… (175)  
 
 Martin Luther acknowledges this tradition when he analyzes St. Paul‘s disquisition on 
the bewitchment of the Galatians.  In A Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, he 
reveals his first-hand experience with the Devil‘s ability to work on the imagination.  Besides 
his worldly ability to work upon the senses, the Devil 
…doth not only bewitch men after this gross manner, but also after a more subtle sort,  
and much more dangerous; wherein he is a marvellous cunning workman.  And hereof  
it cometh that Paul applieth the bewitching of the senses to the bewitching of the  
spirit.  For by this spiritual witchcraft that old serpent bewitcheth not men‘s sense, but  
their minds with false and wicked opinions: which opinions, they that are so  
bewitched, do take to be true and godly.  Briefly, so great is the malice of this sorcerer  
the devil, and his desire to hurt, that not only he deceiveth those secure and proud  
spirits with his enchantments, but even those also which are professors of true  
Christianity, and well affected in religion: yea, as touching myself, to say the truth, he  
sometimes assaileth me so mightily, and oppresseth me with such heavy cogitations,  
that he utterly shadoweth my Saviour Christ from me, and in a manner taketh him  
clean out of my sight. (qtd. in Kors & Peters, 197) 
 
 John Calvin takes Luther one step further and says in Book 2, Chapter 4 of the 
Institutes, that ―man is so enslaved by the yoke of sin, that he cannot of his own nature aim at 
good either in wish or actual pursuit…‖ (vol. 1, 265).  His example is to cite Augustine‘s 
analogy of man‘s will as a horse which goes towards or away from righteousness, depending 
on whether God or the Devil is the rider: 
―If God mounts, he, like a temperate and skilful rider, guides it calmly, urges it when 
too slow, reins it in when too fast, curbs its forwardness and over-action, checks its 
bad temper, and keeps it on the proper course; but if the devil has seized the saddle, 
like an ignorant and rash rider, he hurries it over broken ground, drives it into ditches, 
dashes it over precipices, spurs it into obstinacy or fury.‖  With this simile, since a 
better does not occur, we shall for the present be contented. (vol. 1, 266) 
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 Much of the debate over the powers of evil resides in sermons and writings from the 
church fathers from one perspective, and skeptics and philosophers from another.  But the real 
crucible for the reality of the phenomenon was in the courtroom.  By bringing individuals to 
trial for the crime of fascination, the various theories and beliefs about the phenomenon were 
reified into specifics that had to be proved before a magistrate.  The confirmations were 
inconclusive for the most part; in the absence of a provable methodology, the trials mostly 
became accusations and rebuttals over alleged evil intents.  Wallace Notestein remarks on the 
situation in A History of Witchcraft in England: 
The truth seems to be that the idea of witchcraft was not very clearly defined 
and differentiated in the minds of ordinary Englishmen until after the beginning of 
legislation upon the subject.  It is not impossible that there were English theologians 
who could have set forth the complete philosophy of the belief, but to the average 
mind sorcery, conjuration, enchantment, and witchcraft were but evil ways of 
mastering nature.  All that was changed when laws were passed.  With legislation 
came a greatly increased number of accusations; with accusations and executions 
came treatises and theory. (5)  
 
Whether its origins were magical or not, when maleficium appeared in the physical 
manifestations of human interaction, it invited prosecution when it appeared to transgress the 
laws of England.  In the abstracts of Essex witchcraft cases, 1560-1680, presented in Alan 
MacFarlane‘s Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England, there are numerous complaints lodged 
against individuals for ―bewitching.‖  Sometimes the complaint was lodged against the 
defendant for bewitching animals such as pigs or cows.  But the records of the King‘s Bench 
contain specific accusations against some residents of the village of Birdbrook for employing 
actual and ―suspected‖ fascination: 
 No. Date/Source Name/…  Offence/Process 
 
 1,186 1583  Joan Maidston  committed to gaol for ‗fascination‘ and 
  K.B.9 658 m.369   died there of plague on 20 Apr. 1583 
 
 1,191 1593  Joan Grine  imprisoned for suspected ‗fascination‘ 
  K.B.9 683 m.152   and died of plague on 5 Apr. 1592 
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 1,192 1596  Joan Luckyn  imprisoned for ‗fascination‘ and died on 
  K.B.9 690 m.285   4 Dec. 1595 of plague 
 
 1,193 1596  Joan Gardiner  imprisoned for ‗fascination‘; died on  
  K.B.9 690 m.283        alias Webb 9 Dec. 1595 of plague 
(qtd. in MacFarlane, 302) 
The witchcraft trials of the period were an attempt to control evil influences and 
practices, but the more covert operations of mental malpractice often escaped detection and 
censure by the lack of material evidence.  Keith Thomas, in ―The Relevance of Social 
Anthropology to the Historical Study of English Witchcraft,‖ describes some of the 
difficulties in tracking down verifiable incidents of bewitchment: 
Only some of the once voluminous judicial records still survive, and the majority of 
these are only bald indictments made at Quarter Sessions or Assizes.  A good deal can 
also be learnt from the defamation cases brought before both secular and ecclesiastical 
courts by persons who felt they had been wrongly accused of witchcraft; while 
incidental light is thrown on magical practices in general by the prosecutions of 
charmers and diviners before the Church courts.  But it is only when detailed 
depositions by witnesses can be found, either in their original form or in the versions 
contained in the contemporary pamphlet accounts of celebrated trials, that the social 
context of the accusations can be discovered. 
Judicial cases of all kinds, however, represent only the tip of the iceberg, and it 
is at the lower reaches that the historian, by comparison with the anthropologist, is 
most hampered, since, unless an accusation reached the law-courts, it is unlikely to 
have left any mark on the surviving evidence.  The only substantial exception to this 
rule is constituted by the case-books of the contemporary doctors and astrologers who 
were consulted by persons who believed themselves to have been bewitched.  The 
evidence they contain is sufficient to confirm that formal accusations of witchcraft 
represented only a small proportion of the suspicions and allegation made in everyday 
life.  (52-53)  
 
Thomas‘s article implies that the fear and perception of bewitching phenomena or 
beliefs about it were rather widespread and more or less commonly held.  This would make 
sense, given the number of people maintaining superstitious beliefs and practices in 
Shakespeare‘s day.  The belief in the efficacy of witchcraft was the foundation of its seeming 
power and as long as ―natural philosophy‖ was unable to provide more conclusive, scientific 
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explanations of certain mysterious circumstances and events, the courts and the pulpits would 
continue to host arguments in pursuit of the ―true‖ facts or story. 
However, the work of Reginald Scot, Johan Weyer, Sir Francis Bacon, and those who 
followed in their skepticism ultimately led to a more scientific attempt to deny witchcraft‘s 
practical efficacy; but the belief in it has never been truly rooted out of the popular thought.  
As the seventeenth century began, magic was beginning to be considered more of a 
phenomenon of folk belief, while sciences such as alchemy and astrology sought to provide 
more logical explanations for various natural philosophies.  Regardless of the contemporary 
academic debates, demonology was still a powerfully operative belief overall.  Nathan 
Johnstone‘s The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England, details some of the reasons 
for this: 
In England the concept of the Devil underwent a very subtle process of cultural 
change in the hands of the Protestant reforming clergy.  They were convinced that 
Satan offered an intimate threat to every Christian, especially when his agency was 
hidden from perception by the physical senses.  This conviction was driven equally by 
a sense of personal danger in the face of demonic power, and by a belief that 
diabolism lay concealed behind the superficial piety of the Catholic church.  The 
reformers did not wish to overturn traditional belief in the Devil as they did more 
high-profile aspects of Catholic religion such as eucharistic piety or the doctrine of 
good works, and hence there was no explicit reform of demonological theology.  
Instead a characteristically Protestant demonism emerged from a subtle realignment of 
emphasis rather than an open attack upon tradition.  The central focus of this change 
was to emphasise the Devil‘s power of temptation, especially his ability to enter 
directly into the mind and plant thoughts within it that led people to sin. (1-2)   
 
This subtle development of the Devil now being able to plant thoughts, though still not to 
know or move them, gave even more power to Satan and released a person even further from 
individual culpability.  However, that person was not relieved of responsibility; these 
implanted temptations were to be resisted and destroyed. 
Daemonologie (printed in Scotland in 1597, and again in London in 1603), reflected 
many commonly held beliefs of that period as well.  While James I was loath to attribute 
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actual power to witches, he was initially satisfied that there was a power proceeding from the 
Devil.  This power was, according to James, deceptively employed.  It could catch an unwary 
soul, and make a fool of anyone who believed he could control infernal forces: 
…it is no power inherent in the circles, or in the holines of the names of God 
blasphemousslie vsed: nor in whatsoeuer rites or ceremonies at that time vsed, that 
either can raise any infernall spirit, or yet limitat him perforce within or without these 
circles.  For it is he onelie, the father of all lyes, who hauing first of all prescribed that 
forme of doing, feining himselfe to be commanded & restreined thereby, wil be loath 
to passe the boundes of these injunctiones; aswell thereby to make them glory in the 
impiring ouer him (as I saide before:) As likewise to make himselfe so to be trusted in 
these little thinges, that he may haue the better commoditie thereafter, to decieue them 
in the end with a tricke once for all; I meane the euerlasting perdition of their soul & 
body. (16-17)    
 
This idea that the Devil is ―the father of all lyes,‖ references John 8:44 (Geneva):  
Ye are of your father the deuill, and the lustes of your father yee will doe: he hath bene 
a murtherer from the beginning, and abode not in the trueth, because there is no trueth 
in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh hee of his owne: for he is a liar, and the 
father thereof.  
 
It is a potent phrase in that it reinforces the idea that the Devil is the ultimate deceiver, 
including his explanations of things like charms, conjurations or future events; and like nearly 
everything else the Devil said, his explanations were not to be trusted—especially in his 
supposed obedience to God.  A favorite trick of the Devil, apparently, was ―feining himselfe 
to be commanded & restreined‖ to create a false sense of confidence and control in a given 
victim.  The trap would spring later at the most auspicious time to serve his larger purpose: to 
take the unwary or unrighteous by any attractive means possible in order to secure the 
―euerlasting perdition of their soul & body.‖   
As a theoretical explanation of the workings of demonism, such a model makes a kind 
of intellectual sense.  But the people who felt victimized by maleficium maintained a more 
visceral connection to the issue.  As Johnstone argues it, 
 53 
…demonism maintained a hold in early modern culture because its identification of 
diabolic agency within religious, social and political commonplaces allowed people to 
engage with an experience of the Devil which was positively felt. (17) 
 
This development toward the personal experience of the Devil naturally required an encounter 
with sense theory and specifically the primacy accorded to the perception of the demonic 
influence.  Here, for Johnstone, is the crux of the issue: 
The sense of the weakness of the physical senses and the mental faculties to provide 
adequate insight into the spiritual within the world defined by extension the nature of 
the Devil‘s most formidable agency.  Man‘s perceptual weakness was made the first 
principle of diabolic activity, the surest means by which the Devil exercised his power 
over humanity.  Thus Satan‘s hidden influence on the conscience came to define his 
relationship with men over the external manifestations of his power which had 
traditionally comprised his remit of activity. (287)  
 
In other words, any inability of the human senses or inspiration (―right‖ reasoning) to explain 
adequately the role of Christian spirituality in the world has the potential to leave human 
thought vulnerable to diabolic influence or activity.  The limitations of perception engender a 
kind of mental void where misperception can exist and such a void in this instance could 
provide a space for Chaos to enter in. 
Shumaker explains why the Devil was a convenient solution to the logical difficulties 
revealed in the construct of assigning supposed magical power to the manipulations or willful 
intents of mankind, while the church was insisting ―that power belongeth unto God‖ (Psalms 
62:11): 
First, it was essential that the charms themselves be thought ineffectual, that 
doubts arise about a universe so structured as to make enchantments operative.  This 
step was taken with the emergence of a conviction that devils were the real agents of 
all the mischief.  The demon was not constrained by the witch‘s rigamaroles but seized 
upon her ill will as an excuse to do injuries by which, because she had assented to 
them, his claim to her soul would be established.  At the same time, of course, he 
would gain satisfaction from the exercise of his malevolence upon the immediate 
victims… (91) 
 
The implication here is that infernal powers took advantage of a person‘s malicious intent as 
an opportunity to create more havoc—usually laying claim to everyone involved who did not 
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defend against the maleficium.  That this exercise of malevolence was an easy thing for the 
Devil to accomplish is noted by Andrew Hyperius: 
And it is no hard matter for the deuill, or his disciples beinge studious of magike, to do 
these thinges.  For the senses of men are by diuers meanes deceyued.  First, when that 
some fraude or chaunge is committed in that thinge which is laide before the senses.  
By which reasone the deuill taketh to him, and againe putteth from him, suche bodies 
or shapes as pleseth him: by the same reason he can shewe foorth all kinde of bodies 
and shapes, and put forth the same to the senses, to be sene and touched and by some 
meanes or other to be perceyued. (f4)  (87) 
 
The Devil, in this conception, possessed the power not only to persuade and tempt, but also to 
affect the perception of normal reality by showing ―foorth all kinde of bodies and shapes‖ that 
can be ―sene and touched and by some meanes or other to be perceyued.‖  This is more 
suggestive of a misperception rather than a misinterpretation of evidence.  Misperception 
alters the actual process of gathering the data into the evaluative faculties, rather than 
mistaking their meaning once they have been properly acquired. 
Until modern psychology began to attempt to explain the effects of fascination as the 
effects of a form of hypnosis, the understanding of this type of bewitchment remained 
mysterious.  Sir Reginald Scot cites Virgil and Theocritus (among others) as proponents of the 
belief that fascination proceeds from physical causes, the most potent of which is the 
―inchanting or bewitching eie.‖  In the passage below, he describes the more positive facet of 
the phenomenon as he attempts to show its workings: 
But as there is fascination and witchcraft by malicious and angrie eies unto 
displeasure: so are there witching aspects, tending contrariwise to love, or at the least, 
to be procuring of good will and liking.  For if the fascination or witchcraft be brought 
to passe or provoked by the desire, by the wishing and coveting of anie beautifull 
shape or favor, the venome, is strained through the eies, though it be from a far, and 
the imagination of a beautiful forme resteth in the hart of the lover, and kindleth the 
fier wherewith it is afflicted.  And bicause the most delicate, sweete, and tender bloud 
of the belooved doth there wander, his countenance is there represented shining in his 
owne bloud, and cannot there be quiet; and is so haled from thence, that the bloud of 
him that is wounded, reboundeth and slippeth into the wounder, according to the 
saieng of Lucretius the poet to the like purpose and meaning in these verses. 
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  Idque petit corpus, mens unde est saucia amore, 
Námque omnes plerúnque cadunt in vulnus, & illam 
Emicat in partem sanguis, unde icimur ictu; 
Et si cominùs est, os tum ruber occupat humor:  
 
  And to that bodie tis rebounded, 
  From whence the mind by love is wounded, 
  For in a maner all and some, 
  Into that wound of love doo come, 
  And to that part the bloud doth flee 
  From whence with stroke we striken bee, 
  If hard at hand, and neere in place, 
  Then ruddie colour filles the face. (400)  
 
The understanding of the workings of fascination took a good deal of time to evolve towards 
the purely psychological model.  Yet as early as 1605, Francis Bacon, after describing the 
workings of fascination in The Advancement of Learning, went on to observe that it is not 
infectious spirits, but the imagination‘s ―transmissions…without the mediation of the sences‖ 
(105), i.e., a purely mental communication producing a ―conceit,‖ that is the key to 
fascination‘s mesmeric effects.  Bacon was perhaps the earliest and most authoritative author 
to separate fascination from magic, even if he neglected to pursue its workings. 
 As late as the early eighteenth century, fascinating bewitchment was still tied to the 
concept of magic and the influence of spirits.  It was not until Franz Anton Mesmer‘s work 
and notoriety in the 1770s that fascination and mental malpractice began to be more clearly 
seen as a psychological effect.  Stuart Clark, in Thinking With Demons, cites William Whiston 
(Account of the daemoniacks, 1737), and Joseph Glanvill (Saducismus triumphatus, 1689) in 
his illustration of the ongoing attempts to discern fascination‘s source of power: 
As late as 1737, William Whiston, Newton‘s disciple and his successor in the 
Lucasian chair of mathematics, wrote that the assaults of invisible demons, as long as 
they were well attested, were ‗no more to be denied, because we cannot, at present, 
give a direct solution of them, than are Mr. Boyle‘s experiments about the elasticity of 
the air; or Sir Isaac Newton‘s demonstrations about the power of gravity, are to be 
denied, because neither of them are to be solved by mechanical causes.‘  Of the causes 
of ‗fascination‘, Glanvill said: ‗this kind of agency is as conceivable as any one of 
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those qualities ignorance hath cal‘d Sympathy and Antipathy, the reality of which we 
doubt not, though the manner of action be unknown.‘  (306) 
 
As investigations into the causes progressed, the Devil and his demons gradually 
receded from the scientific understanding of fascination.  With early modern science 
enthusiastically pursuing a more thorough investigation into observable phenomena, some 
beliefs were disproved and dismissed while others began to be understood in their true 
essence.  However, the plays of the Renaissance dramatists were not yet ready to approach 
susceptibility and suggestibility from a purely scientific model, and certainly the box office 
demanded dramatically engaging ―hooks‖ for the popular audience.  Gods, demons, spirits 
and sprites therefore, were alive, well, and popular figures upon the Elizabethan and Jacobean 
stages.  To gain a clearer understanding of the pre-Enlightenment folk beliefs regarding 
fascination, it is expedient to consider a brief overview of the ―evil eye‖ –how it was thought 
to work, and how it probably did its work.  The central and demonstrable element on both the 
world‘s stage and the playhouse‘s stage was human belief and its attendant behavior. 
 
The Evil Eye and Mesmeric Suggestion 
 
Is it possible to see the attributes of the modern day concepts of mesmerism and 
hypnotism in what the Elizabethans defined as fascination?  This charismatic power over 
another person‘s will was traditionally thought to be aided by a pact with a supernatural force, 
which is still a belief in many cultures even in the twenty-first century.  A more natural 
explanation of the phenomenon‘s efficacy, according to someone like Reginald Scot, involves 
a type of chemical transference or reaction. The binding power of fascination in this model 
seems much like a poison or virus that works on long after its introduction. 
Poisonous concepts, suggestions and suppositions certainly had a similar power to the 
material toxins—as Thomas Wright says in Passions of the Minde in Generall:  
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…a false imagination corrupteth the vnderstanding, making it beleeue that things are 
better than they are in very deed.  And by this meanes, the wit two wayes is troubled; 
first, in that the vehemency of the imagination causeth a vehement apprehension and 
iudgement of the wit; secondarily, the false representation breedeth a false conceit in 
the minde: and by these we proue the imagination and passions to preuaile so mightily, 
that men, in great paine, or exceeding pleasure, can scarce speake, see, heare, or thinke 
of any thing, which concerneth not their passion. (52)  
 
Planted in a susceptible thought, might they work their effects like Iago‘s ―poisonous 
minerall?‖  Something like this is the intent of his plot against Othello when he reveals: 
…that I doe suspect the lustie Moore, 
Hath leap‘d into my seate, the thought whereof 
Doth like a poisonous minerall gnaw my inwards, 
And nothing can, or shall content my soule, 
Till I am euen‘d with him, wife, for wife: 
Or failing so, yet that I put the Moore, 
At least, into a Iealousie so strong, 
That Iudgement cannot cure;… (4.976-983)  
 
The poison is Iago's mental conviction that he has been cuckholded by Othello.  By 
implication in the text, if Iago cannot be ―euen‘d with him, wife, for wife,‖ then he will accept 
the consolation of projecting his own jealousy upon Othello—presumably to suffer the same 
gnawing of "inwards" that plagues Iago. 
 With such overt maleficium directly stated to the audience, there is no question of 
Iago‘s intent.  The question for the audience to consider revolves around whether Iago has 
succeeded in leading Othello to misperceive as well as to misinterpret the reality around him.  
If Iago can alter Othello‘s sense of reality regarding his identity and relationships he will then 
have achieved, in Othello‘s thought, a fascination of ―Iealousie so strong, / That Iudgement 
cannot cure.‖ 
In Pale Hecate’s Team, K. M. Briggs lists ―Some Terms Used in the Writings on 
Witchcraft and Magic.‖   There, fascination is described as ―Bewitching by the power of the 
evil eye‖ (223).  Fascination was, in fact, a rather well-recognized phenomenon in its 
manifestation as the ―evil eye;‖ the number of authorities who were cognizant of the presence 
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and power of the evil eye was impressive, as Fredrick Elworthy notes in The Evil Eye and 
Practices of Superstition: 
There were two kinds of fascination among the ancients, the moral and the 
natural, and this belief is still held.  The moral power was that exercised by the will.  It 
was against the users of this, that the special laws of the Romans were directed.  These 
included all those who practised incantation and malignant arts.  More terrible were, 
and still are, those in whom the faculty of the evil eye was natural, whose baneful look 
was unconscious, whose eye threw out radios perniciosos, which by a sort of 
mesmeric power acted upon the nervous system of the victim.  It has always been 
recognised as a rule of good manners never to praise immoderately lest the speaker 
should fascinate against his will. (32-33)  
 
As for the variety of thinkers that more or less accepted this idea, Shumaker cites Johannes 
Leonardo Vairo‘s 1583 work De Fascino when he explains that: 
Leonardo Vairo, in an interesting and ultimately rather skeptical document 
about enchantments (including the evil eye) called De fascino libri tres (1583), 
supports his assertions that ―nearly all authors, not merely Latins and Arabs but also 
Greeks,‖ accepted the reality of facsinum by citing Aristotle, Alexander 
Aphrodisiensis, Plutarch, Heliodorus, Isigonus, Pliny, Nymphodorus, Apollonides, 
Philarchus, Algazel, Avicenna, Pomponatius Solinus, Philostratus, Virgil, Ioannes 
Franciscus Ponzinibius, and Petrus de Tarantasia at one burst before slowing down in 
order to bring in others more at leisure.  The list is in no way unusual. (74) 
[Shumaker quotes Vairo in Vairo, Ioannes.  De fascino libri tres.  (Parisiis: Apud 
Nicolaum Chesneau, 1583), pp. 2-3 (I, i)] 
 
Elworthy devotes considerable attention to the way in which the concept of the evil eye and 
its description as fascination is: 
...one of the hereditary and instinctive convictions of mankind…The belief that there 
is a power of evil working, which is ejaculated (as Bacon says) upon any object it 
beholds, has existed in all times and in all countries.  It was adopted and sanctioned 
alike by the Fathers of the Church, by mediaeval physicians, and all writers on occult 
science; while in our own day it still exists among all savage nations, and even here in 
England in our very midst. (3) 
 
Elworthy‘s claim that ―all writers on occult science‖ sanctioned the validity of  
 
fascination is a bit too absolute in its certainty, but he nevertheless highlights that this binding  
 
power—however it was delivered—was more or less generally accepted as an actual force.  In  
 
Joshua Gregory‘s article ―Magic, Fascination, and Suggestion,‖ there is a citation from an  
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Arabian proverb: ―The Evil Eye owns two-thirds of the grave-yard‖ (146).  As part of his  
 
short survey from evil eye superstitions to psycho-kinesis via Bacon and others, he goes on to  
 
observe: 
 
The deadly Evil Eye … is the source of ―Fascination,‖ as when strong imagination 
acts through the eyes of malicious old women who injure children.  Fascination 
became a common name for what was also called ―forcible imagination,‖ or, more 
simply, ―Imagination‖—conceived to have power. (146) 
 
He mentions the connection between belief and physical causation (which will be developed 
in more detail in this study as part of the next chapter, ―The Primacy of Perception‖), and he 
argues that  
…it is more effective to work by the Imagination of another who believes in your 
power to do strange things.  Such Imagination has most force upon things with the 
lightest and easiest motions.  Thus it works most easily upon the ―spirits of men.‖  
These are the traditional ―animal spirits‖ racing through conduit nerves to serve 
sensation or excite movement. (148-149)  
 
 In a more recent article, Amica Lykiardopoulos identifies the main elements and 
issues of fascination as the evil eye—what was attributed to the phenomenon and what it left 
unexplained.  She makes note of Elworthy‘s work, but brings a more fully delineated 
approach to the central issues of the concept.  The following are her observations and relevant 
ideas from ―The Evil Eye: Towards an Exhaustive Study:‖ 
The belief that a glance can damage life and property, commonly known as 
evil eye, overlooking, fascination, mal’d’occhio or malocchio, gettatura, has been 
widespread in both westernized and non-westernized societies, in the past, as it is now.  
It has been found in ancient Babylonia, Egypt, the Graeco-Roman world, and 
Talmudic Judaism, and also in India, China, Africa, as well as among the Eskimos and 
American Indians.  Several writers hold that the belief is universal…Pliny, for 
example, states that special laws were enacted against injury to crops by incantation, 
excantation, or fascination.  Elworthy goes so far as to imply that the evil eye is the 
basis and origin of the Magical Arts.  It may be assumed that the belief in the evil eye 
is the fear of potentially harmful powers outside the sphere of human control, 
projected to certain members of the community. (222-223) 
 
a. Possessors 
Possessors of the evil eye, or people capable of causing harm through their 
glance, can be practically anybody.  (223) 
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b. Susceptibility 
There is almost no exception as to whom or what can be susceptible to the  
influence of the evil eye… 
Prominent people are believed to be particularly susceptible to the evil  
eye, and this is no wonder, since to be prominent would mean to be powerful, 
in one way or another, and this, in turn, may often cause other people‘s envy. 
(224) 
 
c. Explanations 
The actual process of how the evil eye is cast is not usually mentioned  
although it is supposed to involve a conscious wish on the part of the 
possessors to harm the object of their malevolence.  This wish may or may not 
be actually pronounced.  Traditionally, no attempts to explain the power have 
been made, and it was usually attributed to the influence of evil 
entities…When Mesmerism or hypnotism came into vogue, fascination was 
explained as the hypnotic power of a person over others…The direct 
consequences are always harmful to the receiver of the action, ranging from 
mild symptoms like fever or headache, to actual destruction or death.  (224-
225) 
 
 Lykiardopoulos‘s analysis identifies three key issues which find residence in the plots 
of Macbeth and Othello: projection, susceptibility and the ill will of maleficium.  Even if the 
characters in the stories remain unaware of the operation of the influences of fascination, the 
audience at these plays has the potential to watch its operation—if they are aware of the 
causal elements. 
Modern science has yet to find that there is validity in the theory that spirits or vapors 
actually flow physically from one person to another via the eyes, inducing a hypnotic state.  
The ―beames,‖ ―streames,‖ and ―vapors‖ of fascination are most likely more incorporeal in 
their essence.  Perhaps the beames might indicate the force of personal magnetism or 
charisma, the streames signify the fixation and binding of the victim‘s thought and the vapors 
indicate the physical reactions to the undue mental stimulus?  The actual physics involved in 
fascination or mesmeric suggestion are not so far removed from the early modern concept.  
Even by taking the terms literally, we can entertain the theory that sound waves which 
emanate from the vibrations of one person‘s vocal cords, disturbing the surrounding air, are 
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received as rhythmic impressions on another person‘s eardrum.  These impressions are then 
decoded into a recognizable communication.  Truth has nothing to do with this process; it is 
simply a conveyance of information.  The information is carried to the conscious thought, i.e. 
the imaginative faculties of the sixteenth-century model, and processed there for further 
evaluation.  The ―beame‖ could be sound.  Light waves permit the comprehension of 
information as they reflect off of various surfaces and land upon the retina.  Visual stimuli are 
then decoded in much the same manner by the cognitive faculties and the imagination.  The 
―streame‖ could be light or visual stimulus. 
These physical conduits do nothing more than relay information eventually to the 
imaginative faculties.  What the information translates into—for better or worse—is carried 
by ―animal spirits‖ (the ―vapors,‖ perhaps) within the body, which may in turn cause physical 
reactions.  These animal spirits of the body are not to be confused with demonic spirits—
familiars and the like.  In a bio-mechanical model, they are more suggestive of neural 
pathways rather than whispering demons.  In all, it serves to support the perspicacity of the 
mechanics of the Renaissance model and points to ways in which our current understanding is 
still resonant with the early modern model. 
The malice thought to be introduced via the evil eye, in the absence of any material 
transference was arguably the powerful result of the human propensity of suggestibility—as 
the perceived connection with the imagination indicates.  This mental activity could induce an 
individual to behave in exactly the same manner that the plaintiffs against witchcraft claimed 
for it as its external manifestations in the court cases.  It may have been viewed as witchcraft, 
but fascination‘s operation in the realm of suggestibility is the essence of its efficacy, and 
perhaps this is how it has endured as a concept in the English language, thought and culture. 
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John F. Schumaker notes the universality of suggestibility in ―The Adaptive Value of 
Suggestibility and Dissociation‖:   
Nothing is, in fact, more uniquely human than the intriguing class of behavior that is 
broadly defined as ―suggestibility.‖  A global perspective will reveal that 
suggestibility is one of the very few categories of behavior that is universal by strict 
definition…We find suggestibility, just as we do religiosity, in virtually all cultures of 
the world. (108)   
 
He even humorously proposes that humanity should perhaps modify its generic name to 
―homo suggesto-religiousus‖ (108).  But it is his observations regarding ―dissociation‖ and 
―reality-transcendence‖ (119) that are of greater interest:  
As an example, let us use my former belief in ―holy water.‖  I needed to achieve a 
certain degree of dissociation before I could genuinely believe that a bowl of water 
was ―holy water.‖  Certainly, a ―holy water‖ belief qualifies as a suggestive behavior 
since it requires that I accept a communicated proposition, with conviction, without 
adequate grounds for acceptance (McDougall, 1908).  Beyond that, I had adequate 
grounds for nonacceptance, since our priest could be seen drawing the water from an 
ordinary tap!  Regardless, the ―holy water‖ belief was the result of a suggestion that I 
absorbed while in a dissociated state.  The emotional chanting of the choir, the priest‘s 
monotonous voice, the gold incense burner swinging on its chain, the endlessly 
repeated rituals—I went ―under‖ in no time at all.  But, even though in a receptive 
dissociated state, a suggestion was still necessary if I was to come away with that 
―holy water‖ belief. (118) 
 
Though Shumaker displayed susceptibility on that particular point, it does not imply 
that he is susceptible on all points.  Individuals only have the common potential to accept 
suggestions, but not everyone is susceptible.  Susceptibility is tied to acceptance.  Without this 
portal of acceptance, no force of persuasion can manipulate the subject.  Shumaker elaborates 
on this idea in the following explanation: 
Simple logic tells us that a person must be suggestible in order to accept such 
suggestions.  However, we must not fall into the same trap as is possible with regard 
to ―hypnosis.‖  Religion is only one of many procedures for utilizing our dissociative 
and suggestive capacities in the service of reality-transcendence.  And while it is an 
inevitable procedure of all workable cultures, not all people respond to such 
suggestions.  Most religious ceremonies are intended to assist people in the task of 
achieving a dissociated state in which suggestions can be implanted.  Still, just as 
some people do not respond to ―hypnotic‖ procedures, some people do not respond to 
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religious procedures.  This does not change the fact that virtually all people have the 
potential to accept religious beliefs, or suggestions. (119-120) 
 
 It may be that early modern society experienced what we now define as various 
degrees of ―dissociated states,‖ or some form of ―reality transcendence,‖ and called them 
―enchantment,‖ ―charm‖—being ―overlooked‖ or ―bewitched.‖  It is difficult to say where 
bewitchment, reality transcendence or mesmerism reside.  The major difference between 
hypnosis and bewitchment is the degree of control exercised by the hypnotist.  Clinical 
hypnosis strives to control the course of the subject‘s experience in the interests of data 
collection and clarification of the phenomenon.  Fascination seems to be more chaotic; once 
the malice is released or transmitted, there is no sure way to predict the subsequent course of 
events.  There is no experimentation or examination of the phenomenon within its own right; 
mental subornation is an imposition on perception with malice as its main demonstration.   
 The study of hypnosis reveals a few concepts that are seen in the behaviors of 
Shakespeare‘s tragic heroes.  This is not to suggest that these characters are, in fact, 
hypnotized, but rather that their onstage actions conform to behavioral displays shared by 
victims of early modern bewitchment and subjects under hypnosis.  Susceptibility combines 
with suggestibility to produce varying degrees of dissociative mental states.  For example, it 
could be argued that fascination takes hold in the victim‘s thought—perhaps within the 
context of the classic conceptions or forms of the ―evil eye.‖  If the evil eye has true efficacy 
then it is the operative function and follows its own acknowledged methods and procedures.  
If the evil eye does not have any true power, it nevertheless might still appear to be the 
operative power through associations with existing forces that do have power.  Fixation of the 
imagination must, by necessity, follow an individual‘s mental detachment from his discernible 
reality into the acceptance of a proposed, alternative reality.  This ―dissociated‖ state then 
feeds to the imagination information that may conflict with discernible reality, but does so in 
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a manner that the individual‘s conceptual faculties will accept as plausible suggestions of a 
new reality—in Schumaker‘s words, ―reality-transcendence.‖  In a non-dissociated state, such 
conflicting information would either be reconciled or rejected.  Establishing the alternate 
―reality‖ is fundamental to the operation of fascination. 
 Ernest R. Hilgard‘s landmark study of hypnotic phenomena at Stanford University 
makes an attempt to outline some of the workings and salient features of dissociative states in 
Hypnotic Susceptibility.  Though he acknowledges that ―our language is not good for 
specifying states of awareness, because these are not stable enough to permit exact labeling‖ 
(5), he does define seven qualities of the hypnotic state.  He also examines some of the ways 
in which a hypnotist communicates with his subject, and identifies the difference between 
illusion and hallucination.  To summarize these points briefly, the seven identifiers of a 
hypnotic state are: subsidence of the planning function, redistribution/diffusion of attention, 
heightened ability for fantasy production and memory recall, tolerance for persistent reality 
distortion, increased suggestibility, role behavior, and varying degrees of amnesia for what 
transpired within the hypnotic state (c.f. Hilgard, 6-10). 
 While it is not necessary for a subject to conform to every one of these criteria in order 
to be classified as hypnotized or dissociative, many times they are all concurrent in varying 
degrees of ascendancy.  The concept of role behavior is quite interesting as Hilgard describes 
it: 
The suggestions that a subject in hypnosis will accept are not limited to specific acts or 
perceptions; he will, indeed, adopt a suggested role and carry on complex activities 
corresponding to that role.  Perhaps there is something of the actor in each of us; in 
any case, the hypnotized subject will throw himself into a role, particularly if it is a 
congenial one, and act as if he were deeply involved in it. (10)  
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For those who are susceptible to heightened reality-transcendence (and not everyone is), there 
can be a pronounced lack of awareness that they are in a dissociative state.  Hilgard mentions 
a control factor in one of his experiments that establishes this fact: 
In order not to associate hypnosis entirely with responsiveness to suggestions, but to 
consider it in its aspects as an altered state of awareness, subjects in our studies were 
asked to tell us what it was like to be hypnotized…Even among the subjects who 
responded well, only some two-thirds felt confident that they could tell when they 
were in the hypnotic state.  (10-11) 
 
To complicate the study of the awareness of the altered state, those who responded positively 
were not always correct in their estimates; only the deeper states of hypnosis are most readily 
recognized, according to Hilgard. 
 Once a hypnotic condition is introduced, the individual is generally influenced through 
ordinary instructions, direct suggestions, and inhibitory suggestions.  An instruction 
guarantees action only if the subject is deeply dissociative, or if it is something that the 
subject might comply with even outside of the hypnotic state.  Suggestions, conversely, while 
they might be dismissed as absurd in a non-dissociative state, gain a more plausible reality 
under hypnosis, and compliance with the perceived reality can be accomplished without ever 
receiving a specific instruction.  As Hilgard describes below, much depends upon how a 
suggestion is presented: 
An ordinary instruction is given under hypnosis just as it is in the waking 
state, and it leads to a deliberate (voluntary) movement if the subject is cooperating.  
The hypnotist requests: ―Please interlock your fingers.‖  The subject does this within 
hypnosis as he does in the waking state, and there is no implication that he has 
relinquished any control to the hypnotist.  The totally nonsusceptible subject usually 
responds to ordinary instructions just the same as the susceptible one.  This, then, is 
merely cooperative social behavior, of the kind we expect from people acting 
courteously toward each other.  When the ordinary instruction is enhanced by special 
pleading, and the subject is urged to do his utmost, it takes on some additional 
qualities, and may then produce differential effects between the susceptible and the 
nonsusceptible; in its ordinary form, however, it elicits the ordinary social responses 
expected in the waking state. 
A direct suggestion is different.  The hypnotist says: ―Your hand and arm are 
light, and they are beginning to rise from your lap.‖  This is not an invitation to raise 
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the arm and hand, as it would be were this an ordinary instruction.  If the subject raises 
his arm deliberately, as he would if told to raise his arm, he violates an understanding 
that the rise must be ―involuntary.‖  The arm must do the rising; you must not lift it.  
Most adults understand this readily, so that, for the susceptible subject, the arm slowly 
rises, and for the insusceptible subject the arm stays resting in his lap. 
The third type of communication, the inhibitory suggestion, is usually made in 
a more complex three-step fashion, the hypnotist first suggesting an involuntary effect 
(―Your arm is getting stiff‖) and then proposing an inhibition of control (―You cannot 
bend it‖), followed by a test of the inhibition (―Go ahead and try to bend it!‖). Such a 
series of suggestions, involving in the end loss of voluntary control, is sometimes 
called a challenge test, because it ends with a challenge to try to do what the hypnotist 
has said you cannot do.  (98-99) 
 
 Before Hilgard‘s study, Charles Baudouin performed extensive experiments at the 
New Nancy School and published his findings in Suggestion and Autosuggestion.  For a 
twentieth-century readership he wishes to move beyond the controlling and domineering 
aspects of previously held views of suggestion and to ―make a good use of suggestion, 
considering it as one of the natural forces, and looking upon it, not as a power for dominating 
others, but as an instrument of self-mastery‖ (27).  Before arriving at the lofty goal of his 
argument, however, he offers pertinent insights into fascination‘s relationship with suggestion 
theory.  He considers that the etymology of "suggestion" signifies ―to bring in surreptitiously, 
to bring in from underneath‖ (28).  He likens the process to fresh air entering a room through 
the gap between the door and the floor; the suggestion ―enters our consciousness without 
conscious effort on our part and sometimes in defiance of our will‖ (29).  He then focuses 
directly on the phenomenon of fascination, noting how it comes about largely from a process 
of accepted suggestion: 
…let us consider the well-known phenomenon of fascination, where the attention is so 
completely captured by an object that the person concerned continually returns to it in 
spite of himself…The first thing is the working of spontaneous attention.  The isolated 
noise, breaking the silence of the night, naturally attracts the ear.  Then, our attention 
recurring again and again to this noise, we imagine that it is impossible for us to 
refrain from attending.  Next, the idea materialises (here we have suggestion at work), 
and in fact we are no longer able to withdraw the attention.  We have spontaneously 
suggested our own impotence. 
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 We now make repeated efforts to release the attention from the object which 
fascinates it, but at each successive effort we feel that our powerlessness becomes 
more evident.  Here is the remarkable point: the effort counteracts itself, turning to the 
right when it wishes to turn to the left; our effort spontaneously reverses itself in 
accordance with the idea which actually dominates the mind and which has become a 
suggestion—the idea of impotence.  In a word, the more we wish, the less are we able. 
(36-37) 
 
Baudouin then connects fascination with ―obsession, which is nothing more than a 
mental fascination‖ (37).  But it is an extremely powerful captivation of the thought.  It is  
…a fascination by images, memories, ideas, from which we cannot free the mind, 
simply because we think we cannot free it and because this thought becomes a 
suggestion.  The fixed idea is only the ultimate degree of obsession.  Moreover, 
obsession and fascination, which become more overwhelming at every effort made to 
dispel them, can be dispelled by a reflective autosuggestion or by an induced 
suggestion. (37) 
 
Though Baudoin delineates a more modern understanding of fascination, it is nevertheless 
helpful in its theory to illuminate some of the mechanics of the phenomenon.  Especially 
since, as Lykiardopoulos revealed previously, a thorough and generally accepted 
understanding of the workings of fascination did not exist in the sixteenth century.   
In its operation as an illusion of the senses—brought on by, as Baudouin avers, 
―images, memories, ideas, from which we cannot free the mind‖ (37)—suggestion is probably 
what underprops Hyperius‘s statement about bewitching in the Two Commonplaces: 
 
Therefore of these things is manifest, that bewitchinge doth stretch very farre and that 
under it are comprehended all thinges, which are don with the elusion of the senses: 
that thinges are beleued to be sene, harde, and perceyued, which notwithstandinge are 
no such maner of things.  (f4)  (86-87) 
 
Yet Baudouin observes that the mesmerism or fascination can be dispelled by a ―reflective 
autosuggestion or by an induced suggestion‖ (37).  According to Hyperius, prayer (an 
intercession of divine enlightenment or counter-suggestion perhaps) is also an effective 
restorative, as he relates from the story of St. Macharius and the cow/girl delusion.  However 
it is restored, reality perception, rather than transcendence can undo the effects of fascination, 
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breaking the "irrevocable" spell of the Devil.  This clear perception is the only way to relieve 
the situation, because more transcendence, or the substitution of further misperceptions only 
mire the victim more deeply into the miasma of erroneous fantasy.  
Deadly beasts of mythology, and their fabulous powers, take on an anthropomorphized 
quality in one who embodies maleficium—and that person, regardless of stature, can be seen 
to be a deadly threat to health, property and sanity—a human basilisk, or cockatrice.  This 
lends a naturally compelling weight to the imagery within the artifice of the theatre.  In 
Thomas Middleton‘s Women Beware Women, Isabella becomes aware of a plot against her 
virtue, and tells Hippolito: 
ISABELLA [aside.] 
   O shame and horror! 
In that small distance from yon man to me 
 Lies sin enough to make a whole world perish.— 
 ‗Tis time we parted, sir, and left the sight  
 Of one another; nothing can be worse 
 To hurt repentance; for our very eyes 
 Are far more poisonous to religion 
 Than basilisks to them. (4.2.125-140) 
Henry VI lashes out at Suffolk in Shakespeare‘s The First Part of the Contention with the 
vehement: 
 Lay not thy hands on me: forbeare I say, 
 Their touch affrights me as a Serpents sting. 
 Thou baleful Messenger, out of my sight: 
 Vpon thy eye-balls, murderous Tyrannie 
 Sits in grim Maiestie, to fright the World. 
 Looke not vpon me, for thine eyes are wounding; 
 Yet doe not goe away: come Basiliske, 
 And kill the innocent gazer with thy sight: 
 For in the shade of death, I shall finde ioy; 
 In life, but double death, now Gloster’s dead.  (10.1610-1619) 
 
But the most vicious dramatic use of the eye-killing serpent image comes from Richard III.  
In the ―wooing scene‖ with Lady Anne, Richard suggests that she forget the fact that he killed 
her husband and her father in the wars of contention, and agree to marry him.  Her response 
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and the subsequent exchange capture a passionate verbal duel.  Lady Anne is so outraged that 
at one point she spits at Richard, who responds: 
 RICHARD GLOCESTER 
     Why doest thou spitte at me. 
 LADY ANNE 
  Would it were mortall poison for thy sake. 
 RICHARD GLOCESTER 
  Neuer came poison from so sweete a place. 
 LADY ANNE 
  Neuer hung poison on a fouler toade, 
  Out of my sight thou doest infect mine eies. 
 RICHARD GLOCESTER 
  Thine eies sweete Lady haue infected mine. 
 LADY ANNE 
  Would they were basiliskes to strike thee dead. 
 RICHARD GLOCESTER 
  I would they were that I might die at once, 
  For now they kill me with a liuing death: 
  Those eies of thine from mine haue drawen salt teares, 
  Shamd their aspect with store of childish drops:…(2.306-316) 
 
In the theatre, the discovery of the warning signs—suggestion, deception, obsession— 
can be an important part of the argument of the play and a thrilling raising-of-the-stakes of the 
action for the edification of the audience.  The signatory devices which illuminate the action 
and provide a basis for reflection as well as entertainment in the best plays examine the 
complexity of the choices and decisions that lead to salvation or ruin.  They show the 
characters‘ acceptance and rejection of alternatives that determine the human negotiations and 
navigations through the central dilemma.  Shakespeare excelled in presenting some of the 
most engaging questions for consideration, while showing how complex these navigations 
through some ethical arguments can be. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
THE “PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION” 
AND EARLY MODERN SENSE BELIEFS: MIND/BODY MECHANICS 
 
 
…there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so:   
(Hamlet. 7.1180-1181). 
 
―That the Taste of Goods or Evils Doth Greatly Depend on the Opinion we Have of Them‖ 
Fortune doth us neither good nor ill: She only offereth us the seed and matter of it, 
which our minde, more powerfull than she, turneth and applieth as best it pleaseth: as 
the efficient cause and mistris of condition, whether happy or unhappy. 
(Montaigne, ―Chapter XL,‖ Essayes, 290)  
 
The phenomenon of fascination generates no power and manifests no presence, unless 
it is engendered within the faculty of perception.  It is powerful in its illusions but largely 
helpless against clear reasoning and a true picture of present realities.  It underscores a major 
theme running through much of Shakespearean drama: the problem of discerning reality over 
appearance.  Appearance vs. Reality is a rich topic in any study of the public theatre where the 
manipulations of perception present in the drama are echoed and reflected in the enthralling 
effect that theatre can have upon its audience.  The central concerns of the tragic heroes who 
find themselves at the turning point of their lives and are forced to make difficult decisions 
which determine their ultimate fate are made even more compelling in Shakespeare‘s plays 
not only because the heroes weigh moral, strategic, and tactical arguments for and against 
their plans, but also because these decisions are prompted by circumstances that cannot be 
absolutely perceived and evaluated.  The judgments of Othello and Macbeth are complicated 
by the fact that Shakespeare has hinged these dilemmas upon elements that challenge the 
heroes (and, by association, the paying audience) to separate appearances from reality in order 
to make a correct situational evaluation and, subsequently, adopt a proper course of action.  It 
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is important, therefore, to take a brief look at how the process of discerning the situational 
reality relates to the operation of fascination.   
Before an object, utterance, tone or even an odor can be understood, it must first be 
perceived by the sense faculties.  In early modern terms this involves understanding the 
relationship of the body, the humors and spirits, as well as the non-corporeal elements of the 
passions, will and the decision-making processes of the mind.  Perception is a crucial element 
in understanding the actions of Shakespeare‘s heroes, because all action or response proceeds 
from it.  The operative will of the characters is influenced primarily by their perception of 
what constitutes their current reality and the decisions that follow are the result of their 
reasoning faculty‘s reaction to the perceived object or event.  If the perception is accurate and 
―reality‖ is correctly understood according to the shared experience of the participants, the 
response is generally appropriate to the character‘s inherent nature and ability to reason and 
act.  However, if the perception is somehow flawed, then the decision-making process can be 
corrupted by the imposition of a false sense of reality and this can provide an opportunity for 
inappropriate reactions—or characteristic reactions taken to a needlessly dangerous extreme.   
If Shakespeare‘s dramatic dilemmas were based solely on determinism or simple 
deception, they would not have the scope and dimension that separates them from, say, a 
classic Morality play.  But Shakespeare makes his dramatic arguments captivating and 
compelling by showing us men caught up in the fixation of misperception.  What prevents the 
characters from discerning the true reality is the fixation of their thought upon some 
fascinating element of their dilemma—which, as Montaigne muses, can lead to needless 
vexation if ―having the choice of it, if none compell us, we are very fooles, to bandy for that 
partie, which is irksome unto us‖ (269).  Though the process may indeed be difficult, 
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Montaigne argues that the end is certainly within our means in his essay ―That the Taste of 
Goods or Evils Doth Greatly Depend on the Opinion we Have of Them (‗Chapter XL‘)‖: 
Men (saith an ancient Greeke sentence) are tormented by the opinions they 
have of things, and not by things themselves.  It were a great conquest for the ease of 
our miserable humane condition, if any man could establish every where this true 
proposition.  For if evils have no entrance into us, but by our judgment, it seemeth that 
it lieth in our power, either to contemne or turne them to our good.  If things yeeld 
themselves unto our mercie, why should we not have the fruition of them, or apply 
them to our advantage?  If that which we call evill and torment, be neither torment, 
nor evill, but that our fancie only gives it that qualitie, it is in us to change it:…(269)  
 
To illustrate the fixation of misperception, Andre du Laurens mentions a graphically 
humorous example of just how bizarre the extremes can become.  In A Discourse of the 
Preservation of the Sight (1599), du Laurens lists over a dozen cases where ―the most 
fantasticall and foolish imaginations‖ (101) have taken hold in thought.  Case number ―The 
fifteenth‖ is especially curious: 
The pleasantest dotage that euer I read, was of one Sienois a Gentleman, who 
had resolued with himselfe not to pisse, but to dye rather, and that because he 
imagined, that when he first pissed, all his towne would be drowned.  The Phisitions 
shewing him, that all his bodie, and ten thousand moe such as his, were not able to 
containe so much as might drowne the least house in the towne, could not change his 
minde from this foolish imagination.  In the end they seeing his obstinancie, and in 
what danger he put his life, found out a pleasant inuention.  The[y] caused the next 
house to be set on fire, & all the bells in the town to ring, they perswaded diuerse 
servants to crie, to the fire, to the fire, & therewithall send of those of the best account 
in the town, to craue helpe, and shew the Gentleman that there is but one way to saue 
the towne, and that it was, that he should pise quickelie and quench the fire.  Then this 
sillie melancholike man which abstained from pissing for feare of loosing his towne, 
taking it for graunted, that it was now in great hazard, pissed and emptied his bladder 
of all that was in it, and was himselfe by that meanes preserued. (103)  
 
The lengths to which the town worthies had to resort to dispel Sienois‘s misperception shows 
that fascination can be cured, but usually with great difficulty.  A perceptive fault which is 
believed to be accurate by the fascinated person is not easily rectified because there is such a 
close relationship between an individual‘s perception and his sense of reality. 
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In The Primacy of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty attempts to explain the 
phenomenology of perception in some of its more basic forms.  Perception is our window to 
our context—the ―perceived world.‖  It dictates our comprehension of events and objects and 
is the starting point for discernment.  His position on the mind and body as a unified system 
of cognizance agrees well with the early modern concept of the sense faculties: 
…the body is no longer merely an object in the world, under the purview of a 
separated spirit.  It is on the side of the subject; it is our point of view on the world, the 
place where the spirit takes on a certain physical and historical situation.  As Descartes 
once said profoundly, the soul is not merely in the body like a pilot in his ship; it is 
wholly intermingled with the body.  The body, in turn, is wholly animated, and all its 
functions contribute to the perception of objects—an activity long considered by 
philosophy to be pure knowledge. (5)  
 
 Reality cognizance is a complex function in view of its vulnerability to a myriad of 
forces or conditions.  The individual‘s ―point of view on the world‖ can be redirected into 
alternative impressions by mentally entertained suppositions, or it can be distorted by illusions 
caused by physical forces—refracting light, insufficient light, ―subtile thinne humours,‖ or 
―bodies‖ laid against the senses.  Hyperius, again in Two Commonplaces, offers a list of a few 
of these conditions: 
And how saye you by this that the Media or meanes which are put in betwene the  
instrument of the sighte and the bodies laid against it, do often bring to passe, that  
things are iudged to be other then they be.  Through glasse the sense and color is  
chaunged: the same may likewise happen of subtile or thinne humors and exhalations  
dispersed by the ayre nigh vnto vs.  And wood that is parte put into the water,  
appeareth croked, the which notwithstanding is right.  For that, that thinges put  
betweene the instruments of the sences, and the bodies layde againste them, doe cause  
such deceauing shapes.  And these impedimentes can the deuill easilye bring forth, as  
well in the instrument of the sight, as in the instruments of the other sences: and he  
doth so beguile men, that they beleue and percieue other things then in deed they see  
and perceaue. (n.p.)  (90-91)  
The physical aspects of misperception are important to the power of fascination, because they 
lend ―reality‖ to the suppositional arguments of the fascinating fixation.  The victim is much 
 74 
more likely to be held in fascination‘s thrall if he is presented with seeming physical evidence 
and ―proof‖ of the supposition‘s validity. 
In The Elizabethan Malady, Lawrence Babb provides a good outline of some of the 
prevailing medical theories of Shakespeare‘s day.  His overview is useful in targeting those 
theories related to the phenomenon of perception and of the understanding of the mind/body 
relations.  In the following excerpts he situates the key elements of the early modern 
perceptive faculties within their accepted functional model: 
The faculties of sense and motion with which the sensitive soul is endowed are 
subdivided into various senses and motions.  The senses are of two kinds, external and 
internal.  There are five external senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—and 
three internal senses—the common sense, the imagination (often called the phantasy, 
or fancy), and the memory.  The internal senses are located in the brain.  The common 
sense receives impressions of the world outside from the external senses and 
assembles them into composite images.  Its primary function, however, is 
apprehension.  The eye does not know what it sees; the ear does not know what it 
hears. (3) 
 
In man, the rational soul is the ruling power, and the sensitive faculties are its servants.  
It has two divisions—intellectual and volitional, that is, reason and will.  The former, 
which looks at the world through the medium of the imagination, is capable of 
perceiving the essence, not merely the appearance.  It seeks truth through a logical 
train of thought.  It draws conclusions regarding truth and falsehood, good and evil; in 
other words, it is capable of judgment.  The reason determines what is good and what 
is evil and informs the will of its conclusions.  The will, because of an instinct 
implanted in it by God, desires the good and abhors the evil which the reason 
represents to it.  The will is sometimes called the rational appetite because it desires 
the good just as the sensitive affections desire the pleasing, and it abhors the evil just 
as they abhor the displeasing.  When the will conceives a desire or an aversion, a 
corresponding passion normally arises in the sensitive soul.  Thus the will causes 
physical action indirectly through the sensitive passions.  Often the sensitive and 
rational desires conflict; the pleasant is not always the good.  In such a case, the 
sensitive nature should yield, and passions corresponding to the promptings of the will 
should arise.  For the reasonable will is the absolute mistress of the human soul. (3-4) 
 
 Perception does not always imply an accurate apprehension of the total reality; it is a 
process of discernment that occurs as unfoldment rather than instantaneous total 
comprehension.  Operating mostly within the internal ―sensitive‖ faculty of Common Sense, it 
often prompts and leads the Imagination or ―fancy.‖  An object can be perceived, but initially 
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only in part.  The complete reality can remain elusive until such time as the whole is 
assimilated.  When perceiving ideas, rather than objects, the task is even more complicated.  
Again, from Merleau-Ponty comes the idea where: 
We find that perceived things, unlike geometrical objects, are not bounded 
entities whose laws of construction we possess a priori, but that they are open, 
inexhaustible systems which we recognize through a certain style of development, 
although we are never able, in principle, to explore them entirely, and even though 
they never give us more than profiles and perspectival views of themselves.  Finally, 
we find that the perceived world, in its turn, is not a pure object of thought without 
fissures or lacunae; it is, rather, like a universal style shared in by all perceptual 
beings.  While the world no doubt co-ordinates these perceptual beings, we can never 
presume that its work is finished.  Our world, as Malebranche said, is an ‗unfinished 
task.‘ (5-6) 
 
If the modern world appears to phenomenologists to be an ―unfinished task,‖ the 
world of Shakespeare‘s audience, experiencing the confluence of ideas within witchcraft, 
alchemy, astrology, humanism, and the ideological conflicts of the emerging religious 
debates, must have seemed equally open-ended. Correctly perceiving the world is an 
unfinished task that has concerned mankind for centuries.  In the first place, perception 
depends upon the existence of an object or concept—―being.‖  Once being is discerned, there 
is a natural impulse then to attempt to determine ―meaning.‖  Jose Ferrater-Mora addresses 
this component in the following passage from his essay ―Reality as Meaning:‖ 
…realities appear then as seen, understood, meant, conceived, etc.  In some way, 
therefore, meanings are produced.  But they are not to be separated from the 
realities—not only because they ultimately refer to realities but also, and mainly, 
because the very same meanings in turn can be constituted as realities.  Meanings can 
be ―objectified‖ and thus can be turned into intentional, or ―intentionable,‖ objects.  
Thus, for instance, thoughts about realities may in turn be objects of further thoughts 
and, in general, of further ―intentions.‖ (133)  
 
As Ferrater-Mora implies, once a certain reality has been perceived as having being 
and meaning, whether it is a physical or a mental entity, the interpretation of that reality then 
becomes a foundation for subsequent perceptions (or misperceptions) as the meaning itself 
becomes objectified and examined for possible further meaning or intentions.  Regardless of 
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whether the perceived reality is factual or fantastical, thought can continue to scrutinize it ad 
infinitum, as the process of perception is driven by an unlimited number of things to perceive.  
Ferrater-Mora foreshadows how such scrutiny can occupy conscious thought as the individual 
discovers that 
Meaning produces meaning…Meanings are given neither in nor outside of reality once 
and for all.  They result from a relation to the reality which makes it increasingly 
better known and, in consequence, increasingly ―significant.‖ (134)  
 
As an individual‘s thought pursues meaning based on the perception of a concept or a series 
of events, there exists the possibility that the pursuit could be endless.  With thoughts 
producing more thoughts in search of deeper meaning, the individual‘s consciousness can 
potentially be overwhelmed and obsessed with the chase, yet it still can fail to discover the 
essence of a central meaning.  However, a picture of the reality emerges from all of this 
activity and becomes, as Ferrater-Mora says ―significant.‖  In the case of Othello and 
Macbeth, they illustrate their perception of events in their own unique significations, but how 
closely these perceptions are tied to the stage reality as the audience sees it is largely due to 
how these two characters process the suppositions they encounter. 
Even the descriptive devices used to convey meaning, in the case of the poetic 
language of dramatic texts, have the potential to illuminate as well as to obscure the true 
meaning or reality.  On the one hand, language can be the essential tool of expression towards 
understanding, yet, on the other hand, it can create more platforms for additional explanations 
which complicate that understanding.  Ferrater-Mora argues that  
…language does not limit itself to reflecting reality; it turns it into a cluster of 
meanings.  When linguistically expressed, these meanings become objectified, and are 
thus the object of further intentions and possibly of further descriptions. (136)  
 
Meaning can continue to elude pursuit once the faculty of imagination enters the process.  By 
entertaining the possibilities of alternate meanings connected to thoughts and language, it can 
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literally change the picture of the attendant imagery associated with those thoughts and words.  
A simple example is Iago‘s pun on ―honest.‖  Here the meaning and potential imagery alter 
drastically depending upon whether thought focuses on honesty as truth-telling or honesty as 
sexual integrity. 
Mikel Dufrenne addresses the captivating power of some of the functions of the 
faculty of imagination—especially when the object or supposition in question is fictitious.  He 
observes in the following passage from The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience that: 
Imagination makes an object appear which, in spite of its unreality, is so convincing 
that it seizes and engulfs consciousness.  Since imagination is said to manifest the 
capacity of consciousness to nihilate the world, the imagining consciousness is totally 
involved in this activity and cannot negate its own negation.  Only by a sudden turn of 
events, such as an awakening from deep sleep, can it break the enchantment and return 
to the real.  Similarly, thought which relies on images always risks becoming lost in 
them.  Sartre shows clearly that only a considerable reflective power enables one: (a) 
to avoid being the dupe of symbolic schemes which purport to give the solution to a 
problem; and (b) to refuse to lose oneself in images…Imagination is opposed to 
perception as magic is to technique. 
Perception in contrast, aims at the real…we cannot deny the marked difference 
between the dreaming and the perceiving man, that is, between a consciousness which 
turns away from the real and one which aims squarely at the real. (354)  
 
This passage succinctly identifies the key relationship between perception and imagination as 
it relates to the function of fascination.  Perception operates from an intention to construe, 
accurately and alertly, the facets of the object or event.  Imagination operates from an 
intention to assimilate the facets and instead of construing being and meaning from a 
standpoint of objectivity, it works via synthesis (with memory, association, etc.) to form a 
composite and perhaps a more subjective interpretation of the object or event.  Nevertheless, 
this subjective approach is still in the service of discerning reality.   
In Dufrenne‘s ―dreaming/perceiving man‖ model, the imagination turns away from 
contemplation of the real in order to work through the information it receives, while the 
perception focuses on more or less pure discernment.  Yet part of the activity of the 
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imagination is to attempt to contextualize the being and meaning of the perceived object.  
This is complicated by the process of discerning what is false from what might be real as an 
immediately immanent event.  Dufrenne here elaborates on what he calls the ―prereal:‖ 
There is an unreal which is a prereal—the constant anticipation of the real 
without which the real would be, for us, a mere spectacle lacking the depth of space 
and duration…Thus the essential function of imagination is to preform the real in an 
act of expectation which allows us not only to anticipate and recognize the real…but 
also to adhere to it.  In comparison with this function, the fascination with the unreal 
on which Sartre insists appears as a sort of aberration in which the unreal, no longer a 
legitimate means of attaining the real, is posited as an end in itself.  In fact, it is most 
often the real which is aimed at and elaborated upon by the imagination. (355) 
 
Some confusion may arise as the discussion of real, unreal and ―prereal‖ goes through 
the deep analysis of philosophical inquiry.  But for the purposes of the present argument, the 
salient points are that perception seeks the existence and meaning of the things which it 
attempts to evaluate in a rather straightforward act of conscious, observational inquiry, while 
imagination tends to evaluate by means of an associative, non-linear, and conjectural process 
that more readily connects its inquiry with the subconscious.  Dufrenne‘s comment that 
―imagination is opposed to perception‖ illustrates that the two are pursuing different 
objectives, with perception working in support of Reason in the search for true meaning.  
Both imagination and perception are operating towards the discovery of meaning, but they use 
different styles of inquiry and can produce divergent results.   
Merleau-Ponty here discusses the difficulty of grasping an essential ―real:‖ 
The idea of going straight to the essence of things is an inconsistent idea if one thinks 
about it.  What is given is a route, an experience which gradually clarifies itself, which 
gradually rectifies itself and proceeds by dialogue with itself and with others.  Thus 
what we tear away from the dispersion of instants is not an already-made reason; it is, 
as has always been said, a natural light, our openness to something.  What saves us is 
the possibility of a new development, and our power of making even what is false, 
true—by thinking through our errors and replacing them within the domain of truth. 
(21)  
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Perception cannot exist alone in discerning truth.  It is the initial part of a mechanism of 
assimilation that leads to understanding and it is also the crucial first link in any behavior 
chain.  Its impressions are lodged in the imagination until another force, such as inspiration, 
revelation or, tragically, malicious supposition can alter them. 
A similar understanding resonates from the pen of Thomas Wright.  In Passions of the 
Minde in General he presents a series of questions that anticipate the modern inquisitions of 
phenomenology and also serve to sidelight the central perceptual queries of the tragic figures 
from Shakespearean drama: 
I could propound aboue a hundreth questions about the soule and the body, which 
partly are disputed of by Diuines, partly by naturall and morall Philosophers, partly by 
Physitians, all which, I am of opinion, are so abstruse and hidden, that they might be 
defended as Problemes and either part of Contradiction alike impugned.  Some I will 
set downe, that by them coniecture may be made of the rest. 
 
Problemes concerning the substance of our Soules. 
 
 …17  What dependance hath our vnderstanding vpon the imagination 
18 How a corporall imagination concurres to spirituall conceit. 
19 What is apprehension and conceiuing? 
20 What, iudgement and affirming? 
21 What, discourse and inferring?… 
23  How apprehend we so many things together without confusion?… 
37 What is the vniversall obiect of our Vnderstanding?  euery thing, or onely 
the truth of things. 
38 Whereupon commeth the difficulty we find in Vnderstanding, proceedeth  
it from the obiect, or the weaknesse of the faculty, or both?… 
41 What is Art?  what the Idaea in the Artificers minde, by whose direction  
hee frameth his workes?  what is Prudence, Wisedome, the internall speech 
and words of the minde… 
44  What is Conscience?… 
89 What is our fantasie or imagination… 
91  How our Vnderstanding maketh it represent vnto it what it pleaseth. 
92  How our wit can cause it conceiue such obiects as sense neuer could  
present vnto it… 
 
…few or none of these difficulties, which concerne vs so neere as our soules and 
bodies, are throughly as yet, in my iudgement, declared, euen of the profoundest wits; 
for I know not how their best resolutions leaue still our Vnderstandings dry, thirsting 
for a clearer and fresher Fountaine. (300-309)  
 
 80 
Imposed values, or intentionally distorted re-evaluations of perceived things can 
change our relations to established norms. The major difficulty of perception, as Merleau-
Ponty points out, is bound up in the fact that rarely, if ever, is it possible to perceive an object 
or circumstance in its entirety. Yet the effort to do so is essential.  Two of Shakespeare‘s 
tragedies detail the horrific consequences of the failure of that effort.  Should Othello, after 
being seemingly careful to test Iago‘s assertion that Desdemona has been unfaithful to him 
with Cassio, commit an honor killing based upon the insinuations of only one individual?  
Should Macbeth, who has previously fantasized about eliminating King Duncan, take the 
Weird Sisters‘ prognostications as fact and pre-empt the natural order of things when that 
natural order does not at first appear to work out according to his perception?  In both 
instances, they were right to hold to their first instinctive positions.  It was when they were 
persuaded to embrace a suppositional reality that they inaugurated their ruin. 
The Greek concept of hamartia, the ―error of judgment‖ that undergirds the idea of a 
hero‘s ―tragic flaw,‖ is placed within a different frame of view when considered from the 
perspective of perception, imagination and fascination.  Aristotle, in his De Poetica, 
delineates a structure for successful tragic drama that influenced nearly all of the Elizabethan 
English dramatists.  Whether they were attempting to work strictly within its form, or whether 
they were rethinking it to create brilliant new concepts of tragedy, they found Aristotle‘s basic 
observations useful, and modern critics have traced his influence in their work.  Taken 
directly from the Poetics, the decision-making faculties of the tragic hero of the stage operate 
within both his nature and his circumstances.  But the element of hamartia does not suggest 
that the hero should be somehow entirely virtuous, except for a significant defect, which 
causes his ruin.  In fact, Aristotle writes that the protagonist should not be ―pre-eminently 
virtuous and just‖ (1453a, 8-9).  He should be 
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the intermediate kind of personage,…whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him 
not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment, of the number of those in the 
enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of 
note of similar families. (1453a, 8-11)  
 
The complexity of the central character matches Aristotle‘s desire for a layered (but unified) 
plot:   
It follows, therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided.  (1) A good man 
must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to 
happiness.  The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us.  
The second is the most untragic that can be; it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; 
it does not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears.  Nor, 
on the other hand, should (3) an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness 
into misery.  Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us 
to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of 
one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous of fear-inspiring in the 
situation. (1452b, 33 – 1453a, 7) 
 
The perfect Plot, accordingly must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double 
issue; the change in the hero‘s fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on 
the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any 
depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we 
have described, or better, not worse, than that.  Fact also confirms our theory.  (1453a, 
12-18)  
 
The key issue regarding perception, then, is a ―great error‖ rather than an inherent 
defect that makes the hero irrecoverably vulnerable.  Michael Hattaway, in ―Tragedy and 
Political Authority,‖ references Wimsatt and Brooks‘s Literary Criticism when he observes 
that: 
The word from Aristotle that generated the notion of ‗tragic flaw‘ is hamartia.  
Etymologically the word means ‗missing the mark with a bow and arrow‘, an error but 
not necessarily a culpable one.  It designates an action—an error or mistake—rather 
than a flaw in character.  However, by the time of the translation of the New 
Testament from Greek, five hundred years after Aristotle, the word had changed its 
meaning to ‗sin.‘ (118) 
 
Hattaway identifies what might appear to a theatre audience: the tragic hero engaged in 
―sinful‖ actions.  While hamartia‘s meaning may have evolved to include the judgment-laden 
connotations of sin, Aristotle‘s original concept of ―missing the mark‖ might be more 
 82 
effective in invoking that audience‘s pity.  It certainly coincides with the mechanics of 
perception better than whatever might be understood as sin—if indeed ―the taste of goods or 
evils doth greatly depend on the opinion we have of them‖ (Montaigne, 290). 
Before the perceived thing even reaches the seat of reason and judgment, its nature 
and meaning must have already been processed and formalized within a certain bias or 
perspective.  In that space between the true nature of the perceived thing and its form when 
presented to the reasoning faculties, lies the potential for the distortion and manipulation of 
the comprehension of its essence.  The error of judgment becomes a weak portal of the 
mechanism of perception.  Through the manipulation of the victim‘s imagination and 
ultimately his reasoning faculties, a mental fixation can be difficult to expunge—especially if 
those mental changes bring with them physical effects. 
 The ongoing tension between the true nature of the events presented in Shakespearean 
tragedy and their perceived values and meanings—both by the stage characters and by the 
audience—creates an immediacy for Shakespeare‘s arguments that galvanizes focus upon 
them in a way that few other playwrights have achieved.  Yet any literary work that calls into 
question what the individual can and should know, could or should do, invites its audience or 
readership not only to place these questions within a personal context for evaluation, but to 
experience them viscerally, understand the nuances and magnitude of their implications from 
within the aesthetic construct, and ultimately to compare them to the highest conceivable 
sense of the manifestation of reason, or ―logos,‖ as Merleau-Ponty phrases it:  
By these words, the ―primacy of perception,‖ we mean that the experience of 
perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted 
for us; that perception is a nascent logos;…that it summons us to the tasks of 
knowledge and action.  It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, 
but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to 
recover the consciousness of rationality. (25)   
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The Power of the Imagination and the Seat of Reason 
 
Some ascribe all vices to a false and corrupt Imagination, Anger, Revenge, Lust, 
Ambition, Covetousnesse, which preferres false before that which is right and good, 
deluding the soule with false shews and suppositions. 
–Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (123-124)   
 
 Any study that examines a relationship between thinking and acting must identify the 
specific links between mind and body that make that action possible.  Over the centuries, the 
theories regarding this interconnectivity have changed, though even today there is still an on-
going debate as to exactly how the mind and the body interact.  One of the central theories for 
early modern medicine involved the classical theory of humors and spirits—one of the most 
influential doctrines as far as ―psychological‖ issues were concerned.  Actually, ―pre-
psychological‖ might be a more accurate term, as the Elizabethans did not conceptually divide 
psychology from physiology.  As Gail Kern Paster explains in Humoring the Body,  
…there was no way conceptually or discursively to separate the psychological from 
the physiological.  The physical model for what Renaissance philosophers called the 
organic soul—that part of the tripartite soul governing the emotions—was, Katharine 
Park has argued, ―a simple hydraulic one, based on a clear localisation of 
psychological function by organ or system of organs.‖ (12) [Paster quotes Park from 
the Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 469] 
 
―Psychology‖ was originally the study of the psyche, or soul; according to the OED, the word 
first appeared in 1693 in a translation of Blancard’s Physical Dictionary:   
Anthropologia, the Description of a Man, or the Doctrin concerning him.  Bartholine 
divides it into Two Parts; viz. Anatomy which treats of the Body, and Psycology, 
which treats of the Soul. (OED, 2347)   
 
Any ―anatomie‖ of fascination, therefore, must include a delineation of how it works 
upon the mind (the imagination, thereafter the reason and memory), concurrent with its effect 
upon the body (―humours,‖ ―spirits,‖ internal organs and external features).  The salient 
aspects of the phenomenon pertinent to the study of its presence in Macbeth and Othello 
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revolve around the way in which it works and proceeds from a mental conception to a 
physical demonstration, not physical cause to mental effect.  There are various early modern 
medical theories and writings that explain pathologies and mental perturbations resulting from 
improper diet, lack of exercise, exposure to the elements and many other material causes.  
Likewise, there were ailments that seemed to proceed from purely mental causes—such as 
believing that a family member was actually a cow or other beast—which mystified 
Renaissance doctors and invited speculation that the Devil was somehow involved.  The 
language of Macbeth and Othello indicates that any fascinating effects proceed more from 
spectacle and argument rather than the ill-health or the physical intoxication of the hero.  
 Generally, the documents of the time do not treat fascination as one of the symptoms 
of a medical condition.  When it is mentioned, it occurs in relation to magic or a state of awe 
from some extraordinary source.  If one views the words ―fascination‖ and ―bewitchment‖ as 
essentially synonymous (as Veron‘s Dictionary asserts) in early modern writings, then the 
phenomenon is presented as having a certain power to influence behavior, yet at the same 
time is relatively indefinable in its source.  And if the power of fascination does not, in fact, 
come from witchcraft, medicine or the supernatural, but rather from suggestion and the 
fixation of an individual‘s imagination, the operation of the phenomenon loses much of its 
mystery and begins to reveal the true source of its power. 
To view the phenomenon as more of a psychological pathology misrepresented as an 
occult force is to focus directly upon the crux of the issue.  Because Renaissance physiology 
and pre-psychology were bound in the same hide, the mind/body relationship should be 
studied holistically—as Paster envisions it—as a ―psychophysiology‖ (12).  In order to 
demonstrate how fascinated thought translated into physical action, I shall argue that the 
mechanics of that process are as follows: 
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Fascination engages, ―bewitches,‖ the victim‘s thought—specifically encouraging the 
Imagination to obsess upon a certain Suggestion  
which, in turn, 
creates a supposititious Fixation in the Imagination powerful enough to override the 
normal influence and functions of Judgment/Reason, and possibly to compromise 
Memory,  
which, in turn, 
allows the Imagination to dominate the mental processes, including the management 
of the ―Motions‖, i.e., the Emotions, or Passions, 
which, in turn, 
allows Passion-based decision-making to rule the Fascinated thought,  
which, in turn, 
allows the Passions, via the Will, to physically stimulate the Spirits, Humors and Body 
toward a particular and insufficiently interrogated bias or imbalance,  
which, in turn, 
further corrupts the mental processes by the added influence of the Humors, and 
ultimately impels physical actions governed by the new mind/body alignment.  
 
The key element in this construction is the Imagination.  To reiterate the relationship between 
perception and the imagination, Mikel Dufrenne once again illuminates the concept: 
Whatever form imagination may take, it is always linked to perception, and its 
snares are dangerous only in this connection.  From the very fact that perception 
represents an unceasing effort to overcome the seduction of images, we see that 
images are primary and that we reach the real through the unreal.  It is because 
imagination continually enlarges the field of the real which is offered to it and 
furnishes its spatial and temporal depth that appearances gain a certain stability and 
that the real becomes a world—an inexhaustible totality in which appearances arise 
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through the disposition of my body and the direction of my attention…To imagine is 
first of all to open up the possible, which is not necessarily realized in images.  
Imagination is to be distinguished from perception as the possible is distinguished 
from the given, not as the unreal is from the real.  Imagining is reproductive, not 
productive.  If imagining produces anything, it is the possibility of a given.  Imagining 
does not furnish the content as perceived but sees to it that something appears.  Its 
correlate is the possible, and this is why it can get carried away at times. (357)  
 
The Renaissance concept of the workings of the imagination provides not only the 
vital link between sense testimony and reasoned reaction, but also the chaos that results when 
the imagination creates a false reality out of the ―possibilities of the givens‖—the sensory 
data—and also the stored memory.  Imagination is also the key factor in the creation of a 
mental state that is not brought about by bodily dysfunction.  It can create a situation 
independent of the influence of the humors and, subsequently, motivate those humors via the 
passions. 
Robert Burton addresses the concept in detail within Part I of Anatomy of Melancholy.  
In a subsection titled ―Of the force of Imagination,‖ he lists many ―phantasticall visions‖ and 
―absurd suppositions‖ that afflict some unfortunate individuals.  In a lengthy discourse which 
is worth citing, he argues that in many instances these suppositions 
…can be imputed to naught else but to a corrupt and false Imagination.  It works not 
in sicke and melancholy men only, but even most forcibly sometimes in such as are 
sound, it makes them suddainely sicke, and alters their temperature in an instant.  And 
sometimes a strong apprehension, as Valesius proues, will take away Diseases: in both 
kindes it will produce reall effects.  Men if they see but another man tremble, giddy, or 
sicke of some fearefull disease, their apprehension and feare is so strong in this kinde, 
that they will haue the same disease.  Or if by some Southsayer, wise-man, fortune-
teller, or Physition, they be told they hall haue such a disease they will so seriously 
apprehend it, that they will instantly labour of it.  A thing familiar in China, faith 
Riccius the Iesuite, If it be told them they shall be sicke on such a day, when that day 
comes they will surely be sicke, and will be so terribly afflicted, that sometimes they 
dye vpon it. D. Cotta in his discouery of ignorant practitioners of Physicke cap. 8. hath 
two strange stories to this purpose, what fancy is able to doe: The one of a Parsons 
wife in Northamptonshiere, Ao 1607. that coming to a Physition, and told by him that 
she was troubled with the Sciatica, as he coniectured (a disease shee was free from) 
the same night after her returne, vpon his words fell into a grieuous fit of the Sciatica.  
And such another example he hath of another goodwife, that was so troubled with the 
cramp, after the same maner she came by it, because her Physition did but name it.  
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Sometimes death it selfe is caused by force of phantasie.  I haue heard of one that 
coming by chance in company of him, that was thought to be sicke of the Plague 
(which was not so) fell downe suddainely dead.  Another was sick of the Plague with 
conceit. (125-126) 
 
Later, he makes a specific link between the power of the imagination and the phenomenon of 
fascination as a force.  ―Forcible imagination,‖ produces the external effects from one person 
to another: 
So diversly doth this phantasie of ours affect, turne & winde, so imperiously command 
our bodies, which as another can take Proteus or a Camelion allshapes; and is of such 
force, as Ficinus addes, that it can worke vpon others as well as our selues.  How can 
otherwise bleare eyes in one man cause the like affection in another?  Why doth one 
mans yawning make another yawne?  One mans pissing provokes a second many 
times to doe the like?…Why doe Witches and old women fascinate and bewitch 
children, but as Wierus, Paracelsus, Cardan, Mizaldus, Valleriola, and many 
Philosophers thinke, the forcible Imagination of the one party, moues and alters the 
spirits of the other. (127) 
 
Brutus, in Julius Caesar, outlines a poetic model of the struggle that imagination 
provokes in the mental realm as it contends with reason.  He likens it to an internal 
―insurrection‖ when the dread of the impending action comes imaginatively into focus as he 
contemplates the assassination of Caesar: 
 Betweene the acting of a dreadfull thing, 
 And the first motion, all the Interim is 
 Like a Phantasma, or a hideous Dreame: 
 The Genius, and the mortall Instruments 
 Are then in councell; and the state of man, 
 Like to a little Kingdome, suffers then 
 The nature of an Insurrection. (4.625-631)   
 
 Lawrence Babb, in The Elizabethan Malady, Lily Bess Campbell, in Shakespeare’s 
Tragic Heroes, and Gail Kern Paster‘s Humoring the Body provide modern studies of the 
ways in which the humors and the passions interact with human behavior and, in the case of 
Campbell, their influence on Shakespeare‘s characters.  The following brief analysis of the 
overview of the relations of imagination and physical behavior is indebted to their work and 
 88 
to the work of the authors of the fundamental primary sources—Burton, Galen, Aristotle, 
Wright, du Laurens and Bright. 
 The Renaissance concept of the conscious thought was predicated on classical beliefs 
espoused by thinkers such as Aristotle (De Anima) and Galen (Art of Physic), which specified 
physical locations for different faculties.  Babb asserts that, 
The Renaissance derived its information concerning temporal man chiefly from 
writers of ancient times and from medieval writers indebted to classical thought.  The 
principal authorities were Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Augustine, Avicenna, and Aquinas. 
(1)  
 
With respect to the operation of fascination, the salient points within the early modern theory 
of mind/body interaction, center on the internal senses.  These are the prime movers of human 
action.  In addition to the five external senses, sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—which 
interacted with the ―sensitive soul‖—there were three internal senses which interacted with 
the ―rational soul‖: the ―common sense,‖ the imagination (both located in the outer or 
foremost of the three ―cells‖ of the brain), and the memory (located in the rear of the brain).  
Babb supplies the following outline for the hierarchy of the Renaissance concept of the body: 
 
The soul is the force which animates the inert matter of the body and directs its 
activities.  It is one and indivisible.  It is nevertheless, for purposes of analysis and 
description, divided into three sub-souls known as the vegetative (or vegetable) soul, 
the sensitive (or sensible) soul, and the rational (reasonable) soul. 
The vegetative soul is seated in the liver.  Its principal faculties are those of 
nourishment, growth, and reproduction; in general, it directs the humbler physiological 
processes below the level of consciousness.  Plants and animals as well as men have 
vegetative souls.  The sensitive soul has the faculties of feeling and motion.  It has the 
power of perceiving objects other than itself, it evaluates them as pleasing or repellent, 
and it directs motions of the body calculated either to obtain or to avoid them.  It is 
seated in the brain and heart.  Animals as well as men are endowed with sensitive 
souls.  Man is distinguished from all other created beings by the possession of a 
rational soul, located in the brain, which is capable of distinguishing good from evil 
(not merely pleasure from pain), of contemplating itself, and of knowing God.  The 
rational soul is the ―self.‖ (2-3) 
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Man‘s exclusive rational soul, in the middle (highest) ―cell‖ or ―womb‖ of the brain, 
was seen as connected somehow to the immortal essence, and reason was the most likely 
vehicle to transmit the inspirations of the divine.  It was the special element of the link 
between soul and body and was to be the irreproachable agent that governed the body 
according to righteousness.  It was also seen as a faculty endowed exclusively upon mankind 
as a gift from God.  When it was receiving direct inspiration from the divine, it was 
theoretically infallible in its function.  But reason was also responsible for interpreting and 
judging stimuli from the material world.  The perceptive faculties gathered raw data via the 
five senses: light and sound waves, temperature fluctuations, spatial differentials, odors and 
tastes—and this data was processed by the imagination, which could interpret sensory 
impressions and evaluate them beyond the immediate information.  The imagination had an 
analytical function that could determine whether the existing situation was pleasant or painful 
and could assemble composite images from stored memory to contextualize the current 
experience.   
The reasoning ―soul‖ made value judgments on the images and scenarios sent to it 
from the imagination and, when all was in balance, made good decisions with respect to 
possible actions taken by the body.  It took useful operations and stored them in memory, 
which also, interestingly enough, kept a database of information that came directly from the 
imagination.  Incoming data, therefore, was presented to the reasoning faculties after having 
been assembled and contextualized by the imagination.  The reasoning faculties evaluated this 
information by comparing it to data stored in the memory and interrogating it through 
inspiration and its own moral biases.  Once reason made a determination, it would incite the 
passions to impel action if that was what the perceived situation warranted.  These passions 
were powerful forces and reason would choose only the appropriate passion to drive the 
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action.  In a situation of impending physical harm, for example, fear might be invoked to 
cause the body to move away from the threat.  When desire of a person or thing became 
predominant, then love would be aroused to bring the person into closer contact and 
familiarity with the object of desire. 
Where the system becomes vulnerable to dysfunction is when the operative mental 
elements extend beyond or outside of their prescribed parameters.  In much the same way that 
society in the macrocosm experiences disorder when individuals attempt to abrogate the 
social hierarchy, the body experiences chaos in the microcosm when the established order of 
the mental and physical hierarchy is misgoverned.  In the model of fascination, a potentially 
devastating disorder can occur when the imagination is co-opted to work outside of its 
specific assimilative mandate and assume the responsibilities of reason‘s judiciary function 
and the regulation of the passions.  Imagination has formidable creative powers, and reason 
has a certain dependency upon imagination that can render it vulnerable.  As Babb illustrates 
below, the imagination 
…is a faculty which never rests; even when the other sensory and intellectual powers 
are in repose, a stream of images flows aimlessly through the imagination, and when 
one is asleep, this stream continues in his dreams.  It is called the eye of the mind 
because the rational powers see the external world through it and through it alone; a 
new impression must pass successively through the external senses, the common 
sense, and the imagination before the reason may apprehend it. (3)   
 
 The rational (―thinking‖) soul and the sensitive (―acting‖) soul rely on the internal 
powers of what sixteenth-century thought called ―motions,‖ ―affections,‖ ―passions,‖ and 
―perturbations.‖  These terms are virtually synonymous with what modern thought would 
term emotions, and the term that seemed to have the most usage in Shakespeare‘s time was 
―passion.‖  These passions, as with all agents of action, were seated in the sensitive soul, 
specifically in, as Lily B. Campbell states: 
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…the appetitive part of the soul, the part of the sensitive soul which desires or 
avoids,…considered as the great opponent of reason for supremacy in man.  And it is 
in this appetitive part of the sensible soul, or at any rate according to any possible 
division of the soul, it is in this appetitive part of the soul that the passions reside.  
Hence the fundamental moral concern of the period is with the passions and the 
reason. (68) 
 
The general categories of the varied and numerous passions were identified as Concupiscible 
(Love, Hatred, Desire, Aversion, Joy/Pleasure, Sadness/Grief) and Irascible (Boldness, Fear, 
Hope, Despair, Anger). Babb clarifies and summarizes their functions as follows: 
Concupiscible passions arise when the imagination or the reasonable will 
perceives or conceives an object which appeals to it as pleasing or repellent.  If the 
object is pleasing, the motion love is aroused; if painful, the motion hatred.  From love 
arises desire, the inclination to possess whatever one loves; from hatred arises 
aversion, the inclination to shun whatever is abhorrent.  Joy follows the fulfillment of 
desire; sorrow arises when inclination is thwarted.  The irascible passions motivate 
effort toward the satisfaction of the concupiscible passions.  Boldness inspires one to 
meet difficulties and dangers with confidence; fear prompts him to flee from dangers 
with which he apparently cannot cope; hope encourages him to persevere in his 
pursuits; despair persuades him to abandon fruitless endeavors; anger is the impulse 
to fight for the fulfillment of desire or aversion.  These eleven principal passions are 
considerably subdivided.  Ambition, avarice, and sexual love, for example, are 
subdivisions of desire; pity, shame, and remorse are subdivisions of sorrow.  There are 
also compound passions; envy, for instance, is compounded of the desire for 
something and the hatred of its possessor. (4) 
 
The Christian attitude towards the passions followed more of the Peripatetic doctrine 
that passions were only evil when they were not governed by the reasoning faculties, rather 
than the Stoic doctrine which held that all passions were all evil and were to be completely 
rejected and transcended.  Christianity had a slight doctrinal problem with the idea that all 
passions were evil, as Christ was described as having expressed various passions.  Therefore, 
the concept of distinguishing passions from virtues enjoyed a greater popularity.  The 
passions, either of excess or defect, cause the will to summon up chemical reactions within 
the four ―humours‖ and both the animal and vital ―spirits.‖  According to the dominant (and 
sometimes unregulated) passion, this creates a disruption in the orderly flow and balance of 
the fluids that both initiate physical action and influence the mind.  So, in the case of an 
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extreme fixation of fascination driving imagination and passions, the humors and the spirits 
can create a kind of ―feedback loop‖ that provides a secondary chemical reinforcement of the 
aberrant mental condition. 
 To trace the chemical reactions that ultimately impel the limbs to take the actions 
dictated by fascinated thought, it is necessary to understand the basic characteristics of these 
chemicals.  The Renaissance model, to state it very briefly and generally, believed that 
humors and spirits were products of the digestion of food.  When the food entered into the 
stomach, it was turned into a viscous liquid called ―chyle.‖  This initial form of chyle was 
then sent to the liver where it underwent a second ―concoction‖ and was broken down into 
humors: Blood, Choler, Melancholy, and Phlegm. 
 Blood, which was the most desirable humor, warmed and moistened the whole body, 
nourished the organs, muscles and flesh, and by a process known as the ―third digestion,‖ 
actually became flesh.  It was the life-giving humor and its qualities were Hot, Moist, Red and 
Sweet.  It was so vital to the body that it is analogous to Air in the macrocosm (the outside 
world).  Its ―seat‖ or primary residence was in the liver. 
 Choler was a lighter fluid that had a tendency to rise to the higher point of the body.  It 
nourished those parts of the body that were considered ―hot and dry.‖  It provoked the 
expulsion of excrements and its qualities were Hot, Dry, Yellow and Bitter.  It was analogous 
to Fire in the macrocosm and was thin and volatile.  Its seat was in the gall bladder. 
 Phlegm was essentially just partially digested chyle.  If it were fully digested, it would 
become blood.  It nourished those parts that were cold and moist, such as the brain and the 
kidneys, and its qualities were Cold, Moist, Colorless and Tasteless.  It was analogous to 
Water in the macrocosm and its seat was in the lungs—sometimes the kidneys. 
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 Melancholy was the heaviest and the thickest product of the ―second concoction,‖ and 
it tended to sink.  It was the least pure and least nutrimental part of the chyle and was 
considered a type of excrement.  It was analogous to Earth and nourished elements such as 
bones, gristles and sinews.  It also promoted appetite in the stomach and its qualities were 
Cold, Dry, Black and Sour.  Its seat was the spleen. 
 Though the bodily condition of ―Hot and Moist‖ was considered the healthiest and 
―Cold and Dry‖ was tantamount to the condition of death, the ideal proportions of the humors 
were for blood to be the most abundant, then phlegm, melancholy, and finally choler.  
Melancholy was thought to be somehow more useful, though full of dangers, than the 
explosive choler.  It was chiefly the melancholy and choleric humors that provided 
opportunities for corruption.  Too much blood gave ascendancy to such ―airy‖ qualities of 
cheer, bounty, pity, mercy and courtesy; it was innately healthy and an abundance of it was 
not overly problematic.  Phlegmatics were unlikely to contribute to tragic circumstances 
because they manifested conditions of antipathy—a decidedly undramatic quality.  However, 
the humours of Melancholy and Choler were excellent tools of the disease of fascination, 
because their nascent qualities (or as Culpepper says, ―conditions‖) lend themselves well to 
the phenomenon that works as a bewitchment.  Nicholas Culpepper‘s 1652 translation of 
Galen‘s Art of Physic describes the age-old picture of melancholics as 
…naturally covetous, self-lovers, cowards, afraid of their own shadows, fearful, 
careful, solitary, lumpish, unsociable, delight in being alone, stubborn, ambitious, 
envious, of a deep cogitation, obstinate in opinion, mistrustful, suspicious, spiteful, 
squeamish, and yet slovenly, they retain anger long and aim at no small things. (qtd. in 
Aughterson 366)  
 
The description of cholerics is somewhat more complimentary, but is still rife with dangerous 
tendencies: 
As for conditions, they are naturally quick witted, bold, no way shame-faced, furious, 
hasty, quarrelsome, fraudulent, eloquent, courageous, stout-hearted creatures, not 
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given to sleep much, but much given to jesting, mocking and lying.  (qtd. in 
Aughterson 365) 
 
In Shakespearean drama, the melancholic and choleric profiles call to mind the more 
unsavory traits of Macbeth and Othello.  They outline qualities of character that tend toward 
the reactionary and aggressive which is generally considered unwholesome compared to the 
sanguine, and diametrically opposite the tendencies of the phlegmatic. 
After the humors are created from the digested chyle, there is a further refining 
process which takes place in the heart and in the brain.  The ―spirits‖— natural, vital and 
animal—are created out of blood to carry heat, moisture and signals to every necessary organ 
of the body.  The natural spirits are, according to Burton: 
…begotten in the Liuer, and thence dispersed through the Veines, to performe those 
naturall actions.  The Vitall Spirits are made in the Heart of the Naturall, which by the 
Arteries, are transported to all the other parts: if these Spirits cease, the Life ceaseth, 
as in a Syncope or Swouning.  The Animall Spirits are formed of the Vitall, brought vp 
to the Braine, and diffused by the Nerues, to the other Members, giue sence and 
motion to them all. (22)  
 
 In many ways, the Elizabethan sense of how the mind and body works is not too far 
distant from our modern concept.  Exchange ―humours‖ for ―endocrine secretions‖ and 
―spirits‖ for ―neurological impulses,‖ and the model is virtually identical.  The excretory and 
reproductive elements have been ignored here as irrelevant to the discussion, but even they 
have a similar degree of sophistication and currency in their conception.  The system takes a 
command from the rational soul (regardless of whether the Reason or Imagination is in 
charge) and translates it into action by stirring up a Passion which acts upon the biochemical 
system chiefly through the heart. 
 A function of the sensitive soul, passions have a direct effect on the heart by the 
animal spirits contained in the brain.  When reason determines that there is a need for a 
passion, it sends animal spirits to the heart, which dilates or contracts depending on the 
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specific emotion.  At the same time, a signal is sent to the corresponding seat of one of the 
humors and that humor affects the operation of the heart as well.  Pleasant or attractive 
passions expand the heart, sending blood and vital spirits with their attendant heat and 
moisture throughout the system.  Repellent-type passions cause the heart to contract and the 
system loses heat and moisture.  Combative passions send heat, but no moisture, and are 
quick to burn up the system.  Cold and moist ―passions‖ are almost a misnomer, as the 
qualities of cold and moist have little to no effect upon the heart.  Those of a phlegmatic 
disposition tend to be unemotional. 
 Of the three more or less active passions, the attractive ones, such as joy and love, tend 
to promote vitality and growth while the repellent ones, like sadness and despair, are death-
inducing because they drain away vital heat and moisture from the body.  The combative 
passions can be healthy in the sense that they can preserve life through ―fight-or-flight,‖ but if 
left unchecked, the moisture-consuming heat will dry out the body and ultimately exhaust it.  
Because of their intense effects upon the heart, ―any passion, if it is very sudden and violent, 
may kill outright‖ (Babb, 15). 
 Outside of a predisposing physical cause or digestive irregularities that might produce 
a mental condition from a physical disarrangement of the biomechanical system, the passions 
should be viewed less as a material entity, but more as a mental product that initiates a 
physical response through the perturbation of the brain‘s animal spirits.  As the activators of 
the Will, they are the impetus that drives the system.  To equate the process with a crude 
automotive analogy, the forcible imaginations of fascinated thought, like an unregulated 
spark, activate the petrol of the passions.  The passions expand or contract—the resulting 
motion being an explosion or retreat—creating the movement of Will.  Will‘s direct 
connection to the physical body puts the mental and emotional impetus into material action.  
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As in a car, the key to motion is in the regulation of the electric current.  If Reason is the 
governor, the motions are predictable and harmonious.  Unregulated sparks and power surges 
threaten the function of the whole system.   
In theory, the push of the imagination-prompted passions against the undiscerning will 
is the mental/physical connection.  When Imagination guides the Passions instead of Reason, 
the controlling influence of Judgment is laid aside.  Passions can arise from unproven 
assertions or affecting images and fancies, even propositions from a suggested reality that are 
inherently unreasonable.  This proceeding is what makes them dangerous and unpredictable.  
Without the passions, imagination would have no power over the physical.  It would simply 
be a large database for images and speculation—in the more primitive sense of the word.  As 
it is, however, the imagination‘s influence over the passions, in the absence of reason, creates 
an opportunity for fascination to undermine the formidable power of judgment and the 
rational soul.  In fact, this is the only way, in this model, that fascination can have any effect 
whatsoever.  It must work the imagination up into such an enthralled ―phrensie,‖ that 
judgment and reason are suppressed by the runaway imagination and physical action is 
precipitated almost automatically.  There is little delay, in the most acute cases of fascinated 
thought, between conception and implementation.  Unless reason is able to intervene, 
whatever the imaginant perceives as necessary is put into action. 
 Whether a given complaint was seen as proceeding from the operation of manipulative 
internal daemons, an imbalance of the elements in the microcosm, an imbalance of elements 
in the macrocosm, or the enthralled psychophysiology of the victim himself, many writers 
agreed with Robert Burton‘s assertion that restoring order and balance to the patient‘s thought 
was of paramount importance in effecting any lasting cure: 
Perturbations of the minde rectified.  From himselfe, by resisting to the vtmost, confessing his 
grief to a friend, &c. 
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Whosoeuer he is that shall hope to cure this malady in himselfe or any other, must first 
rectifie these passions and perturbations of the mind, the chiefest cure consists in 
them… 
The Bodies mischiefs as Plato proues, proceed from the Soule: and if the minde be not 
first satisfied, the Body can neuer be cured. (359-360) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
THE DEVIL AND HIS "RANGING" 
 
 
The Devil—"Ranging for his Prey" 
 
 
Now on a day when the k children of God came and stoode l before the Lord, Satan m 
came also among them. 
Then the Lord sayde vnto Satan, Whence n commeth thou: And Satan answered the 
Lord, saying, o From compassing the earth to and fro, and from walking in it. 
—Job 1:6,7 
 
The Devil is a legacy of the widespread human tendency to attribute the origin of evil  
to non-human influences. 
     —Richard Cavendish, The Black Arts (281) 
 
 
The belief in supernatural influence upon mankind‘s affairs has been subjected to 
conjecture and theory since the beginning of time and a prolific source of speculation has 
centered upon the presence of evil in human experience.  It is a logical impossibility for 
perfection to engender imperfection, so one of the theological solutions to a creation theory 
that places an all-good Creator in opposition to a chaotic, imperfect (untruthful, unloving) 
influence is to posit that imperfection or evil is not created but somehow allowed to exist.  But 
this only provokes another problem: how does evil have existence if it was not created by 
God, and God created all?  Rather than adopt the more Platonic theory that all evil is seeming 
imperfection, the result of a mistaken human sense of things, many Christian religious 
doctrines have accepted evil as reality and made attempts to reconcile imperfection to the 
theoretical perfection of God‘s Creation.  Some of these attempts have generated the idea of 
an ―adversary‖ which vies for preeminence with a perfect God.  If God did not create evil, it 
either does not exist, or there must theoretically be a second creative source that sponsors evil 
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with God‘s permission.  Such theories provoke energetic contemplation on the practical 
nature of the problem.  History is full of attempts to answer the related questions. 
Despite the witchcraft trials, accusations and volumes of literature devoted to the 
practice of Satanism, and though many groups have historically been accused of devil-
worship, genuine Satanists have probably made up a very small segment of the religious 
community—at least in early modern England.  Though hard evidence for this assertion may 
be difficult to produce, it seems plausible when one considers the various and sometimes 
conflicting justifications for the accusations of witchcraft and devil-worship.  And while 
Shakespeare never directly illustrates the cultish formalism of demonism, he does present 
some of its elements, for example, by his display of ―The Coniuration‖ scene in The First 
Part of the Contention (4.593-662), the ―Apparitions‖ scene in Macbeth (18.1352-1463), and 
in several speeches invoking spiritual entities to fortify the will, to bring some expected 
material gain, or to solemnize a commitment to a potentially violent action. Queen Margaret‘s 
curse in Richard III, ―Why then giue way dull cloudes to my quicke curses:" (3.597-623), 
Lady Macbeth‘s speech ―Come you Spirits, / That tend on mortall thoughts,…"(5.332-346), 
and Othello's "…Like to the Pontic Sea / …I here ingage my words" (9.1903-1912) are three 
of the more famous passages of such invocation.  Othello vows by "yond Marble Heauen" 
(9.1910), but he might not qualify as God's earthly instrument of Justice if his cause is 
erroneous.  In an unrighteous persecution, God, in a doctrinal Christian context, would not 
support the effort.  But in the same theoretical construct, the Devil just might. 
 In a physical form, the Devil was difficult to see, but reports of his works and the work 
of his minions were commonplace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Hyperius cites 
the following example which also indicates the purpose of the Devil‘s agenda (to call the 
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faithful away from true faith) and the main defense against him: calling upon the Savior for 
intervention: 
S. Hierome in the lyfe of Hilarion doth shewe, that the deuill did somtime set forth 
before the saide holy man to be hard of him the cryinge of yong children, the wailing 
and lamentation of women, the noyse of armies, the blating of cattell, and straunge 
sounds of diuers voyces, that he ranne away rather for the sounde than for the sight.  
And a while after he sheweth: as vnawares, when the Mone shined, he sawe a chariot 
with fiery horses to runne vpon him: and when he had caled upon Jesus, before his 
eyes all the pompe was swalowed vp with a sodden openinge of the earth.  He addeth: 
how ofte naked women appered vnto him while he laye, how ofte verie great plentie of 
delicates appered to him beinge an hungred.  And he reckeneth vp certaine other 
thinges.  And all things were on this wise prepared of deuiles, which to call hym away 
from faith, from feruent inuocation, and contemplation of deuine things, did set forth 
things not true, but shapes and images of thinges, or els bodies for the time formed. 
(f4)  (87-89) 
 
In the following citations from Confessions, St. Augustine considered the source of 
evil influence, and wondered how it could come from a perfect creation: 
But again I said, Who made me?  Did not my God, who is not only good, but  
goodness itself?  Whence then came I to will evil and nill good, so that I am thus justly  
punished?  Who set this in me, and ingrafted into me this plant of bitterness, seeing I  
was wholly formed by my most sweet God?  If the devil were the author, whence is  
that same devil?  And if he also by his own perverse will, of a good angel became a  
devil, whence, again, came in him that evil will whereby he became a devil, seeing the  
whole nature of angels was made by that most good Creator? (122) 
 
Where is evil then, and whence, and how crept it in hither?  What is its root, and what 
its seed?  Or hath it no being?  Why then fear we and avoid what is not?  Or if we fear 
it idly, then is that very fear evil, whereby the soul is thus idly goaded and racked.  
Yea, and so much a greater evil, as we have nothing to fear, and yet do fear.  
Therefore either is that evil which we fear, or else evil is, that we fear. (124)  
 
John Calvin comes quickly to the crux of the presence and agency of evil in creation 
and the world, and compared to the rest of his prodigious writings spends relatively little time 
discussing the origins.  For Calvin, it is sufficient that Satan evolved; the real work is 
concerned with how to deal with the manifold sin of the first disobedience caused by Satan‘s 
temptation of Eve, and unite with Christ.  In the Institutes, he summarizes his position: 
But as the devil was created by God, we must remember that this malice which 
we attribute to his nature is not from creation, but from depravation.  Everything 
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damnable in him he brought upon himself, by his revolt and fall.  Of this Scripture 
reminds us, lest, by believing that he was so created at first, we should ascribe to God 
what is most foreign to his nature.  For this reason, Christ declares, (John viii. 44), that 
Satan, when he lies, ―speaketh of his own,‖ and states the reason, ―because he abode 
not in the truth.‖  By saying that he abode not in the truth, he certainly intimates that 
he once was in the truth, and my calling him the father of lies, he puts it out of his 
power to charge God with the depravity of which he was himself the cause.  But 
although the expressions are brief and not very explicit, they are amply sufficient to 
vindicate the majesty of God from every calumny.  And what more does it concern us 
to know of devils? (152)  
 
This secondary, adversarial entity had to be part of the original Creation, yet somehow 
came to oppose the will of God.  The Devil‘s kingdom was believed to have had its own 
infernal hierarchy as a counterfeit to God‘s and some elements resembled the pagan Greek 
and Roman models.  By the time of Shakespeare, the Catholic and Calvinistic Protestant 
traditions had acknowledged a theological structure that placed the Devil directly opposed to 
God, his demons opposed to God's angels, and his human agents opposed to the church‘s 
saints.  The best extrabiblical literary illustration of this concept is John Milton‘s Paradise 
Lost.  Though it was written long after Shakespeare‘s death, it paints a compelling picture of 
the early modern religious concept of God and the Devil.  The Christian story of the creation 
of the adversary is bound up in the scenario of ―The Fall of Lucifer,‖ inspired by the Bible 
and portrayed by Milton below in a distillation of the angel Raphael‘s tale to Adam from 
Books 5 and 6: 
 As yet this world was not, and Chaos wilde  (Book 5, 577-8) 
Reignd where these Heav‘ns now rowl,… 
 
  …th‘ Empyreal Host     
Of Angels by Imperial summons call‘d 
Innumerable before th‘ Almighties Throne 
Forthwith from all the ends of Heav‘n appeerd 
Under thir Hierarchs in order bright…   (583-587) 
 
 Hear all ye Angels, Progenie of Light,   
Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Vertues, Powers, 
Hear my Decree, which unrevok‘t shall stand. 
This day I have begot whom I declare 
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My onely Son, and on this holy Hill 
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold 
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint; 
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow 
All knees in Heav‘n, and shall confess him Lord:  (600-608) 
 
Satan, so call him now, his former name    
Is heard no more in Heav‘n; he of the first, 
If not the first Arch-Angel, great in Power, 
In favour and in praeminence, yet fraught 
With envie against the Son of God, that day 
Honourd by his great Father, and proclaimd 
Messiah King anointed, could not beare 
Through pride that sight, & thought himself impaird. 
Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain, 
Soon as midnight brought on the duskie houre 
Friendliest to sleep and silence, he resolv‘d 
With all his Legions to dislodge, and leave 
Unworshipt, unobey‘d the Throne supream…  (658-670) 
 
With an army of angels loyal to his rebellious cause, Satan does battle with God‘s legions: 
   …with ruinous assault   (Book 6, 216-219) 
 And inextinguishable rage; all Heav‘n 
 Resounded, and had Earth bin then, all Earth 
 Had to her Center shook. 
 
As celestial beings made of eternal substance, no wounds are fatal (though they are very 
painful for the rebels).  It is not until the Son joins the battle that the Satanic Host is defeated 
and ejected from Heaven: 
   …they astonisht all resistance lost,  (6, 838-843) 
 All courage; down thir idle weapons drop‘d; 
 O‘re Shields and Helmes, and helmed heads he rode 
 Of Thrones and mighty Seraphim prostrate, 
 That wisht the Mountains now might be again 
 Thrown on them as a shelter from his ire. 
 
 Yet half his strength he put not forth, but check‘d  (6, 853-879) 
 His Thunder in mid Volie, for he meant 
 Not to destroy, but root them out of Heav‘n: 
 The overthrown he rais‘d, and as a Heard 
 Of Goats or timerous flock together throngd 
 Drove them before him Thunder-struck, pursu‘d 
 With terrors and with furies to the bounds 
 And Chrystal wall of Heav‘n, which op‘ning wide, 
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 Rowld inward, and a spacious Gap disclos‘d 
 Into the wastful Deep; the monstrous sight 
 Strook them with horror backward, but far worse 
 Urg‘d them behind; headlong themselves they threw 
 Down from the verge of Heav‘n, Eternal wrauth 
 Burnt after them to the bottomless pit. 
  Hell heard th‘ unsufferable noise, Hell saw 
 Heav‘n ruining from Heav‘n and would have fled 
 Affrighted; but strict Fate had cast too deep 
 Her dark foundations, and too fast had bound.   
Nine dayes they fell; confounded Chaos roard, 
And felt tenfold confusion in thir fall 
Through his wilde Anarchie, so huge a rout 
Incumberd him with ruin: Hell at last 
Yawning receavd them whole, and on them clos‘d, 
Hell thir fit habitation fraught with fire 
Unquenchable, the house of woe and paine. 
Disburd‘nd Heav‘n rejoic‘d, and soon repaird 
Her mural breach, returning whence it rowld.      (6, 879)  
 
This mythology presents a very interesting concept in placing Satan and his legions in 
competition with mankind to enter (or re-enter) heaven.  For as Satan says in Book I: 
For who can yet beleeve, though after loss,   (1, 631-634) 
That all these puissant Legions, whose exile 
Hath emptied Heav‘n, shall fail to re-ascend 
Self-rais‘d, and repossess thir native seat? 
 
   …our better part remains  (1, 645-662) 
To work in close design, by fraud or guile 
What force effected not: that he no less 
At length from us may find, who overcomes 
By force, hath overcome but half his foe. 
Space may produce new Worlds; whereof so rife 
There went a fame in Heav‘n that he ere long 
Intended to create, and therein plant 
A generation, whom his choice regard 
Should favour equal to the Sons of Heaven: 
Thither, if but to pry, shall be perhaps 
Our first eruption, thither or elsewhere: 
For this Infernal Pit shall never hold 
Caelestial Spirits in Bondage, nor th‘ Abyss 
Long under darkness cover.  But these thoughts 
Full Counsel must mature: Peace is despaird, 
For who can think Submission?  Warr then, Warr 
Open or understood must be resolv‘d. 
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Man is seen as a competitor for the fallen angels‘ lost places in Heaven.  As Satan‘s jealousy 
of God‘s power and Christ‘s honored position caused him to rebel, so man‘s rival status as 
entities groomed to replace the rebels in Heaven causes Satan to envy that state of grace.  He 
resolves to keep mankind from Heaven by making Man unworthy of it.  Thus, he ―enters‖ into 
the serpent in the Garden of Eden, to beguile man into failing a test of obedience—the same 
fault for which he himself was cast out of Heaven. 
The Devil, in the form of the serpent, makes good use of Eve‘s imagination.  By 
suggesting to her that the prohibition against eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of 
Good and Evil was not to protect her from instant death, but to prevent her from becoming ―as 
a god" (Gen. 3:5), the serpent awakened in her the ambition to be more than she already was.  
This mythological being, a talking serpent, represented a prompting to the willful propensities 
of man to look beyond the status quo.  As the scene is portrayed in the Geneva Bible, the 
serpent worked through what Hilgard calls a ―direct suggestion:‖ 
And the woman sayd vnto the serpent, 
We eat of the fruite of ye trees of the garden. 
 
But of the fruite of the tree which is in the mids of the garden, God hath said, Ye  
shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, c least ye die. 
 
Then * the serpent said to the woman, Ye shall not d  + die at all, 
 
But God doth know that when ye shall eate thereof, your eyes shall be opened, 
And ye shall be as gods, e knowing good and euill. 
 
So the woman (seeing that the tree was good for meat, and that it was pleasant to  
the eyes, & a tree to be desired, to get knowledge) tooke of the fruit thereof, & did * 
eat, and gaue also to her husband with her, and he f did eat. 
 
Then the eyes of them both were opened, and they g knew that they were naked,  
and they sewed figge tree leaues together, and made themselues breeches. (Gen 3: 2-7) 
 
The glosses on the side of the biblical page containing the above text clarify that Satan made 
use of the lowly serpent by speaking through him to Eve (a, b).  The primal acts of 
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disobedience to the established order brought in a little chaos to human paradise.  Eve bears 
the initial blame, but Adam is culpable as well; the true mistake is apparently not immediately 
repenting and seeking God‘s forgiveness: 
c. In doubting of Gods threatnings shee yeelded to Satan. 
d. This is Satans chiefest subtilitie, to cause vs not to feare Gods threatnings. 
e. As though he should say, God doeth not forbid you to eat of the fruit, saue that he 
knoweth that if ye should eate thereof, yee should be like to him. 
f. Not so much to please his wife, as moued by ambition at her perswasion. 
g. They began to feele their misery, but they sought not to God for remedy. (A2)  
 
Many of the temptations, quandaries, internal questionings and negotiations 
confronting Othello and Macbeth find their roots resonating in Lucifer's Fall and Adam and 
Eve's expulsion from the Garden.  Both plays feature the issues of doubt or misapprehension 
of an established order, lack of respect for an established order, self-righteous vauntings 
above place, self-justification in transgressions of the law, presumption of ―getting away with 
it,‖ and the absence of a compelling impulse to correct, repent of or repair individual 
transgressions.  Many of these elements bind together in the Renaissance concept of the 
―deadly sin‖ of Superbia, or Pride—generally considered to be the worst, or deadliest of the 
Seven Sins.  Perhaps this is because it was so indelibly associated with Lucifer's Fall? Richard 
Cavendish observes that it seems not only to be a central part of his being, but also a 
motivating force within him—which some people might find irresistibly compelling: 
Evil has its own perverse allure and the greater the powers with which the 
Devil is credited the more his attraction is increased.  The Devil, like God, has been 
constantly pictured in the image of man, and Christians have believed in the great 
archangel‘s revolt against God, in part at least, because it strikes a responsive chord in 
the human heart.  Lucifer is man in rebellion and his pride seems a more worthy 
explanation of the origin of evil... The result has been the tendency to see the Devil as 
a titanic romantic figure, as he is in Paradise Lost—the arch-rebel against authority, 
fearless, determined, defiant in the face of superior force, unhumbled in defeat—and 
to accord him a willing or unwilling admiration.  With all the magnificence of the 
Devil‘s pride and power, it is not surprising that some have attempted to enter his 
service. (289)  
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 The Devil as the chief of all evil and bewitchment in the cultural conceptions of early 
modern Protestantism is a useful context in which to place an argument for fascination as a 
chaotic element in society.  In their essential states, phenomena such as fascination, 
bewitchment, the deadly sins and other undesirable influences can be seen as disordering or 
dissociative states of thought, contrasting with the theology of living "in grace" or a life ―hid 
with Christ in God" (Col. 3: 3).  Evil is a relative perspective and sometimes not altogether 
supportable as a conditional reality if a close analysis is made of its perceived essence.  The 
causal force of evil is even circumspect.  For evil to operate as a force, theoretically, it must 
do so under license from God.  From the marginalia in the Geneva Bible's first chapter of Job 
come explanations to remind us that: 
l:  Because our infirmitie cannot comprehend God in his maiestie, hee is set foorth 
unto us as a King, that our capacitie may be able to understand that which is spoken of 
him. 
 
m:  This declareth that although Satan be adversarie to God, yet hee is compelled to 
obey him, and doe him all homage, without whose permission and appoyntment hee 
can doe nothing. 
 
o:  Herein is described the nature of Satan, which is ever ranging for his prey. 
(Job 1:6,7) 
 
Individual experience and perspective tends to create value judgments of good and 
evil.  Evil does not fit logically within the perfection of Creation—Calvin calls it a 
"depracation"—implying that it is a departure from the truth.  "Evil" is a term for the 
development of disorder, and disorder is not inherently evil.  Perhaps that is a circular way of 
saying that with no Creator, the thing—evil—is nothing.  Disorder is what the Creator 
allegedly made Creation from and the Creator (the Christian Creator in any event) did not add 
evil—He simply organized the Void which existed before the world and time.  It might be 
said that evil is a subjective evaluation of disorder appearing within an ordered Creation.  
However, if God is not the author of disorder, Christian theory assigns it to God's 
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"adversary"—the definition of the word "Satan" in the original Hebrew.  It is the Devil who 
is, as the Gospel of John declares, "…a liar, and the p father thereof" (John 8:44).  The 
marginal note "p" here adds "The authour thereof." 
 The whole rationale for the Devil concept, intellectually, was to find a place to lay off 
some of the uncomfortable burdens of personal responsibility for creating disorder, or 
failures.  Culturally, it was convenient to have an established mythos that aided in the creation 
of common signifiers in order to foster group identities.  But most importantly for the theatre 
arts, the adversarial relationship of God and the Devil provided a generally accepted universal 
conflict that could be dramatized in an almost limitless number of possible scenarios. 
 The mention of the public theatre here might provoke, in the mind of a sixteenth-
century English ―anti-theatricalist,‖ thoughts about the purpose of the work of the Devil.  As 
the Malleus Maleficarum contends, the Devil was employed in the earth, not only to draw 
people to his legions after death, but also as a means of testing and chastisement—one of the 
purgative processes that mankind must supposedly endure to establish his worthiness of 
salvation or grace.  Cavendish provides an interesting study of the way in which human 
concepts of good and evil have been formed and how the concept of the Devil was important 
to Renaissance Christian doctrine: 
It was the Christians who gave the Devil almost the position of a god.  
Convinced of the stainless goodness of God, they sensed and feared the presence of a 
great supernatural Enemy, the quintessence of all evil.  That the Devil sinned through 
pride became and remains the orthodox Catholic belief. 
In the Middle Ages and the early modern world the Devil was a familiar 
reality.  He figured in popular tales, stage plays, mumming dances; he was preached 
from pulpits; he leered or frowned from the walls and windows of churches.  He and 
his legions were everywhere, subtle, knowing, malicious and formidable. (289)  
 
The Devil was indeed a dramatic presence in early modern England—both inside and outside 
of the theatrical context—yet he was still an incorporeal presence, except when he was 
"conjured" to appear onstage.  This was a much easier place for him to exist, because there 
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was no ontological need to explain his presence there.  His metaphysical existence became a 
theatrical reality in the play texts and playing spaces over the centuries.  His popularity there 
bred associations that drew opposition from late sixteenth-century moralists almost as soon as 
the advent of the professional playhouses occurred in London.  In ―The Idolatrous Eye: 
Iconoclasm, Anti-Theatricalism, and the Image of the Elizabethan Theater,‖ Michael 
O‘Connell quotes Philip Stubbes (Anatomie of Abuses) in his initial observation that 
In 1583, seven years after the first public theater was built in London, Philip Stubbes 
declared that all stage plays are ―sucked out of the Devills teates, to nourish us in 
ydolatry heathenrie and sinne.‖ (279)   
 
Perhaps the intent of such a statement was negative publicity, but, ironically, it may 
have only served to associate the traditions and concepts of the Devil more firmly in the 
minds of Shakespeare‘s audience.  O‘Connell shows that ―Identity, whether in individuals or 
in institutions, comes not only of what fosters but what opposes"(281-282).  And far from 
damaging the popularity of theater, it eventually carried on with such momentum that there 
was only one thing to be done in the minds of the anti-theatricalists—what actually was done 
in 1649: the demolition of the public playhouses.  O‘Connell makes the observation  
That such writers saw theater, even what we consider secular theater, in 
religious terms may explain the extraordinary vehemence of their opposition and why 
they could not be satisfied with reform.  For although such anti-theatrical writers as 
John Northbrooke, Anthony Munday, Stubbes, and Gosson inveigh against what they 
see as the dangerous moral corruption of the London theaters, there is for them no 
question of regulating behavior in the playhouses or censoring what was played on 
their stages.  Only a complete extirpation of all theaters and playing would satisfy 
them. (279) 
 
The extirpation took approximately seventy years of sustained effort because the theatres 
were so popular and successful.  Controversies surrounding performances, for example, 
Eastward Ho! (which landed two of its three authors in jail—George Chapman and Ben 
Jonson—and compelled the other one, John Marston, to go underground into a forced retreat), 
sometimes served to stir up even more interest in what was happening onstage.   
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Perhaps, in addition to bull and bear baiting pits, the theatres were seen by some as 
"audience baiting" pits.  Though there is little probability that such a phrase was used in that 
time, authors like Stephen Gosson, in his 1579 The Schoole of Abuse note the dangers of 
exposing oneself  as an audience member to the snares of the ―foulers‖ in the theaters: 
Thus have I set downe of the abuses of poets, pipers and players, which bring us to 
pleasure, slouth, sleepe, sinne, and without repentaunce to death and the devill: (32) 
 
If you doe but listen to the voyce of the fouler, or joyne lookes with an amourous 
gazer, you have already made your selves assaultable, and yeelded your cities to be 
sacked.  A wanton eye is the darte of Cephalus: where it leveleth, there it lighteth, and 
where it hitts it woundeth deepe. (32-49)  
 
 William Rankins directly equates the actors with devils (the baiters, the harriers?) 
when he claims in A Mirrour of Monsters (1587): 
First, they are sent from their great captaine Sathan (under whose banner they beare 
armes) to deceiue the world, to lead the people with intising shewes to the diuell, to 
seduce them to sinne, and well tuned strings, to sound pleasing melodie, when people 
in heapes daunce to the diuell.  But rather seeme they the limbs, proportion, and 
members of Sathan. (n.p.) 
 
It was only natural, one can suppose, that the confusion of players with soldiers of the ―great 
captaine Sathan‖ would come about not only because of the dramatic arguments presented in 
the play texts—requiring the actors to take on various aspects of villainy—but more by what 
was actually occurring in and around the theatres.  It is a matter of historical record that 
theatre performances were opportunities for sexual assignations and thievery amongst the 
audience members.  Some of the London theatres were located in or near what might be called 
adult entertainment districts today.  In ―The Renaissance in Britain,‖ Greg Walker makes the 
point that with the revolution of the professional playhouses, 
…drama, which had been a vehicle for a moral and religious critique of worldly life 
and what we would identify as a consumer society, became unmistakably an integral 
and compromised part of that same commercial culture.  Playgoing had always been 
only problematically related to sober living and moral improvement, but with the 
development of the playhouses, it could no longer seriously be maintained that it was 
primarily a pious activity, akin to attending a sermon or reading a work of improving 
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literature.  The very geography of the theatres proclaimed their proximity to those 
other centres of licentious indulgence and ‗waste‘, the cockpits, bear-baiting rings, 
bowling alleys, and brothels.  And in the plays of Kyd and Marlowe the links became 
all too obvious. (156-157)   
 
Cavendish‘s view that the Devil takes the blame for what many people bring on to 
themselves finds an antecedent in anecdotal form in Martin Luther‘s Commentary on 
Galatians.  The theatre is a handy place to harangue for the ills of society that are therein 
reflected and it does produce its own brand of temporary fascination.  But the phenomenon, if 
it appears to take hold upon an individual‘s thought with no apparent external stimulus, 
provokes theories as to how such a malady can suddenly appear without visible cause.  A 
natural impulse is to attribute such bewitching effects to the magical powers of the Devil, as 
Luther alludes to in the following story from the Commentary: 
Such a thing of late happened to that miserable man Dr. Kraws of Halle, which said, ―I 
have denied Christ, and therefore he standeth now before his Father and accuseth me.‖  
He being blinded with the illusion of the devil, hath so strongly conceived in his mind 
this imagination, that by no exhortation, no consolation, no promises of God he could 
be brought from it; whereupon he despaired, and so miserably destroyed himself.  This 
was a mere lie, a bewitching of the devil, and a fantastical definition of a strange 
Christ, whom the Scripture knoweth not.  For the Scripture setteth forth Christ, not as 
a judge, a tempter, an accuser; but a reconciler, a mediator, a comforter, and a throne 
of grace. (qtd. in Kors 199)  
 
The Devil was not only a powerful imaginative presence in an individual‘s daily life, 
he also had a rich tradition of appearing incarnate on the stages of the medieval dramas that 
were performed well before Christopher Marlowe‘s Faustus conjured Mephistopheles in The 
Tragicall Historie of Dr. Faustus, or Ben Jonson abused him in The Devil is an Ass.  He was 
such a perennially irresistible dramatic force that he has continued to appear, in various forms, 
in plays all the way up to the present day—from the medieval Mystery Cycles to Archibald 
MacLeish‘s J.B. 
The very fact that so many people subscribed to the physical, or more accurately the 
ontological reality of the Devil in sixteenth-century England, created a seemingly logical 
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structure from which to account for events that were detrimental to their everyday lives.  For 
those who were not ready to pursue abstract philosophical concepts, Satan, his minions, and 
his influences sufficed to explain maleficium in a more practical and personal paradigm.  It 
not only helped to conceptualize and explain the phenomenon, it also graphically illustrated 
the attraction that some people could feel towards abandoning the established order conceived 
by church and state.  The Devil, after all, was seductive; he offered personal power, worldly 
riches—things which the poor and disenfranchised might seek after—even at the price of 
one‘s eternal soul.  If he could even attempt to seduce Christ Jesus, who among men could 
feel safe from the Devil‘s attentions?  His power was seen as considerable and subtle; one 
needed an almost Herculean or Christ-like effort to avoid his snares.  If one should, on the 
other hand, try to use the infernal powers for his own ends, one quickly found that these 
powers were equivocal and treacherous.  Yet making the Devil go away was fairly 
straightforward, according to the gospels—one need only tell him to ―get thee behind me‖—
and, surprisingly, the Devil would leave.  At least that is what was supposed to happen.  Or 
perhaps, metaphorically, the mesmeric suggestion that imposed appearances over realities 
would be discovered as a false sense of things and be destroyed.   
Luther imagined Dr. Kraws of Halle as bewitched by the Devil, but in either sense it is 
the recognition of the error that is fundamental to the destruction of its power.  Robert Burton 
advises that one not consent to suggestion or be vexed by the fact that suggestions occur.  
Rather, the solution is to remain unperplexed and unsusceptible—as he advises us in the 1625 
edition of The Anatomy of Melancholy: 
 …although he hath sometimes so slily set upon thee, and so far prevailed, as to 
make thee in some sort to assent to, to delight in such wicked thoughts, yet they have 
not proceeded from a confirmed will in thee, but are of that nature which thou dost 
afterwards reject and abhor.  Therefore be not overmuch troubled and dismayed with 
such kind of suggestions, at least if they please thee not, because they are not thy 
personal sins, for which thou shalt incur the wrath of God or his displeasure: contemn, 
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neglect them, let them go as they come, strive not too violently, or trouble thyself too 
much, but as our Saviour said to Satan in like case, say thou: Avoid, Satan, I detest 
thee and them.  Saith Austin, as Satan labours to suggest, so must we strive not to give 
consent, and it will be sufficient: the more anxious and solicitous thou art, the more 
perplexed, the more thou shalt otherwise be troubled, and intangled. (1927, 958) 
 
Suggestion and persuasion can only evolve into action if they are accepted.  Prior to that, they  
 
may torment the holy man, the prince or a tragic hero within a play, but they will never cause  
 
chaos unless they are endowed with a seeming reality and become manifested in "personal  
 
sins." 
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PART TWO 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
"INTISING SHEWES:" MACBETH AND OTHELLO AS TRAGEDIES 
OF BEWITCHMENT 
 
 
They that haue powre to hurt, and will doe none, 
That doe not do the thing, they most do showe, 
Who mouing others, are themselues as stone, 
Vnmooued, could [cold], and to temptation slow: 
They rightly do inherrit heauens graces, 
And husband natures ritches from expence, 
The are the Lords and owners of their faces, 
Others, but stewards of their excellence: 
The sommers flowre is to the sommer sweet, 
Though to it selfe, it onely liue and die, 
But if that flowre with base infection meete, 
The basest weed out-braues his dignity: 
For sweetest things turne sowrest by their deedes, 
Lillies that fester, smell far worse then weeds. 
—Sonnet 94 
 
To illuminate the operation of mental malpractice via the effects of fascination in 
Shakespearean tragedy—bewitchment through mesmeric suggestion—two plays offer 
themselves as fundamental examples for study: Macbeth and Othello.  Moving beyond  
William Rankins's opinion that stage actors work for the Devil to lead the audience to him  
with "intising shewes," "to seduce them to sinne" (A Mirrour of Monsters, n.p.), the intent  
here is to focus the discussion upon the specific elements that affect perception within the  
plays themselves: the conflicts between the appearance versus the reality of ideas and  
suggestions which are presented to the physical senses and to the imagination. This section of 
the inquiry is chiefly concerned with identifying the presence of fascinating "bewitchment" in 
these two plays, and analyzing its influence upon character actions and interactions.  Rather 
than to dwell unprofitably upon, for example, what Shakespeare might have intended as a 
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moralizing lesson, it is more interested in highlighting how the provocation to action from a 
fascinated thought process might produce a vivid and seemingly uncontrollable transforming 
power.  In varying degrees of form and context, Macbeth and Othello illustrate certain 
elements of the encounter with evolving perceptions of self and the navigation through the act 
of murder.  
Macbeth experiences the influences of prophecy, equivocation, the suggestion that he 
can purge blame and guilt if he attains "sovereign sway," and is surrounded by the spectacle 
of imagery—viewed both by his inner and outer eyes—which definitely distorts his 
understanding of reality.  Othello finds himself the object of projected malice, that malice 
resembling in many ways an "evil eye‖ curse from Iago.  Within this relentless campaign 
against his newfound fortune as a husband and respected military leader, we observe a 
disastrous alteration in his understanding of his own reputation, confidence and self-control 
through the plague of doubt and changed perceptions of self-identity.   
Other examples can be found in various Shakespeare plays that present different views  
of the personal struggle with fascination or its influence upon characters in service to a given  
plot structure, but Macbeth and Othello highlight the phenomenon in a manner that is at once  
familiar, yet rich and undeniably compelling. These two characters are not unique in their  
encounters with bewitchment, but the dramatic contexts in which they operate seem to be the  
most relentlessly graphic and place suggestion and misperception as issues at the heart of the  
central plot dilemmas. 
The power of the look, ―overlooking,‖ can be benign, unless that captivation somehow  
becomes a tragic enthrallment.  False conclusions are encouraged and formed from the partial  
perception of reality and the outward cloaks of integrity, piety or virtue can do much to  
hoodwink the victim, as Bassanio observes in The Merchant of Venice: 
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So may the outward showes be least themselues, 
The world is still deceau‘d with ornament. 
In Law, what plea so tainted and corrupt, 
But, being season‘d with a gracious voyce, 
Obscures the show of euill.  In religion 
What damned error but some sober brow 
Will blesse it, and approue it with a text, 
Hiding the grosnes with faire ornament: 
There is no voyce [vice] so simple, but assumes 
Some marke of vertue on his outward parts;  (14.1353-1362) 
 
Portia is captivated by Bassanio at first report, and though he later fails her test involving his  
wedding ring, presumably they live happily, or mostly happily, after the end of the play.  In a  
more tragic setting, Romeo is instantly charmed by the sight of Juliet: ―Now Romeo is  
belou‘d, and loues againe, / Alike bewitched by the charme of lookes:‖ (6. 722-723).  Their  
sad tale features two lovers completely besotted with each other—a benign form of  
fascination—but their tragic end is due more to the impossible straits their circumstances have  
created and the failure of Friar Lawrence‘s attempts to help them flee Verona.   
In The Rape of Lucrece, on the other hand, Tarquin is represented as being enthralled  
by Lucrece, and despite the protest of his reasonable will, his fascination with enjoying her  
body stirs his passion of lust to overrule all reasonable and powerful arguments to respect her  
honor and to preserve his own.  "Madly tost (tossed)" and "bewitcht," are terms that describe  
his condition, and almost immediately after ravishing Lucrece, Tarquin realizes the scope of  
his error and the magnitude of his ensuing ruin: 
 Eu‘n in this thought through the dark-night he stealeth, 
 A captiue victor that hath lost in gaine, 
 Bearing away the wound that nothing healeth, 
 The scarre that will dispight of Cure remaine, 
 Leauing his spoile perplext in greater paine. 
  Shee beares the lode of lust he left behinde, 
  And he the burthen of a guiltie minde. 
 
 Hee like a theeuish dog creeps sadly thence, 
 Shee like a wearied Lambe lies panting there, 
 He scowles and hates himselfe for his offence, 
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 Shee desperat with her nailes her flesh doth teare. 
 He faintly flies sweating with guiltie feare; 
  Shee staies exclayming on the direfull night, 
  He runnes and chides his vanisht loath‘d delight.  (729-742)   
 
As detailed in previous chapters, a fascinated state is really a mentally fixated state— 
an obsessive operation of the conscious and sometimes unconscious thought.  It may be  
argued in the example of Tarquin that it is simple lust that undoes him.  Yet lust which impels  
an individual to action that he knows is against his better judgment, suggests the presence of a  
binding power he is almost helpless against, even as Reason and Judgment try to re-establish  
sway.  It is no longer a simple lust; it is ―lust in action‖ (Sonnet 129), driven by the forcible  
imagination that does not easily permit resistance to the satisfaction of its objective.  The  
victim is tied up in an active fascination of thought and deed, which is often described in  
terms of madness and ecstasy.  In Tarquin‘s case he knows what he risks, yet does not seem to  
be able to help himself: 
 Such hazard now must doting Tarqvin make, 
 Pawning his honor to obtaine his lust, 
 And for himselfe, himselfe he must forsake. 
 Then where is truth if there be no selfe-trust? 
 When shall he thinke to find a stranger iust, 
  When he himselfe, himselfe confounds, betraies, 
  To sclandrous tongues & wretched hateful daies?  (155-161) 
 
This is due, Shakespeare says, to the fact that he  
 Is madly tost betweene desire and dred; 
 Th‘one sweetely flatters, th‘other feareth harme, 
 But honest feare, bewicht with lustes foule charme, 
  Doth too too oft betake him to retire, 
  Beaten away by brainesicke rude desire. (169-175) 
 
Reasonable ―dred‖ falls to desire because desire has ―bewicht with lustes foule  
charme‖ the saving element of ―honest feare.‖  This ―rude‖ desire is ―brainesicke,‖ arguably a  
poetic description of a dissociative state where suggestion has produced an impulsive decision  
to act that, unresisted, demands compliance.  The reference to bewitchment and charms  
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invites the comparison to a fascination that, when dispelled, plunges the victim into an almost  
instantaneous remorse for the action.  One of Shakespeare‘s sonnets describes this condition  
as a kind of ―expense of Spirit,‖ and details almost exactly Tarquin‘s experience as he is  
tossed between lust and the fear of dishonor and disgrace: 
Th‘expence of Spirit in a waste of shame 
 Is lust in action, and till action, lust 
 Is periured, murdrous, blouddy full of blame, 
 Sauage, extreame, rude, cruell, not to trust, 
 Inioyed no sooner but dispised straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had 
Past reason hated as a swollowed bayt 
On purpose layd to make the taker mad. 
Made [mad] in pursut and in possession so, 
Had, hauing, and in quest to haue, extreame, 
A blisse in proofe and proud [proved] a very wo, 
Before a ioy proposd behind a dreame, 
All this the world well knowes yet none knowes well, 
To shun the heauen that leads men to this hell.  (Sonnet 129) 
 
Misperception turned to "mad pursut" creates a momentum in whichever direction  
fantasy leads; error often needs only to masquerade as truth to divert thought into a path of  
thinking ―that seemeth right vnto man, but the issue thereof are the wayes of death‖  
(Prov.16:25).  Montaigne shows one aspect of the difficulty of discerning truth in his essay  
―Of Lyers:‖ 
If a lie had no more faces but one, as truth hath, we should be in farre better termes 
than we are: For, whatsoever a lier should say, we would take it in a contrarie sense.  
But the opposite of truth hath many-many shapes, and an undefinite field.  The 
Pythagoreans make good to be certaine and finite, and evill to bee infinite and 
uncertaine.  A thousand bywayes misse the marke, one only hits the same. (47)  
 
In the manifold challenges of keeping to a single ―bywaye,‖ few people will willingly  
countenance what seems to be a wrong path.  But many can be led along a road to destruction 
if the path is presented as the right or only way.  Rather than take the full responsibility for 
these errors of perception, or even willful disobedience, an individual may find that it is an 
almost unavoidable temptation to ascribe such human weakness, in the face of mesmeric 
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enthrallment as Cavendish argues (Black Arts 281), to the powerfully seductive efforts of an 
adversary like Satan.  In each of the plays, Macbeth and Othello, the Devil is mentioned or 
alluded to as a tangible presence in each hero‘s dilemma.  The goddess of witchcraft even 
makes an appearance in Macbeth, courtesy of the additional material contributed to the play 
by Thomas Middleton.  Yet in order for the Devil to have true agency, it must be proved that 
he has a true existence.  This is a much more difficult task to perform in the real world than it 
is in the playhouse.  
Hecate exists in Macbeth, so by right of dramatic conceit she can claim some  
influence upon the action in that play.  Iago is framed with language posing him as a devil;  
but is he really a demonic or deific figure like Hecate?  No, he is not—according to the textual  
reality; he is a soldier who behaves devilishly perhaps. Yet each of them can be seen as 
representatives of the causative forces of bewitchment. The symbolic associations with the  
underworld are a palpable presence in the two plays, but the weight the underworld bears 
upon the causality within the plots carries a lesser weight than what might be seen if they 
were part of a Morality play or a Greek Tragedy.  What may have been of greater interest to 
Shakespeare's audience were the reasoning and negotiations of the two tragic heroes in their 
struggles to exercise free will, or maintain a "Bosome franchis'd, and Allegeance cleare" 
(Macbeth 8.505), in the face of aggressive mental suggestion.  Both Macbeth and Othello 
seem to have the power to say "Avoid, Satan!" and sidestep destruction, but it still remains a 
tantalizing and tragically unexplored option. 
Whatever the suborning causes and beliefs might be, true compulsion rises with the  
individual‘s choice to act upon what had been suggested to his thought.  Montaigne relates the  
story of the 1563 murder of the Duc de Guise by Poltrot de Mèrè in his essay ―Of Vertue‖ and  
notes ―how flexible our reason is to all sorts of objects‖ (vol. 2, 437).  Fixation can work upon  
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a victim in such a way as to supply both the true motive to act and the justification of  
the deed itself: ―The motions of so forcible a perswasion may be divers; for our fantasie  
disposeth of her self and of us as she pleaseth‖ (vol. 2, 438).  He cites the following case  
study of a French assassination as an example of how plans which had been laid beforehand  
were demolished by the assassin‘s fascinated, ―amazed‖ thought.  The plan was to ride within  
range of the duke—both assassin and victim were mounted—and shoot him.  The probability  
of success was small because of the incoherence of the strategy—yet it achieved its effect: 
…the blow was not mortall, had not fortune made it so: and the enterprise to shoote on 
horse-backe and far-off, and to one who mooved still according to the motion of his 
horse; was the attempt of a man that rather loved to misse of his effect, then faile to 
save himselfe.  What followed did manifestly shew it.  For, he was so amazed and 
drunken with the thought of so haughty an execution, as he lost all his senses, both to 
worke his escape, and direct his tongue in his answers.  What needed he have done 
more, then recover his friends by crossing of a river?   
 
…when the horrible sentence was pronounced against him, [Poltrot] answered stoutly, 
I was prepared for it, and I shall amaze you with my patience. (vol. 2, 438) 
 
There is a subtle thematic parallel here with the events of Macbeth and Othello.   
Events are set in motion within a plan or plot that subsequently develop beyond the  
perpetrator‘s ability to control them.  Those events create so many possible variables that  
the participants cannot possibly predict or manage the resultant behaviors and circumstances.   
Or, like Poltrot, they find themselves caught up in the mental and emotional convulsions of  
their own misperceptions, realizing in the end how they have been betrayed by what they have  
done under the influence of aggressive mental suggestion—"amazed and drunken with the  
thought," as Montaigne tells it.   
Wayne Shumaker quotes the sixteenth-century thinker John Godelmann in a  
description of how the phenomenon operates as a kind of a mesmeric delusion: 
Tricksters (praestigiatores), said Godelmann, ―charm and deceive the eyes of men, by 
Satan‘s help, with incantations and illusions, so that they do not see things as they 
really are but think they see what is not there.  These are properly called enchanters 
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(Zauberer).‖  Once achieved, this insight too spread through the whole area of inquiry 
and threatened to convert all the occult phenomena into sleight-of-hand or a kind of 
hypnosis. (92-93)   
[Shumaker quotes him in Godelmann, Iohannes.  Tractatus de magis, veneficis et 
lamiis, deque his recte cognoscendis et puniendis.  1591.  III, 104 (III, x).]   
 
Again, we see an implied connection between enchanting and ―a kind of hypnosis.‖ This  
mesmerism is not confined to the perception of physical objects, but can include the  
misperception of forms and actions.  The idea of fascination, while classically associated with  
the phenomenon of the evil eye, was in Shakespeare‘s time a vaguely understood kind of  
magic, and its presence was not always identifiable a priori to any perceived, projected  
maleficium.  In each case, it is the coincidence of an accepted suggestion or supposition with  
the opportunity to perform it that engenders the tragic acts which ruin the hero.  Each of them  
operates under a pronounced delusion of serving a higher purpose: Othello ―sacrifices‖  
Desdemona to his wounded honor and image, voicing the specious justification that he is  
saving others from her perfidy; Macbeth rationalizes that his usurpation of the throne  
supposedly supported by the Weird Sisters‘s prophecy will enable him to endure the  
consequences of regicide.  The perceived evil in these plays is the result of what the heroes do  
when their reasoning succumbs to the confusion of false perception—not necessarily from a 
predisposing psychological weakness.  The evil is the result of allowing the thinking—as it is 
voiced upon the theatre‘s stage—to become fascinated by a lie disguised as truth.  The issue 
becomes not so much identifying a particular flaw that undoes the tragic hero, as it is to 
discover the compound nature of the effects of the accepted suggestions. 
The Aristotelian concept of hamartia—the error of judgment—is reflected in the 
concept of the weak portal.  The two ideas, however, are not completely synonymous.  The 
weak portal is not necessarily a fixed idea representing something as characteristic as a  
―tragic flaw.‖  Fascination can use several means of entry into the imagination given a  
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suitable opportunity.  Vulnerabilities to suggestion such as vanity, greed, lust, gullibility,  
amongst others, are traits that any person can exhibit, and are not necessarily inherent faults.   
Thus, an error of judgment can occur from the influence of any one, or a combination, of such   
states of mind.  A lapse can occur at any point in a person‘s life, even in an area that had  
previously been considered a virtue.  Othello is one example.  He is known as a man who 
counts amongst his virtues the fact that he is not easily jealous.  Yet as a result of Iago's 
projected jealousy and malice, he succumbs to the deadly passion so thoroughly that it distorts 
his perception of reality and convinces him that murder is a justifiable solution.  
In Shakespeare‘s earlier plays there are some instances where the characters conform 
more closely with the stock stage image of a braggart soldier, the old pantaloon, the waspish 
wife; but even when he used these stock profiles as the foundation for their stage personas, 
Shakespeare often reinvented the roles to the point where they began to transcend the 
stereotypical—almost into the actual.   
Northrop Frye, in Northrop Frye on Shakespeare notes that, ―His characters are so  
vivid that we often think of them as detachable from the play, like real people" (4).  In that  
sense, many critics and audiences have come to see these characters as more than dramatic  
devices espousing a position within a dramatic argument.  In the tragedies they are sometimes  
viewed as people in crisis making complex maneuvers and negotiations that deliver on the  
one hand a generally satisfying moral resolution to their stories, yet, on the other hand, they  
provoke a number of open-ended questions about how the viewer or reader would respond in  
a similar situation.  However, Frye offers a caveat that should be considered lest too much  
focus lands on Bradlean psychological character centrism, and not enough on the theatrical  
arguments and devices: 
…it seems clear that Shakespeare didn‘t start with a character and put him into a 
situation: if he‘d worked that way his great characters would have been far less 
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complex than they are.  Obviously he starts with the total situation and lets the 
characters unfold from it, like leaves on a branch, part of the branch but responsive to 
every tremor of wind that blows over them.  [A.C.] Bradley‘s is still a great book, 
whatever one may say of it, but it‘s conditioned by the assumptions of its age, as we 
are by ours. (4) 
 
The "weak portal" should not be interpreted as a character flaw—a ―tragic flaw.‖  It is  
a temporary window of opportunity for Chaos to enter in.  In concert with hamartia, it is also  
the error not only of judgment, but of redress as well.  For an early modern audience familiar  
with Christian themes of repentance and redemption, might a heightened sense of tragedy be  
produced onstage if the principal characters of Macbeth and Othello refused, or were made  
blind to, the opportunities to exercise forbearance and compassion as a means to possible  
reclamation?  The tension created by the enormous possible consequences of a planned  
regicide committed by a noble Thane, and a fatal suffocation of an innocent white Venetian— 
a Senator's daughter—by her new husband, a noble Moorish army general, argue for the  
affirmative.  Can early modern tragic figures suffer their ―slings and arrowes of outragious  
fortune‖ (Hamlet 8.1596), with dignity like their Stoic counterparts?  Yes.  But does this 
classic approach completely serve the tastes of early modern writers and audiences?  
Theologically speaking, should characters conceived in a largely Christian context humbly 
wait for God to redress their wrongs, and serve justice—rewards to the faithful, punishment to 
the evil-doers? Ideally, perhaps, with a lean towards "yes," but then the context of the 
argument has shifted noticeably away from tragedy.   
The fact that Macbeth and Othello do not turn aside from their fatal courses magnify 
the feeling of tragedy, from this interpretive position, because the means to salvage their lives, 
and the lives of those they affect, is available if they can shake off their obsessive thinking 
and behavior.  The initial error of judgment may be dreadful, but it is not theoretically 
unrecoverable.  The absence of such a recovery gives Shakespearean high tragedy its power 
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even today and those elements that contribute to the prevention of any recovery should find 
resonance in any audience once they are recognized.   
As a shifting window of opportunity, the weak portal is exploited at a tragically  
powerful moment.  Instead of Shakespeare‘s heroes finding themselves in a situation that they  
are ―characteristically‖ unfit to handle, they could be seen to be victims of an overriding  
influence which suppresses their native capacity to meet and conquer their individual  
reasonings and reservations.  Susceptibility, however momentary, provides the opportunity for  
suggestion to enter in, perhaps like Baudouin's metaphor of the air flowing underneath a door  
(Suggestion 29), and corrupt the imagination.  Ruination would then be due to the catastrophic  
choices made from compromised perception rather than an intrinsic defect of character.   
Accepted suggestions, more than psychological predispositions, lend an interesting 
dramatic weight to some of the key scenes in Shakespeare‘s scenarios.  It is burdensome to 
interpretation to posit that Othello is singularly and chronically jealous, or that Macbeth is 
solely and chronically ambitious; and modern criticism has moved beyond the more reductive 
critical approaches.  Macbeth and Othello become acutely ambitious or avaricious, and 
acutely suspicious, respectively, through the promptings that attack their susceptibility to 
pursue impulsive behaviors and their belief in false suppositions.  Arguably, this idea offers a 
more dynamic and directly engaging opportunity for the audience to experience a different 
perspective on the dilemmas as they seem to unfold onstage.  If characters and plots appear to 
be too studiously preset or preprogrammed, some of the suspense within the action or 
arguments of the characters could evaporate and potentially disengage the thought of the 
audience from the onstage reasoning process presented by the performance.   
The central interpretive point to be remembered here is that this brief analysis of 
fascination in Macbeth and Othello is not psychological in essence, but rather it is 
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phenomenological.  As such, the psychiatric profiles of the tragic heroes are of minimal 
interest compared to their impact as dramatic phenomena.  In other words, it is less profitable 
here to guess what might be going on in the "mind" of a fictional character, than it is to 
examine what the play in performance potentially suggests to an audience via its language, 
imagery and discernible staging conventions and directives.  In ―Hamlet Within the Prince,‖ 
Martin Wiggins reminds us that ―For the purposes of critical interpretation, we must work 
with what we are given: parts of a character that are not visible, or not inferrable, are not 
there‖ (214).   
Othello accepts the suggestion that he has been dishonored by Desdemona‘s alleged  
duplicity and insincere affections towards him.  He commits himself to her murder because of  
an inability to rise above this insidious and false supposition.  That he can successfully  
assimilate into the upper levels of Venetian society and enjoy an ideal marriage with  
Desdemona is brought into doubt initially by his father-in-law's reaction to the marriage.   
Othello‘s reasons for murder are stated to be the equivalent of an honor killing; but it actually  
has more to do with the fact that Iago has succeeded in not only alienating him from his  
surroundings, but also from his own sense of self.  Iago successfully manages to besiege  
Othello's assumptions and beliefs about his marriage, his standing in Venetian society, his  
reputation—even bringing into question his ability to transcend the stereotypical clichés of the  
"nature" of a Moor.  This self-detachment, pushed to an extreme where the audience is able to  
witness Othello enter into moments of reality-transcendence, ushers in the chaotic license to  
throw off mental discipline, and act upon impulse.  The scenario is framed in jealousy,  
specifically sexual jealousy, but the operative fascination precipitates the loss of all that  
Othello holds dear from a mistaken sense of isolation created by racist malice. 
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Macbeth is seen resisting the fascinating enticements of prophetic assurance to a 
preconceived plot that might gain him the throne of Scotland, but ultimately we watch as he 
succumbs to the idea that he can enact this scenario and live with the consequences.  His is the 
example of a mind that can foresee the horrible fallout of a murder as significant as regicide, 
yet finds himself led to attempt it in spite of reasonable compulsions to desist.  He says that he 
has contemplated an ambitious bid for the throne, but has yet to act upon it.  Perhaps this is 
because his ambitious impulses are stayed by a healthy operation of reason: ―Art not without 
Ambition, but without / The illnesse should attend it‖ (4.311-312).  What invites Macbeth into 
actually performing regicide is the equivocal, suggestive ―prophecy‖ that he ―shalt be King 
hereafter‖ (3.126).  It is not the Weird Sisters' so-called witchcraft charm that changes his 
position, it is the suggestion that there will soon be an opportunity to act practically upon his 
usurpation fantasy.  Yet even that insinuation is checked by reason, until Lady Macbeth 
convinces him that they can carry off the deed by transferring the guilt of the murder to 
Duncan‘s bodyguards.  It is the erroneous supposition that prophecy somehow guarantees the 
imagined ordination of Macbeth‘s desired sovereignty that leads him to trust in a false 
security, which, as Hecate says, ―Is Mortals cheefest Enemie‖ (16.1200). 
Something to consider in the study of these two plays is the idea of meditation.   
Macbeth and Othello process a dizzying array of conjectures and imaginings.  Macbeth, in his 
soliloquies, asides and monologues, shares some of these suppositions and imagery with the 
audience.  Othello, with virtually no soliloquies, except one, in his role, shares fewer ideas 
directly with us.  Yet we see them both meditate upon their situations from the very beginning 
of their respective plays.  In fact, as Martin Wiggins observes in "Macbeth and 
Premeditation," the Thane of Glamis has been ruminating on the possibilities of doing away 
with Duncan before the audience has entered into the storyline of Macbeth.  In and before the 
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events of the first four scenes of the play, "Macbeth's behaviour throughout has revealed a 
preconception of ambition and foul play, dangerous thoughts which the Weird Sisters have 
threatened to bring to light" (33).   
Studying these two plays side by side, the audience's encounter with the staging of 
"evil" behavior seems to be illustrated, in one instance, from the inside-out (Macbeth), and in 
the other example from the outside but still closely connected to the thought/action 
relationship (Othello).  Macbeth allows us to hear and observe his inner negotiations and their 
outward manifestation.  Othello shows us the outward manifestations of an increasingly 
fascinated thought process, but we hear very little regarding the inner negotiations in his own 
words.  Iago, however, serves almost like a kind of prophet-guide to Othello's journey—both 
predicting and frequently attempting to arrange the direction of his decisions and actions. 
These meditations are arguably the most valuable elements of each play.  Strip away  
the technical elements of the theatrical spectacle, the plot idiosyncrasies (compressed time,  
Othello's "double time," Macbeth's additional textual material not wholly of Shakespeare's  
creating), and what we are left with are still the remarkably compelling fundamentals of the 
unfolding central arguments.  Just watching Macbeth and Othello reason through their 
challenges—with absolutely nothing else happening around them—would still be a very 
interesting evening in the theatre. 
The meditative process simultaneously engages the audience—both the theatre patron  
and the reader.  It is nearly impossible to experience these plays without reflecting upon the  
choices each hero makes and their demonstration of the difficulties of moral reasoning.  The 
fascination of the audience operates in the same manner as it would anywhere else.  The 
audience/reader agrees to be susceptible to the text by entering the theatre or turning to the 
first page of the play.  The players/characters suggest a staged reality to be considered in place 
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of, or superimposed over the true reality of spectating or reading.  Depending upon how open 
and suggestible the viewer is, he will experience some degree of reality-transcendence by 
accepting the textual elements temporarily as fact into his thought.  In the scenarios, men 
fight, kill and die, gods and demons appear, the broad daylight of the Globe Theatre is taken 
for rainy night, and men and young boys in costume are accepted in their stage personas as 
queens, courtesans, bawds, nurses and shrews. 
This all may sound a bit facile until it is remembered just how fascinating these  
"intising shewes" can be in performance.  A reader may dress his imagination and transcend  
reality with relative ease if he is immersed in a book with minimal distractions; in the theatre  
the external distractions are more pronounced, but the actors have a profound potential to  
employ their art to overcome the artifice of placing their audience in an unfamiliar physical  
space and subsequently they create an environment where the spectators can become 
immersed in the story despite the artifice.  In performance, Macbeth and Othello have worked 
their fascinating magic upon the theatre audience to provoke spontaneous screams, fainting 
and even attempts to intervene in the action.   
Thomas Davies wrote in his 1784 Dramatic Micellanies that his viewing of a Macbeth 
performance starring David Garrick and Hannah Pritchard convinced him that 
The representation of this terrible part of the play [the murder of Duncan], by Garrick 
and Mrs. Pritchard, can no more be described than I believe it can be equalled…You 
heard what they spoke, but you learned more from the agitation of mind displayed in 
their action and deportment…The dark colouring, given by the actor to these abrupt 
speeches, makes the scene awful and tremendous to the auditors!  The wonderful 
expression of heartful horror, which Garrick felt when he shewed his bloody hands, 
can only be conceived and described by those who saw him!  (qtd. in Wells, 
Shakespeare in the Theatre 21) 
 
Garrick was recorded as even fooling one of his fellow actors onstage.  Bernice Kliman cites 
this anecdote from Kalman A. Burnim (David Garrick: Director), in her discussion of the 
actor on page twenty-six of Shakespeare in Performance: Macbeth— 
 128 
…Garrick, who through his face, his body and his voice could reveal his thought 
processes and minute changes in thought, carried his audience away.  He was able to 
whisper so that the sound could be heard in the farthest gallery…He used this whisper 
to terrific effect in the daggers scene, when Macbeth returns from murdering Duncan, 
yet his voice could be so colloquial as to fool a pick-up actor playing the first 
murderer into thinking that Garrick, and not Macbeth, was telling him there was blood 
on his face (Burnim, Garrick, p. 117).  (26) 
 
In Gamini Salgado's Eyewitnesses of Shakespeare, there is a description of the John  
Kemble and Sarah Siddons performance of the Macbeths reported in J.R. Planche's  
Recollections and Reflections: 
I can remember, however, being greatly impressed by two effects; one, the wonderful 
expression of Kemble's face in his interview with Lady Macbeth after the murder of 
Duncan, act iii. scene 2.  I can see him now, standing in the door-way in the centre of 
the scene.  The kingly crown appeared a burthen and a torture to him.  How terribly 
clear it was, before he uttered a word, that his mind was 'full of scorpions'… 
The other was the exulting exclamation of Mrs. Siddons, when, as Lady Macbeth, 
having read the letter, she greets her husband on his entrance…The effect was 
electrical.  Her whole performance, indeed, impressed me with an awe that, when I 
met her in society, several years afterwards, I could not entirely divest myself of on 
being presented to her. (302) 
 
Kliman tells how Siddons could mesmerize even from behind the scenes in a description of  
how she projected the force and power of Lady Macbeth: 
Most of all, the audience was captured by their sense of her nerve, her terrific will.  
Everyone and everything had to give way before that power.  A backstage spectator 
who viewed the 1816 'return' performance from the opposite prompt door was close 
enough to see her face,…The spectator behind the scenes said that though he was 
privy to the workings of the illusions of the drama, seeing the maid daub Siddons's 
hands with paint before the actor's re-entrance, he nevertheless was filled with terror 
when she re-entered with the knives. (36) 
 
While the quality of staging and performance was not on the same level as Garrick and 
Siddons, the author of this dissertation has had the singular experience of witnessing how the 
power of Macbeth in performance can work upon the sensibilities of the audience.  On tour 
with the Iowa Shakespeare Festival in 1994, the author performed the role of Macduff.  The 
production concept included the convention of having Macduff appear in the beginning of the 
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play as Macduff to deliver the lines of the Bloody Sergeant; the concept also dictated that the 
Sergeant appear very much wounded—covered with blood and bandages.  Most of the  
performances were in outdoor spaces where the audience had easy access to the backstage  
area.  After finishing the scene one afternoon, two boys appeared backstage, unexpected and  
unannounced, as the author washed off the blood and reset some props.  As they observed  
the reset and the change of costume and make-up, the elder of the two (they were brothers)  
told the younger, "You see?  There's nothing to be worried about.  He's ok.  I done told you all  
that blood was fake."  There was a very visible sign of relief in the younger lad as it was  
explained to him that the seeming wounds were false and that the actor had only pretended to  
be hurt and lame.  Once assured that all was well, they hurried back to their places to watch  
the rest of the show. 
The same production featured a tricky staging element whereby Macduff kills and  
beheads Macbeth onstage.  Though simple in its preparation, it created a shocking effect; the  
moment when Macduff killed Macbeth and almost immediately thereafter cut the "head"  
from Macbeth's body with a broadsword and held it up in blood-soaked rags in full view of  
the audience caused some of the more sensitive members of the audience to become 
physically distressed on several occasions. 
Othello has caused strong and sometimes violent reactions from the audience in its  
long production history.  Michael Neill catalogues an excellent and striking outline of some of  
the more notable incidents from the performance of the play in his introduction to the Oxford  
World's Classics, The Oxford Shakespeare: Othello.  In 1822 in Baltimore, Maryland, a  
French novelist witnessed a soldier's violent intervention in Desdemona's death scene.  Not 
only did he shout from the audience, he actually drew his gun and shot the actor playing 
Othello, breaking his arm.  Edwin Forrest's portrayal of Iago in 1825 elicited a death threat 
 130 
shouted from the audience, to the effect that if the patron could get his hands on Forrest after 
the show he would "[w]ring his neck." (c.f. Oxford Othello 8-9).  Neill observes directly that 
Such absolute surrender to the power of Shakespeare's theatrical fiction would have 
astonished Rymer; yet the most conspicuous feature of the play's theatrical life has 
been precisely this extraordinary capacity to swamp aesthetic detachment—even to the 
point where (as in the case of the Baltimore guard) the boundary between fiction and 
reality has sometimes appeared to dissolve altogether.  This has reputedly been true 
not only for audiences, but for performers: (8-9) 
 
Neill's focus then shifts to how some Shakespearean players find the situations within the 
plays creating an undue influence upon some of their own thinking and behavior: 
This is precisely what seems to have happened after a performance by British officers 
and their wives in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1857: the commanding officer, who 
played Othello, shot his Cassio in cold blood, provoking a public scandal over heavy 
drinking and sexual promiscuity amongst the garrison community. (9) 
 
Finally, he mentions the incident from the 1942 Othello starring Paul Robeson, which  
counted amongst its noteworthy accomplishments, a real-life embodiment of one of Iago's  
major anxieties.  Robeson, playing Othello, began an adulterous affair with Uta Hagen, who  
played Desdemona.  Ironically, Hagen also happened to be wife of Jose Ferrer who was  
playing Iago at the time. 
By entering into an agreement to entertain suppositions, we make ourselves  
susceptible to mesmeric suggestion.  Often it can be difficult to tell when we are operating  
within a condition of reality transcendence—like the subjects in Ernest Hilgard's study of  
hypnosis who were unable to determine when they had entered into such a state.  The early  
modern "anti-theatricalists" were not so far off the mark when they decried the power of  
theatre to fascinate its auditors, and with their nascent fear of the Devil near the top of their 
thoughts, condemned the practice of playgoing—unless, perhaps, the players could prove that 
all fascinating spectacles were for the moral health of the theatre's customers. 
Suggestion has no borders and follows no predictable blueprint.  If an individual  
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develops a conceit that later turns into a passion, then maybe some of the ensuing suggestions  
and suppositions might fall into recognizable patterns.  But the range of mischief that might  
be caused by fascinated misperception is wide, sometimes occurring through vulnerabilities  
that an individual may not even know he has exposed.  Attacks, mental and physical, are more  
easily defended against if they come from only one direction.  What makes the attacks against  
Macbeth and Othello so successful is the fact that they appear on several fronts, exploiting  
perhaps more than one susceptibility, and pressure the besieged heroes to defend too many  
vulnerable positions.  Such is the nature of Shakespeare‘s dramatic genius that he shows us  
protagonists fighting continuous assaults upon their thinking and best intentions from  
positions that become increasingly hard to manage.   
Yet, paradoxically, he also offers the audience a behind-the-scenes perspective on  
just how fragile these theatrical campaigns of aggressive mental suggestion are.  If Macbeth 
stands firm after he declares "We will proceed no further in this Businesse:" (7.427), the play 
is over, presumably, and the Macbeths avoid catastrophe.  Likewise, Desdemona might enjoy 
a longer honeymoon if her husband were to hold a conference with her, and Iago, Emilia and 
Cassio, to interrogate the question: "What is all this bother surrounding your handkerchief?"  
This is the captivating force of his greatest work; his audience sees, in the complexity of his 
scenarios and characterizations, an accurate reflection of the manifold assaults that they might  
experience upon their own thought, and an opportunity to objectively reason through possible  
solutions or remedies.   
Othello provides Iago with an opportunity to destroy him by taking Iago‘s words at  
face value.  He allows Iago to create a nightmare revisioning of his marriage without making  
effective attempts to verify the aspersions.  His reliance on Iago‘s sense of honor is misplaced  
and it prevents him from seeing the truth of the situation.  It is somewhat ironic that such an  
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astute master of the battlefield is a mere pawn in the maneuvers of disgruntled, albeit clever  
junior officer.  What hope might he have in a long-term encounter with Venice‘s sophisticated  
civilian society with hundreds of Machiavels like Iago on the loose?   
Macbeth has so many possible areas of intrusion into his seat of reason that it is small 
wonder that he ultimately exists in a liminal state of consciousness that has difficulty 
distinguishing appearance from reality.  Once the seizure of Macbeth‘s imagination has 
begun, there is no redemptive hope left for a man who has come to the conclusion that: 
    …for mine owne good, 
 All causes shall giue way.  I am in blood 
 Stept in so farre, that should I wade no more, 
 Returning were as tedious as go ore: (15.1158-1161)  
 
A crucial element in these examples is the fact that because of their variously 
corrupted imaginings, Macbeth and Othello become murderers.  Until the commission of the 
murders of Desdemona and Duncan, the fascination of the heroes is only a potential threat—a 
force of confusion and mental conflation of images and ideas.  Once carried over into action, 
however, and after the fatal acts, it is mental malpractice at its worst: the enactment of 
unjustifiable homicide. 
It is highly unlikely that Shakespeare ever read the Holy Koran (though if his 
understanding of Arabic was good enough it might conceivably have provided him some 
source material for Othello).  If, however, by some strange chance he had ever heard an 
English version of Sura 133—especially the last two lines—he might have encountered 
something that resonates especially well with regard to the phenomenon of fascination and the 
themes of Macbeth and Othello: 
Sura 133 
 
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
 
Say: I betake me for refuge to the Lord of the Daybreak 
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Against the mischiefs of his creation; 
And against the mischief of the night when it overtaketh me; 
And against the mischief of weird women; 
And against the mischief of the envier when he envieth. (430) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
MACBETH 
 
 
Behold, I will come against them that prophecie false dreames, sayeth the Lord, and 
doe tell them, and cause my people to erre by their lyes, and by their flatteries, and I 
sent them not, nor commaunded them: therefore they bring no profite vnto this people, 
sayth the Lord.        
—Jeremiah 23:32 
 
The Meeting on the Heath 
The play begins in chaos and confusion, which is a slight deviation from the normal 
tragic structure of beginning in order and ending in chaos.  The advent of thunder and 
lightning announces the entrance of the Weird Sisters and in no other play of Shakespeare is 
there so auspicious a beginning.  The playwright is leaving no doubt in the mind of the 
audience that this world is upside down and tormented.  Most significantly, within the first 
eleven lines the Sisters have made it clear that they have targeted Macbeth specifically for 
some purpose.  
1 WITCH 
  Where the place? 
2 WITCH   Vpon the Heath. 
3 WITCH 
  There to meet with Macbeth.  (1.6-7) 
 
The Sisters are described as ―weyward,‖ which, like ―weird,‖ is derived from the Old English  
―wyrd‖—meaning ―fate.‖  The Folio may label the roles as "witch," but they refer to 
themselves as "Sister" and in 3.108 as "weyward Sisters."  In one interpretation of the 
dramatic metaphor, Fate has focused its attention on Macbeth, and Macbeth speaks of dealing 
with and defying Fate, but there is no definitive evidence that the audience should accept 
these creatures as the Sisters Fate.  The purpose of the Sisters‘ choice is still mysterious at this 
point, but they are certainly seeking him as they ―Houer through the fogge and filthie ayre‖ 
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(1.11).  For a theatre audience, these initial events are significant.  The hero of this story may 
be in for a few rough nights if creatures resembling witches are looking for him near a 
battlefield in the midst of a thunderstorm. 
 Macbeth is profiled for us by the battle reports of the bloody Sergeant and the Thane 
of Ross.  His heroism and courage are superlative, and he receives godlike comparisons of his 
valor and martial prowess.  After personally carving a passage through the rebel 
Macdonwald‘s vanguard, Macbeth not only confronts him, but slashes him ―from the Naue 
toth' Chops, /And fix'd his Head vpon our Battlements‖ (2.33-34).  While he is busy putting 
the remainder of Macdonwald‘s force to flight, the King of Norway attacks with the aid of the 
Thane of Cawdor, and presents an even more formidable threat to King Duncan‘s forces.  
With Banquo, Macbeth mounts a counterattack that not only stymies the rebellion, but 
vanquishes it, forcing surrender from Cawdor and Norway.  Macbeth is seen as something of 
an avenging god in this encounter, ―Bellona’s Bridegroome‖ (2.65). 
 The hard-won victories and the valor of Banquo and Macbeth cause great joy, relief 
and celebration in Duncan‘s war camp, whereupon the king immediately declares capital 
sentence on Cawdor and awards Cawdor‘s considerable estate to the absent Macbeth.  The 
Sergeant‘s report presents an intriguing scenario for the fate of all rebels.  Neither Macbeth 
nor a first-time audience can easily discern how it foreshadows the tragic end of the story, yet 
the playwright implants the images of a rebellion decapitated, its leader hacked to death in 
battle and reduced to a disembodied figurehead of treason.  As the events of the play unfold, 
this is exactly the end that Macbeth comes to.  As he delivers the coup de grâce to 
Macdonwald, there is an analogous sense that Macdonwald‘s story is dovetailing into 
Macbeth‘s.  Metaphorically, if Fortune has concluded its business with Macdonwald (and it 
would make for an interesting prequel to Macbeth to know the events of the Macdonwald 
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saga), then is its full attention now turned to the Thane of Glamis—recognizing that Macbeth 
has nearly achieved the acme of his fortune?  Will he now reach the top, only to ride the 
downturn of Fortune‘s Great Wheel?  For many people in an early modern theatre audience, 
this is a standard expectation for tragedy.  Macbeth‘s demise exactly mirroring the battle 
circumstances of Macdonald‘s death is no coincidence.  The rebellion in scene one 
foreshadows precisely the events of scene thirty: Macbeth has turned traitor to his honor, king 
and country, is sought out specifically by an avenging force in battle (Macduff), and is killed 
and beheaded by him—all within the frame of the Sisters' suggestions. 
 Fate, Fortune, the Devil, Beelzebub and other ministering spirits are signified within 
this play for the audience, but only Hecate, the Weird Sisters and a few other witches actually 
appear.  Macbeth and other characters make reference to Fate, Fortune and the Devil but their 
presence and effects are figurative rather than actual.  Ultimately, Macbeth is solely 
determinate in the action of killing Duncan and his two bodyguards, which fulfills his fantasy-
fascination to become King of Scotland and inaugurates the ruin of his noble house and line. 
 
The Prophecy on the Road 
The initial appearance of Macbeth‘s fixation comes as the result of his first meeting 
with the Weird Sisters.  Their supernatural characteristics give them a power of credibility in 
Macbeth‘s estimation that entices belief in their revelations.  The mesmeric quality of their 
fascinum is the power of prophecy.  Not only is it alluring because of its source—alleged 
clairvoyance of the future—but it is doubly enthralling to Macbeth because it also happens to 
predict a cherished hope.  Banquo is not as captivated, perhaps because he is less 
superstitious, perhaps because the prophecy is not so personally alluring.  But it works 
quickly and deeply upon Macbeth once he receives an apparent confirmation of the veracity 
of the prediction.  The Weird Sisters greet Macbeth as ―Thane of Glamis, Thane of Cawdor‖ 
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and he ―that shalt be King hereafter‖ (3.124-26).  Because he is the current Thane of Glamis, 
Macbeth knows at least one third of the greeting is accurate, but he is curious as to the 
meaning of the other hails.  The confirmation of the second prediction comes as he and 
Banquo are summoned to King Duncan by Ross and Angus: 
ROSSE 
  And for an earnest of a greater Honor, 
  He bad me, from him, call thee Thane of Cawdor: 
  In which addition, haile most worthy Thane, 
  For it is thine. 
 
BANQUO 
    What, can the devil speak true? 
 
MACBETH 
  The Thane of Cawdor liues: why doe you dresse me 
  In borrowed Robes? 
 
ANGUS 
     Who was the Thane, liues yet, 
  But vnder heauie Iudgement beares that Life, 
  Which he deserues to loose.  (3.180-87)   
 
Macbeth‘s temptation to place faith in the final prophecy is overwhelming and his  
imagination is jolted into the contemplation of the ramifications of his new status: 
MACBETH  (aside) 
     Glamys, and Thane of Cawdor: 
The greatest is behinde.  (To Rosse and Angus)  Thankes for your paines. 
(To Banquo)  Doe you not hope your Children shall be Kings, 
When those that gaue the Thane of Cawdor to me, 
Promis'd no lesse to them? 
 
BANQUO 
      That trusted home, 
  Might yet enkindle you vnto the Crowne, 
  Besides the Thane of Cawdor.  (3.192-98)   
 
Macbeth jumps slightly ahead of logic in the use of the term ―promise.‖  Prophecy is not  
necessarily promise, though when it coincides with wish fulfillment, it is often taken to be  
equivalent.  Macbeth appears not to hear Banquo‘s caveat on this very point, 
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 BANQUO 
  And oftentimes, to winne vs to our harme, 
  The Instruments of Darknesse tell vs Truths, 
  Winne vs with honest Trifles, to betray‘s 
  In deepest consequence. (3.199-202) 
   
The assertion that Macbeth has previously contemplated supplanting Duncan, even 
presumably by violence if necessary, hangs upon his meditation concerning the last piece of 
the Weird Sisters' pronouncement.  His use of the word ―murder‖ is significant, as is his 
reaction to a strange sense of fear.  If he was prepared to accept the crown as naturally and as 
innocently as he accepted the title of Thane of Cawdor, there would be no occasion for fear, 
and no contemplation of anything like murder.  Yet the lines Shakespeare gives to Macbeth 
indicate that he is gripped by an imaginary pathology so strong that he describes physical 
symptoms.  The strange fear would then make perfect sense if it were a revelation of a pre-
existing murderous fantasy which makes Macbeth as susceptible to suggestion as Othello is in 
his suspicion of Desdemona‘s integrity.  For the first time, Macbeth‘s ―horrible imaginings‖ 
have achieved the status of a real possibility: 
 MACBETH 
  (Aside)  This supernaturall soliciting 
  Cannot be ill; cannot be good.  If ill? 
  Why hath it giuen me earnest of successe, 
  Commencing in a Truth?  I am Thane of Cawdor. 
  If good? why doe I yeeld to that suggestion, 
  Whose horrid Image doth vnfixe my Heire, 
  And make my seated Heart knock at my Ribbes, 
  Against the vse of Nature?  Present Feares 
  Are lesse then horrible Imaginings: 
  My Thought, whose Murther yet is but fantasticall, 
  Shakes so my single state of Man, that Function 
  Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is, 
  But what is not.   (3.207-19) 
 
 Besides Lady Macbeth and the Weird Sisters, Macbeth is subject to the influence of 
the goddess Hecate.  Though her direct influence is confined to contributing a ―vap‘rous drop,  
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profound‖ to the magic that raises ―Artificiall Sprights,‖ she is nevertheless the ―close 
contriuer of all harmes‖ (c.f.16.1174-95), and her presence as the overarching influence of the 
pagan underworld brings godlike elements into the story that engage the phenomenon of 
fascination on every level of existence: the human, the supernatural, and the deific. 
 It is interesting to speculate on the proposition of when Macbeth first entertains the 
notion of succeeding Duncan as King.  The historical Macbeth killed the younger Duncan in 
battle, and reigned more or less competently for seventeen years (1040-1057).  Shakespeare‘s 
king barely survives what appears to be an unspecified number of paranoid and unsatisfying 
months (years?) of turmoil.  Almost from his first appearance in scene three, there is an 
indication that he has at least fantasized about usurping Duncan. As the Sisters greet him, 
Macbeth ―starts‖ at the suggestion that he ―shalt be King hereafter‖ (3.126).  While this is not 
conclusive as to Macbeth‘s state of mind, it is very suggestive, because such a pronounced 
physical reaction, vehement enough for Banquo to comment upon it, indicates that Macbeth 
has been touched in the inner recesses of his thought.   
The first salutation, ―All haille Macbeth, haile to thee, Thane of Glamis‖ (3.124), 
carries with it no new or startling information. The second greeting gives him reason to pause:  
―All haile Macbeth, haile to thee Thane of Cawdor‖ (3.125). To Macbeth this seems odd, 
though not necessarily prescient, for he believes the Thane of Cawdor to be alive: ―…the 
Thane of Cawdor liues /A prosperous Gentleman:‖ (3.148-9). Indeed, this is not, strictly 
speaking, prophecy; the audience has already witnessed Duncan condemn Cawdor and 
transfer his privileges to Macbeth in the previous scene.  However, to Macbeth, it could seem 
prophetic, as he is unaware of the preceding events.  What sounds prophetic in its tone and 
unexpected revelation—possibly engaging Macbeth's attention with subtle powers of 
fascination—is the third greeting:  ―All haile Macbeth, that shalt be King hereafter‖ (3.126).   
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Directly after this pronouncement Macbeth is seen to ―start‖ by Banquo.  Arguably, if 
Macbeth was innocent of malice aforethought towards Duncan, he might show signs of 
curiosity or confusion, but to move physically with enough violence to provoke comment, 
suggests that the enticement to the throne has touched him in an area at least secret if not 
guilty.   
Martin Wiggins offers an insightful inquiry into the effect of the Sisters' interview 
with Macbeth and Banquo in "Macbeth and premeditation."  He argues that Macbeth has 
already entertained the idea of replacing Duncan on the throne via regicide, to the point that 
the fantasy has reified into something more potent—a phantasm.  The line between fascinated 
behavior and mental phantasms, recurrent obsession around a fixed idea, is a thin one.  It does 
not require a large effort to progress from thought to action if the obsession is strong enough.  
Wiggins shows how Macbeth's premeditation upon the subject of taking the throne from 
Duncan has evolved into a powerful force.  Accepting this premise, perhaps Macbeth can then 
be viewed as being so susceptible to a compelling supposition that the deed can now be 
accomplished once the Sisters have seemingly reanimated his fantasy.  The causal connection 
between Macbeth's action and the Weird Sisters' proffered charm is explained by Wiggins's 
idea that 
Macbeth is the object of seduction, but he is also the prize.  Banquo sees his 
companion's fascinated return to the witches' words as the first stage of a temptation 
which, unchecked, may lead him on to regicide.  The audience, however, knows that it 
is not an innocent obsession, and can see that Macbeth is deceiving himself when he 
takes up Banquo's view… The Weird Sisters have solicited nothing.  They cannot be 
advanced as a cause of the murder of Duncan, instruments of Satan like the witch in 
the Nathalocus story, because the murder pre-exists as an idea in Macbeth's mind.  
This is not a play about temptation; rather our attention is drawn to the long process of 
premeditation, the hideous phantasma between conception and action. 
None the less, the obsessional quality of this premeditation is referrable back to 
the witches' prediction: they are a factor, though no cause.  (35) 
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The Sisters encourage what Wiggins calls the phantasma of Macbeth's premeditation to 
further degenerate into becoming what this study describes as a state of fascination.  The 
perception of it becoming evil remains to be discovered later in the play. 
At this point, Banquo notices his colleague's reaction and remarks:   
    My Noble Partner  
You greet with present Grace, and great prediction 
Of Noble hauing, and of Royall hope, 
That he seemes wrapt withal: to me you speake not. (3.130-33) 
 
The spelling of "rapt" here as "wrapt" suggests the enfolding, binding fixation that is taking 
hold in Macbeth's meditations upon the prophecies.  The Sisters then proceed to reveal their 
knowledge about Banquo, but he seems to be less touched by them, perhaps because he is 
shown a lesser prospect of glory, and maintains a more objective perspective on the 
encounter.  It is only when Macbeth perceives that the oracles are about to depart that he 
snaps out of his reverie to ask them to confirm their information:   
Stay, you imperfect Speakers, tell me more: 
By Sinell’s death, I know I am Thane of Glamis, 
But how, of Cawdor? the Thane of Cawdor liues 
A prosperous Gentleman: And to be King, 
Stands not within the prospect of beleefe, 
No more then to be Cawdor.  Say from whence 
You owe this strange Intelligence, or why  
Vpon this blasted Heath you stop our way 
With such Prophetique greeting?  Speake, I charge you. (3.146-154) 
 
The Sisters do not oblige him with an answer, but vanish instead to leave the two noble 
warriors to ruminate on their words. 
 Within a mere ten lines, the Thane of Ross and the Thane of Angus arrive to confirm 
that Macbeth is now Thane of Cawdor.  Macbeth‘s fixation upon the Sisters‘s prophecy 
begins to intensify and once again he muses upon the contingencies so intently that Banquo 
observes for the second time, ―Looke how our Partner‘s rapt‖ (3.219).  The indication, 
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though, that Macbeth is considering darker designs is borne out in the following lines, 
mistaking, as Wiggins says, the fact that the supernatural intelligence is not a true soliciting: 
  (Aside)  This supernaturall soliciting 
  Cannot be ill; cannot be good.  If ill? 
  Why hath it giuen me earnest of successe, 
  Commencing in a Truth?  I am Thane of Cawdor. 
  If good? why doe I yeeld to that suggestion, 
  Whose horrid Image doth vnfixe my Heire, 
  And make my seated Heart knock at my Ribbes, 
  Against the vse of Nature?  Present Feares 
  Are lesse then horrible Imaginings: 
  My Thought, whose Murther yet is but fantasticall, 
  Shakes so my single state of Man, that Function 
  Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is, 
  But what is not.   (3.207-19) 
 
Clearly, this prophecy of the coming crown has touched a fearful and guilty chord within  
Macbeth and he vibrates with the resonance thereof.  But for the present moment, he retreats 
into the safety of reason, ―(aside) If Chance will haue me King, why, Chance may Crowne 
me, / Without my stirre‖ (3.220-1).  A few lines later, he observes, ―(aside) Come what come 
may, / Time, and the Houre, runs through the roughest Day‖ (3.223-4).  This is as much to say 
that whatever is fated to be will be, for time and events will take their due course through 
even the direst of circumstances.   
Macbeth seems willing to stand by for the moment and let things unfold naturally.  
The estate of Cawdor has suddenly come to him without the need for any dishonorable action; 
perhaps the throne can be gained without the need to perform an act that is capable of 
unfixing his hair just in the mere contemplation of it.   As far as the action of the Sisters is 
concerned, they foreshadow Macbeth's eventual condition in the lines of the "First Witch" 
when she describes the torments she intends to inflict upon the Master o'th' Tiger: 
Ile dreyne him drie as Hay: 
Sleepe shall neyther Night nor Day 
Hang vpon his Pent-house Lid: 
He shall liue a man forbid: (3.95-98) 
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They also cast a formal charm of some kind: 
 
    …goe about, about, 
 Thrice to thine, and thrice to mine, 
 And thrice againe, to make vp nine. 
 Peace, the Charme's wound vp. (3. 110-13) 
 
The winding of the charm resonates with the image of its potential victims, Macbeth 
and Banquo, being wound up, bound or wrapped in whatever enthralling force the Sisters 
have attempted to generate.  When they "all haile" Macbeth, do they ape the greeting that 
Judas supposedly offered to Jesus when he betrayed him in the Garden of Gethsemane?  The 
Sisters begin and end their short interview with Macbeth and Banquo using "all haile" and 
perhaps that is a specific element to the charm.  It is not a crucial element; as Wiggins says, 
the Sisters' efforts with the charm are not necessarily causal because Macbeth later is able to 
reason his way out of taking the damning path to regicide.  But as the Sisters depart, the stage 
tableau shows their intended victim in the pose of being "wrapt" and the fantasy of attaining 
the throne does become Macbeth's overriding pre-occupation until he is invested as King at 
Scone. 
Macbeth is able to recognize that he is meditating on the suggested prize; two-thirds of 
the tripartite greeting and its supposition have already come into being.  Does Macbeth know 
that he is susceptible to fascination—bewitchment— because he has premeditated a regicide?  
He seems to display a thought process that is engaged towards fascination, but he is not yet 
suggestible enough to commit murder. 
As Macbeth comes to learn later in the scene where he is lauded for his victories by 
Duncan, the path to the throne will apparently not be direct if left up to chance.  As grateful as 
Duncan is to Macbeth and Banquo for their valor and conquest of the rebel host, he reserves 
the greatest honor for his eldest son, Malcolm, by creating him the Prince of Cumberland.  
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This is a significant check to Macbeth‘s fantasy about ascending the throne.  Also this 
apparent variation from the tradition of tanistry by Duncan is politically volatile and 
supremely ill-timed considering the events of the war.  Macbeth and Banquo are clearly the 
heroes of the day; the only contribution Malcolm seems to have made towards the effort was 
to be captured by the rebels.  To distribute the spoils of war to worthy warriors while 
awarding the keys to the kingdom to one‘s son cannot fail to cause comment at the very 
least—heated opposition at the worst.  In fact, Macbeth no sooner accepts the praise of his 
king, but he once again dwells on the Sisters‘ prophecy in another aside: 
(aside) The Prince of Cumberland: that is a step, 
On which I must fall downe, or else o‘er-leape, 
For in my way it lyes.  Starres hide your fires,  
Let not Light see my black and deepe desires: 
The Eye winke at the Hand; yet let that bee 
Which the Eye feares, when it is done, to see. (4.283-88) 
 
There is no question that Macbeth is now entertaining the removal of Malcolm, Duncan, or 
both.  He sees the necessity for taking action, and intimates that there will need to be a mental  
distancing from the act.  Conscience, he realizes, will object and become an obstacle, but the  
fascination of gaining the throne has now tightened its grip upon his thought, and it is heading 
towards a greater impulse to action. 
 
Macbeth's Letter 
The letter Macbeth sends to his wife may or may not have had the effect he originally  
intended.  If he was looking for someone to talk him out of committing regicide, he makes an  
egregious tactical error by enlisting the aid of his wife.  Rather than urge him to see the  
catastrophic consequences associated with such a plan, she not only encourages it, but shames  
and cajoles him into putting his fantastical thoughts into hard action.  If, however, Macbeth 
was breaking this intelligence to her in order to make her an accomplice in a treasonous plot, 
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then he could have selected no better ―Partner of Greatnesse‖ (5.303).  She not only joins him 
in the conspiracy, but she intends to take an active role in the deed itself.  Prophecy, therefore, 
fascinates not one, but two principal characters, enticing them both to murder and treason. 
Lady Macbeth appears for the first time meditating upon this letter, though as she 
reads it, we become aware of a slight interpretive issue.  The Sisters have greeted Macbeth 
with titles and speculations of greatness but have not "promised" an outcome.  So the line 
from the letter, "thou might'st not loose the dues of reioycing by being ignorant of what 
Greatnesse is promis'd thee" (5.303-5) is assumptive.  But Lady Macbeth also interprets the 
prophecy of the throne as a guarantee.  What is more, she is willing to overcome any moral 
objections Macbeth might have to "catch the neerest way" (5.310).  Apparently, Lady 
Macbeth entertains a kind of fascination for the throne as well and sees nothing as an obstacle 
to it, except the absence of an opportunity to make it happen: 
   …shalt be 
What thou art promis'd: yet doe I feare thy Nature, 
It is too full o'th' Milke of humane kindnesse, 
To catch the neerest way.  Thou would'st be great, 
Art not without Ambition, but without 
The illnesse should attend it.  What thou would'st highly, 
That would'st thou holily: would'st not play false, 
And yet would'st wrongly winne.  Thould'st haue, Great Glamys, 
That which cryes, thus thou must doe, if thou haue it; 
And that which rather thou do'st feare to doe, 
Then wishest should be vndone.  High thee hither, 
That I may powre my Spirits in thine Eare, 
And chastise with the valour of my Tongue 
All that impeides thee from the Golden Round, 
Which Fate and Metaphysicall ayde doth seeme 
To haue thee crown'd withall.  (5.307-22) 
 
If Lady Macbeth is accurate in her assessment of her husband, we can conclude that her 
observation of Macbeth's willingness to "wrongly win" confirms that his aspiration to the 
throne is not innocent but potentially criminal.  Her joining a criminal fantasy, much less 
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aiding and abetting it, will now make her equally liable for whatever they chance to commit 
because of it. 
 Her following speech not only is an invocation to some sort of demonic possession, it 
is a request for total immersion into everything that will perpetuate the fascinated mental state 
until what is now a joint obsession with the Scottish throne has been satisfied: 
   …fill me from the Crowne to the Toe, top-full 
 Of direst Crueltie: make thick my blood, 
 Stop vp th'accesse, and passage to Remorse, 
 That no compunctious visitings of Nature 
 Shake my fell purpose, nor keepe peace betweene 
 Th'effect, and hit.  Come to my Womans Brests, 
 And take my Milke for Gall, you murth'ring Ministers, 
 Where-euer, in your sightlesse substances, 
 You wait on Natures Mischiefe. (5.334-42) 
 
She confesses her maleficium and shows us how she will add the projection of her own 
ambition to that of her husband.  They will achieve "soueraigne sway, and Masterdome" 
(5.362) by beguiling the time and looking like innocent flowers, but being the dangerous 
serpents underneath them (c.f. 5.354-58).  Here the audience encounters an image connected 
in some ways to the legend of the expulsion from the Garden of Eden.  Scotland is still 
recovering from a civil war—hardly an Eden at the present moment—but the association of 
the image tells us it will be a long while before the country ever comes to resemble the 
biblical Garden; the Macbeth's are about to create a very large opening for Chaos to enter in.  
Or, as Macduff says after the murder, "Confusion now hath made his Master-peece" (10.679). 
 
"If 'twere done.." 
 Macbeth is quick to seize upon prophecy which is unexpectedly presented to him,  
betraying a weakness for auguries and portents.  The fact that he has previously fantasized 
about being king, perhaps over the body of the incumbent, shows a willingness to subject 
virtue to expediency, and this is what the predictions of the Weird Sisters so powerfully 
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reinforce.  Rather than raise an armed rebellion against Duncan to contest the throne as the 
Thane of Cawdor does in the beginning of the play, Macbeth dreams of a more direct and less 
honorable way to the crown.  His fear of discovery and censure holds him at bay.  This is 
revealed in scene seven when he gives all the virtuous reasons for not killing Duncan while he 
sleeps in Macbeth‘s castle:  
Hee's heere in double trust; 
First, as I am his Kinsman, and his Subiect, 
Strong both against the Deed: Then, as his Host, 
Who should against his Murtherer shut the doore, 
Not beare the knife my selfe.  (7.408-12) 
 
His resolve to let nature take its course in crowning him king quickly crumbles when Lady 
Macbeth shows him how they can commit the murder and get away with covering up their 
guilt, while suppressing censure and opposition if they are suspected.   
Macbeth seizes as quickly upon this opportunity as he does the hope offered by the 
Weird Sisters‘ prophecy.  Macbeth has to contend with multiple assaults upon his thought and 
given his strong predisposition to see himself as King of Scotland, he is apparently easy prey.  
Yet he still exhibits a strong sense of honor coupled with his overweening royal aspirations.  
This sense of honor, though, is seen to be unequal to the task of keeping his ―Bosome  
franchis'd‖ (8.505) when Lady Macbeth persuades him in a remarkably short space—forty-
eight lines.  Lady Macbeth is able to recommit her husband to the plot against Duncan by 
questioning his sense of honor and assuring him that the deed, while complicated, can be 
carried off in spite of suspicion.  Macbeth moves from ―We will proceed no further in this 
Businesse‖ (7.427), to ―I am settled, and bend vp / Each corporall Agent to this terrible Feat‖ 
by (7.475).  The power of Lady Macbeth‘s conviction and steely resolve not only to spur 
Macbeth on, but to take an equal part in the maleficium is impressive.  It is, in fact, the 
deciding factor in convincing Macbeth to proceed.  Though she does no killing, she creates 
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the murderous opportunity, and stage-manages the tableau of the regicide.  In addition, she 
attempts to manage the aftermath of the murder once they are formally placed on the throne, 
but she proves unequal to the task as Macbeth becomes too unstable to carry it through. 
Lady Macbeth is the pivotal influence in goading Macbeth down the path to ruin.  We 
see very little of her after the banquet scene and it is tempting to imagine that the true horror 
of what they have committed has finally dawned on her thought.  Perhaps it is not a fully 
conscious realization, for she attempts to expurgate her guilt in her sleep-walking episodes.  
This element of the story lends an interesting perspective on the power of fascination to work 
even while the subject is asleep.  Of course, this is where fascination would be thought to 
have the greatest power, as the victim is considerably more vulnerable when the rational 
faculties are dormant in the sleep-cycle. Thought is highly associative and capricious in the 
dream state; obsessions can take on a whole new reality outside of the parameters of 
conscious thought. 
 In the case of Lady Macbeth, we are presented with a portrait of an ambitious woman  
who seems to project that ambitious force of will onto her husband—who is already possessed 
of an ample share of it himself.  However, her failure to perceive the consequences of 
unbridled ambition culminating in regicide proves fatal to both of them.  In fact, it is more 
than a perceptive failure on her part; it is an outright misperception that they can endure the 
consequences and reign successfully with royal blood on their hands.  There is great 
resonance in the fact that she goads Macbeth to commit regicide in order for her eventually to 
become queen, yet fails to understand that she imperils her own peace by her conspiracy and 
complicity.  Her reasoning that if Macbeth can get away with the murder, they will be able to 
brave out the aftermath misses the symbolic implications that she will share directly in 
Macbeth‘s fate because she is more than his partner; she is one with him in deed and 
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consequence—condemning her to mental anguish over a guilt than she can literally never 
wash off. 
 She succeeds in moving Macbeth on where the Weird Sisters‘ prophecy has twice 
failed to make him do more than await the outcome of chance.  Given that she exploits the 
weak portal of Macbeth‘s ambition to capitalize on an opportunity seemingly presented by the 
encounter with the Sisters, she also ruthlessly targets other vulnerable areas of his psyche as 
well.  His successful resistance to the fascinating enticement of the Sisters‘ speech is based on 
logic, recognition of due loyalty, respect for honor and the laws of hospitality and the 
understanding that he could never get away with such an act while Duncan was his guest.  
These are all formidable and correct arguments.  But Lady Macbeth is able to overcome them 
with an aggressive suggestion founded upon misperception—a redirecting of Macbeth‘s 
loyalty priorities and a false estimate of their chances for total success.  She then challenges 
Macbeth's resolve with the brutal declaration: 
I haue giuen Sucke, and know 
How tender ‗tis to loue the Babe that milkes me, 
I would, while it was smyling in my Face, 
Haue pluckt my Nipple from his Bonelesse Gummes, 
And dasht the Braines out, had I so sworne 
As you haue done to this. (7.450-455) 
 
This rings false on two points: 1) that she would actually smash her own baby‘s skull 
in, when she is incapable of murdering Duncan, to whom she has no relation other than that of  
subject/sovereign.  If she cannot kill him in his sleep because he resembles her father, it seems  
highly improbable that she could summon the will to beat her own flesh and blood to death 
while it was nursing.  2) There is no record of Macbeth taking an oath to perform the regicide.  
This use of ―had I so sworne / As you haue done to this,‖ is a subtle, escalating supposition, 
but it is only compelling to the rational thought if there has actually been a sworn oath.  To 
posit that Macbeth has taken such an oath offstage is an understandable, but textually 
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unsupported conjecture.  It is, however, a devious suggestion to convince Macbeth that he 
cannot go back on the plan without being forsworn, which is not actually the case.  
 What makes Macbeth so complex with regard to the operation of fascination, is  
that the plot does not rely on one source of mesmerism to entrap the hero.  Though the 
primary source of the fascination of Macbeth‘s thought springs from the influence of the 
Sisters and Hecate, there is a powerful influence from Lady Macbeth that is crucial to the 
downfall of Macbeth.  The supernatural influence is aided and abetted by a human influence.  
As Macbeth opens himself up to the influence of the Sisters by accepting their predictions as 
true, he likewise opens himself up to the influence of Lady Macbeth by accepting her counsel 
and assessment of the murder and subsequent cover-up.  In each instance he does so not 
because he is stupid or unimaginative, but because he has been partially blinded to reason and 
clear foresight by his avaricious fixation upon his own greatness. 
Lady Macbeth is fully aware of her power with her husband; she uses it to help him to 
the greatness that he obviously desires, but hesitates to grasp.  The fact that they are presently  
childless perhaps contributes to the intensity of her focus upon her husband‘s estate.  What is  
interesting to note about Lady Macbeth is that at no time prior to the murder of Duncan does 
she hesitate to promote the deed.  Her single-minded focus on the regicide is very suggestive 
of the fact that she has become ensnared in the web of bewitching prophecy woven by the 
Sisters.  Though not addressed directly in the prophecies, her inseparability from Macbeth 
brings her into the same path of destruction, unless she is able to resist it like Banquo.  There 
is, however, little chance of that.  The prophecy has worked upon Lady Macbeth‘s thought, 
perhaps to an even greater degree than Macbeth‘s, and what is crucial to note is that it has 
blinded her to the consequences to an even greater degree than her husband.  If this were not 
the case, then in all likelihood Macbeth would successfully talk himself out of the regicide in 
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scene seven.  In fact, it is Lady Macbeth that ensures the success of the Sisters' project, for 
Macbeth has already successfully resisted the pull of their charm: 
 We will proceed no further in this Businesse: 
 He hath Honour'd me of late, and I haue bought 
 Golden Opinions from all sorts of people, 
 Which would be worne now in their newest glosse, 
 Not cast aside so soone. (7.427-31) 
 
Macbeth‘s reasons for discontinuing the plot are famous and powerful.  But the most 
significant reason, and the first one he mentions, is the fact that the assassination cannot 
―trammell vp the Consequence‖ ( 7.399), or capture all of the subsequent loose ends neatly in 
a net.  Something will escape; murder will out. 
 It will haue blood, they say: Blood will haue Blood: 
 Stones haue beene knowne to moue, & Trees to speake: 
 Augures, and vnderstood Relations, haue 
 By Maggot Pyes, & Choughes, & Rookes brought forth 
 The secret‘st man of Blood.  (15.1145-49) 
 
Lady Macbeth dismisses the idea that the two of them cannot get away with the murder.  First,  
she points out, the murder will have no witnesses and be performed upon the king while he  
sleeps.  The guards will be drugged and unconscious, then subsequently blamed.  Secondly,  
anyone who voices suspicions of the Macbeths‘ malfeasance will have no firm ground on 
which to make accusation, as the Thane and his wife will brave out the circumstances and 
defy potential accusers to show proof.  The additional spur needed to prick the sides of his 
intent is Lady Macbeth and her delusion that they can actually succeed in a regicide and 
cover-up.  No conscious deception or contrivance is necessary here because the underlying 
misapprehension masquerades as seeming truth—powerful enough to fool and ensnare 
another victim. 
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An "Ayre-drawne-Dagger" 
 Macbeth's fixation is so advanced by the time his wife rings the bell to cue him to the 
regicide that he reveals to the audience that he has started to hallucinate as a precursor to the 
murder.  This is one of the deepest forms of fascinated thought, where the mental imagery is 
blended into and then mistaken for reality.  Macbeth has entered a state of reality 
transcendence, evidenced by his confusion over the vividness of the mental image of the 
murder weapon: 
 Is this a Dagger, which I see before me, 
 The Handle toward my Hand? Come, let me clutch thee: 
 I haue thee not, and yet I see thee still. 
 Art thou not fatall Vision, sensible 
 To feeling, as to sight? Or art thou but 
 A Dagger of the Minde, a false Creation, 
 Proceeding from the heat-oppressed Braine? 
 I see thee yet, in forme as palpable, 
 As this which now I draw. (8.511-19) 
 
Though he is "bewitched" by what he is about to do, he is not hypnotized or fully 
hallucinating.  He is still aware of his surroundings and can maintain a clearness of purpose 
without the need of an outside agent to dictate his actions.  He can retreat at any time.  But the 
fascinating images and possibilities draw him on and "marshall'st … the way that I was 
going" (8.520). 
 After the murder it is interesting to see how quickly both of the Macbeths fall into the 
condition that the Master of the Tiger supposedly suffers from in scene three.  Lady Macbeth 
quickly shifts from urging her husband to do the deed to telling him "These deeds must not be 
thought / After these wayes: so, it will make vs mad" (9.573-4).  To his visual hallucination, 
Macbeth adds an aural one: "Me thought I heard a voyce cry, Sleep no more: / Macbeth does 
murther Sleepe,"  (9.575-6).  He cannot abide the imagery of the actual deed: "I am afraid, to 
thinke what I haue done: / Looke on it againe, I dare not" (9.591-2).  Lady Macbeth thinks 
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that she can handle the visual power of the fatal tableau, but as we see during the later 
sleepwalking scene it completely overwhelms her thought.  She chastises Macbeth for 
thinking "So braine-sickly of things" (9.585), yet she is the one who suffers the brain-sick 
malady of somnambulism.   
 Both of them have drastically altered their self-perception, and as regicides, they have 
dramatically changed their identities—more so than what they will shortly become when they 
are made King and Queen.  Macbeth knows that he, at least, will have to maintain some 
mental distance from what he has just committed, "To know my deed, 'twere best not know 
my selfe" (9.613).  The crime turns their sovereignty into tyranny—a tragic mockery of 
kingship. 
 
Porter at the Door 
The ―drunken Porter‖ in scene ten presents a dramatic representation of the 
mechanical operation of the weak portal of suggestibility.  Metaphorically, the drunken Porter 
could serve as an example of Reason compromised and Imagination dominant, liable to 
entertain anything that appears at the door of the mind.  Without Reason and Judgment‘s 
corrective influence and their ability to balance appearances against a deeper understanding of 
reality, the mind can be overwhelmed with unfiltered stimuli and become vulnerable to a 
redirection of the victim‘s will that might not occur otherwise. 
 On a dramatic level, the Porter scene echoes the medieval stage conventions of the 
damned appearing at Hell Mouth, receiving their reward for allowing themselves to be 
captivated by iniquity.  Both overtones suggest the warning that in regards to the workings of 
the mind‘s ―castle,‖ great care should be taken to maintain a sober and vigilant guard upon the 
portals—especially perception and imagination. 
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 The scene is short and the comedy serves to provide a brief respite from the relentless 
focus on the coming regicide.  In fact, the Porter scene distracts the audience's attention 
during the moments when Macbeth has gone to Duncan's bedroom to commit the murder.  
The play is so well-known that few audience members, except some first-time auditors, do not 
know that Macduff will soon find the body and exclaim, "O horror, horror, horror,"  (10.676).   
However, besides presenting the metaphorical conceit of the hazard of letting the porter to the 
door of thought become intoxicated, and allow in all kinds of criminal impulses, the scene 
also presents the audience with the image that at the moment Macbeth commits the regicide, 
his world is revisioned into a semblance of Hell. 
 
Displaced Mirth 
 Macbeth's obsession with the throne of Scotland mutates from acquisition to retention 
after he returns from Scone and holds a royal feast for his subjects.  Whereas Duncan was the 
obstacle to the former problem, Banquo now looms as an impediment to the latter.  If 
Macbeth truly trusted the Sisters' prophecy, he would take assurance that he could remain 
king until Banquo's son(s) came of age.  But a mind full of "scorpions" like Macbeth's sees 
vulnerabilities with regard to how long his kingship will last before Banquo's progeny take 
over the throne.  The solution, to a fascinated mind and a now criminal hand is simple: kill 
Banquo and his heirs.  Macbeth's reasoning is impeccable, dishonorable and brutally efficient.  
If his hired assassins had been completely successful in their commission to murder Banquo 
and Fleance, the play would have followed a much different scenario.  But only Banquo is 
killed, keeping alive the prophecy that an heir of Banquo could one day take the throne. 
 The appearance of Banquo's ghost onstage in the banquet scene drives Macbeth from 
fascination to near madness.  If the shock of seeing the ghost had gone any further in its 
extremity, Macbeth might well have fallen to the floor in a catatonic fit like Othello.  Unlike 
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the imaginary dagger, the ghost is listed in the stage directions as making specific entrances 
and exits.  Therefore the audience is intended to see it as well.  Though Macbeth is the only 
one to see it onstage, the audience is permitted to experience a more concrete identification 
with Macbeth's fascination and horror at the sight of Banquo's gory visage.  This is somewhat 
compensatory for the omission of Duncan's death tableau, which would have been too 
shocking to most early modern audiences—the graphic representation of a regicide—and 
would definitely have been censored by the Master of the Revels. 
 A spectacle such as this helps to portray the shocking jolt that Macbeth receives to his 
mental state and explains visually what is another step in the alteration of his self-image.  He 
knows now that no sovereign sway will ever purge the blood of his victims from his 
hangman's hands.  Macbeth is so deeply disturbed by the imagery of the murders he has 
committed or commissioned that he will now act upon his thoughts without allowing space 
for consideration.  His hope is that once he becomes more comfortable with his new 
perspective of self and identity he can at least manage his political reign while his inner 
perturbations begin to sort themselves out: "My strange & self-abuse / Is the initiate feare, that 
wants hard vse: / We are but yong in deed" (15.1165-67). 
 
Hecate and the Apparitions 
 Within the play's witchcraft theme, the prime movers in the web spun to ensnare 
Macbeth are the Weyward Sisters and the goddess of witchcraft, Hecate.  Hecate takes less 
direct action in the ensnarement of Macbeth; instead she scolds the Sisters for presuming 
upon her prerogative: 
 Sawcy, and ouer-bold, how did you dare 
 To Trade, and Trafficke with Macbeth, 
 In Riddles, and Affaires of death; 
 And I the Mistris of your Charmes, 
 The close contriuer of all harmes, 
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 Was neuer call'd to beare my part, 
 Or shew the glory of our Art?  (16.1170-76) 
 
Hecate introduces a possible mediation (for the audience) between predetermination and free 
will—or even the classic style of tragic structure over the neoclassic.  Macbeth does not have 
to bear his sufferings patiently before his early modern audience as his Greek counterpart 
might have done centuries before on the stages of Athens.  In Shakespeare's era, an offer 
could be made by a god or demon, a prediction unfolded, but Macbeth does not have to grasp 
it.  He, like the ―noble Banquo,‖ could refuse to pursue the prophecy if it meant 
compromising his honor or eternal soul.  For some members of the audience—both early 
modern and present-day—if he is to suffer at all, he should be suffering for righteousness‘ 
sake, "For it is better (if the will of God be so) that ye suffer for well doing, then for euill 
doing"  (I Peter 3:17). 
To those members of a Renaissance audience versed in Christian ethos and the 
tradition of decades of Morality plays, his refusal to take a sinful course of action, whatever 
the consequences, would be consistent with making a ―correct‖ decision.  One comparison 
with another character in the play suggests the question, what might a figure like Edward the 
Confessor do if he found himself in Macbeth‘s situation?  The Tragedy of Edward the 
Confessor might be conspicuously brief.  But Macbeth, who is nominally Christian and voices 
Christian arguments within his attempt to solve his dilemma is spectacularly captivated by the 
pagan construct and turns to it more consistently for inspiration than church doctrine. 
 The Christian tones are held in relief to the backdrop of the order created by Hecate 
and the underworld spirits.  Their order is that of vengeance for slights, payback for 
disrespect, and punishment for human weakness.  How is it, then, that Macbeth becomes the 
target for their punitive energies?  Is he not a virtually infallible hero fighting on the side of 
king and country?  The audience is aware that he harbors secret and formidable ambitions, but 
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is that enough to damn him?  Perhaps, but there is an additional clue to the prosecution from 
the spirits: he is a choleric, malicious and irreverent maverick.  To Hecate, Macbeth 
apparently is a self-centered, avaricious schemer who pursues his own agenda, and does not 
pay proper homage to any deity.  She profiles him in the following terms: 
 HECAT  
And, which is worse, all you haue done 
  Hath bene but for a wayward Sonne, 
  Spightfull, and wrathfull, who (as others do), 
  Loues for his owne ends, not for you.  (16.1177-80) 
 
If the reportage of Macbeth‘s inner character is accurate, then it is small wonder that Fate,  
Fortune, and the goddess of purification and expiation might conjoin to torment this 
―wayward son.‖  In making the prosecution of Macbeth an agenda item for Hecate, the play as 
it exists in the surviving text, creates a third force targeting the destruction of Macbeth's reign.  
He has already had to deal with rebellious members of his own country, he realizes that 
England will be sending an army against him and now the audience perceives that a potent 
part of the pagan or supernatural underworld is in the final stages of assaulting his tenuous 
security. 
 The methods of fascination employed by the Sisters against Macbeth are graphically  
overt—to the point of masque-like spectacle.  With their hook baited and set in scene three, 
the Sisters stand by to watch the destructive power of what they perceive to be their mental 
charm work upon its victim.  When Hecate arrives to chide them, not so much for their 
actions as for their omitting her from the proceedings, she indicates that Macbeth was not a 
prime choice for their efforts as he is not a likely convert to their ways.  She implies that 
perhaps Macbeth would damn himself to the underworld without too much aid from them.  
But, as the Sisters have initiated this project, Hecate decides that it should be followed 
through with proper procedure and ritual.  She commands her minions to prepare a ceremony 
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that will finish the job on Macbeth‘s imagination, and put a proper closure to his destruction.  
Hecate herself will prepare the apparitions Macbeth encounters: 
Vpon the Corner of the Moone 
There hangs a vap‘rous drop, profound, 
Ile catch it ere it come to ground; 
And that distill'd by Magicke slights, 
Shall raise such Artificiall Sprights, 
As by the strength of their illusion, 
Shall draw him on to his Confusion. 
He shall spurne Fate, scorne Death, and beare 
His hopes ‗boue Wisedome, Grace, and Feare: 
And you all know, Security 
Is Mortals cheefest Enemie. (16.1190-1200) 
 
 Macbeth pays little respect to the Sisters (and any attendant spirits) when he arrives at  
their lair.  His greeting is a wonderfully self-centered tirade, ending in a brusque command.  
This can be evidence of Hecate‘s previous assessment of his character, or simply the result of 
the strain he has endured since the regicide.  In any event, his thought is ripe for capture, 
because he indicates that he is prepared to believe anything the spirits will tell him, even if 
they detail the Apocalypse.  From this point, Macbeth is totally lost.  If he is willing to take 
the ensuing prophecy as patent truth, prima facie, then he commits himself totally to whatever 
path they lay before him, blind to the pitfalls and possible destruction. 
 There are numerous ways to stage the entrance of the apparitions, but the strongest 
staging concepts again seem to lie in those presentations that materially represent them 
onstage.  They are detailed in the stage directions and the spectacle is infinitely more 
fascinating for the viewer if he can see what Macbeth sees.  As with the Ghost of Banquo in 
scene fifteen, Macbeth actually sees them, not because he is hallucinating, but because there is 
an actual manifestation to be witnessed. Everything that appears onstage is specifically 
designed to overwhelm Macbeth‘s consciousness, just as it works to amaze and fascinate the 
theatrical audience that is witnessing the play.   
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When Macbeth enters, there are six ―witches‖ and the goddess of witchcraft herself 
confronting him.  In the course of the scene, he witnesses three fascinating apparitions, and 
eight phantom kings followed by the most frightening specter that he has seen to date: the 
ghost of Banquo.  This is a perfectly conceived and executed attack upon the reasoning 
faculties of the victim.  Macbeth stands little to no chance of seeing through any equivocation 
within the prophecies, even though the visual evidence is right there before his eyes.  It  
is for this reason that the physical manifestation of the apparitions is so important to any  
production: the audience must see what Macbeth sees, though not necessarily with his eyes. 
 The first apparition appears accompanied by “Thunder. 1. Apparation, an Armed 
Head‖ (18.1375.1).  It warns Macbeth to beware of Macduff, but does not state the particular 
reason.  However, the visual image the apparition presents offers ground for rich speculation, 
which perhaps should occur to Macbeth, but apparently does not.  The head is not attached to 
a body, symbolizing not only the possibility of Macduff at the head of a rebellion, but also 
Macbeth‘s own future (a disembodied head) at the hands of the Thane of Fife.  It also reflects 
back upon the violence Macbeth visited upon Macdonwald, turning that traitor‘s rebellion into 
a headless cause.  If Macbeth, through his actions, has become a traitor to his country and 
crown, will he not suffer the same fate?  The apparition does not (or is not allowed to) 
elaborate, despite Macbeth‘s curiosity.  Here we may also detect an operative element of the 
fascinating influence: allow little time to reflect upon new information, allow reason little 
room to work out the truth.  
Macbeth is rebuffed in his interrogation of the First Apparition by the First Witch, and  
immediately a second image appears: a bloody child.  This Second Apparition is as elegantly  
subtle a messenger as the first, but more potent in its push to lead Macbeth into the trap of  
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overconfidence: "Be bloody, bold, & resolute: Laugh to scorne / The powre of man: For none 
of woman borne / Shall harme Macbeth"  (18.1386-88).  Hearing that, who would not take 
comfort from the prediction that no human could harm him?  It does leave open the possibility 
for lethal accident, or death by wild beast, but Macbeth‘s thought is currently very narrowly 
focused upon Macduff.  He therefore replies: 
 Then liue, Macduffe: what need I feare of thee? 
 But yet Ile make assurance double sure, 
And take a Bond of Fate: thou shalt not liue, 
That I may tell pale-hearted Feare, it lies; 
And sleepe in spight of Thunder.  (18.1389-93) 
 
Again, however, Macbeth seems to miss the visual clues presented by the apparition that  
undermine the apparent veracity of its warning.  A bloody child could represent to Macbeth 
the futility of such a creature being the instrument of his doom—if it was born through the 
natural process.  However, babies born in this manner are less likely to be covered in blood 
than they are likely to be covered in amniotic fluid.  A blood soaked babe is more likely to be 
the result of a birth by Cesarean section; we find out later that this is the reality of Macduff‘s 
birth.   The image of the Second Apparition should suggest, ―Equivocation! Look more 
deeply into this!‖  It is, perhaps, too subtle a projection to a mind charging down another 
course of thought.  Macbeth may be ignorant of the full impact of the Second Apparition, but 
he elects the correct course for his personal safety; he decides to hold equivocating prophecy 
to its seeming promises and plots the murder of Macduff to ―make assurance double sure‖ 
(18.1390). 
 The Third Apparition plays the trickster with Macbeth by switching quietly over from  
symbolic representation to an almost literal presentation:  ―Thunder.  3 Apparation, a Childe 
Crowned, with a Tree in his hand" (18.1393.1).  There is no direct indication that this  
apparition is to represent Malcolm, but it is suggested by the child, i.e. a young king such as  
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Malcolm will be if he ascends the throne.  The tree image, however, is taken by Macbeth to be  
symbolic in its meaning.  Apparently, he sees a symbol of impossibility—a baby lifting a 
tree—and joyously concludes that only an impossibility like a forest uprooting and marching 
against him can fulfill this prophecy.  He indulges in a false sense of security by missing the 
literal message of the image: the young prince (and his forces) will actually cut the trees of 
Birnam Wood and hold them in their hands while they march against Dunsinane.  The 
equivocation again hides in plain sight. 
 At this point, the show for Macbeth is over, and the spirits have fulfilled their 
obligation to his rude command.  But Macbeth is unsatisfied, because the most galling part of 
the prophecy on the heath in scene three remains mysterious.  He demands that the assembled 
coven reveal the nature of Banquo‘s due and in no uncertain terms threatens them rudely with 
a curse if they demur.  This sort of prompting instantly procures Macbeth‘s behest, and he has 
now affronted the dark assembly twice with his wrath.  They, therefore, are only too glad to 
show him the unequivocal truth of Banquo‘s legacy, for they suspect beforehand the effect it 
will have on Macbeth.  The reappearance of the Ghost of Banquo delivers the figurative 
dagger to Macbeth‘s heart and hopes with his smile and the projected triumph of his progeny.  
As Macbeth tries to reconcile the enormity of his humiliation, Hecate lays bare the reason for 
tormenting him—his own arrogance and insolence: 
 I Sir, all this is so. But why 
Stands Macbeth thus amazedly? 
Come Sisters, cheere we vp his sprights, 
And shew the best of our delights. 
Ile Charme the Ayre to giue a sound, 
 While you performe your Antique round: 
 That this great King may kindly say, 
 Our duties, did his welcome pay.  (18.1432-39) 
 
 At the end of this scene, Macbeth is lost, heart and soul to the obsessive fixation of his  
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own agenda.  He has ―in blood / Stept in so farre, that should I wade no more, / Returning 
were as tedious as go ore‖ (15.1159-61).  With this giving over to the impulse to see the end 
of a course of action that he knows is wrong, he suspends reason and the intervention of 
conscience.  Every action he takes from now on will be for his own security and his own 
indulgence: 
    From this moment, 
 The very firstlings of my heart shall be 
 The firstlings of my hand.  (18.1453-55) 
 
 
Final Revelations 
 Macbeth and Richard III are perhaps the only examples in Shakespeare of grasping  
opportunists who realize that to gain the crown, they must risk damning themselves for the 
sake of what may be a tenuous reign—and then do it anyway.  As a dramatic encounter with 
the issue of ―what is the price of fame, and what is the cost of glory‖ Macbeth‘s temptation 
revolves around Christ‘s question in Mark 8, verse 36:  ―For what shall it profit a man, though 
he should win the whole world, if he lose his soule?‖  More importantly, once lost, what is the 
price of getting it back, if that is possible: ―Or what exchange shall a man give for his soule?‖ 
(Mark 8: 37). 
Once he has taken full possession of his ―prophecied‖ fortune, it would take a 
complete breakdown in the fascinating effects of the seductive prophecy to release him from 
it.  It is remarkable that Macbeth sees so clearly how ruinous his act of regicide will be, yet is 
bewitched into thinking that he is somehow exempted from similar consequences from the 
effects of another prophecy—and this is exactly what happens.  The first prophecy of the 
Sisters comes to fruition, but an unforeseen element of the prognostication is that it will be 
subject to the prophecies of others who will bear a contingent impact on Macbeth‘s elevation 
to the throne. 
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For a soldier, it is not the manner of death that holds much terror for the mind, but in 
many cases, it is the matter of honor and reputation that can comprise the more serious loss.  
For Macbeth, who has wagered his soul for present gain, it is this loss that galls him more 
than the eventual loss of his life; it is the subtle, unnoticed influence of fascination, slowly 
undermining the strong foundation of reason that has been left lightly guarded by the pursuit 
of ambition and personal sense.  For Macbeth, the loss of respect and friends is worse than 
any injury he could receive in battle.  For Macbeth, the realization that he has entered the hell 
of a tortured psyche before he has enjoyed a minute of the crown is the ―deepe damnation‖ 
(7.416) of his act of regicide. 
Lady Macbeth also realizes too late that there will be no enjoying the object of their 
plot, when after all their scheming, 
 Nought‘s had, all‘s spent, 
 Where our desire is got without content: 
 ‗Tis safer, to be that which we destroy, 
 Then by destruction dwell in doubtfull ioy. (13.950-53) 
 
The true effect of fascination is to produce upon the body as well as the mind the effects of 
whatever is cherished in thought.  As the Macbeths‘ experience bears out, there is no need to  
wait for Heaven, Hell or the Underworld; whatever governs the mental state ultimately 
governs the material state.  Lady Macbeth‘s sleepwalking attempt to purge her tortured soul 
mirrors Macbeth‘s reflection that 
 I have liu'd long enough: my way of life 
 Is faln into the Seare, the yellow Leafe, 
 And that which should accompany Old-Age, 
 As Honor, Loue, Obedience, Troopes of Friends, 
 I must not looke to haue: but in their steed 
 Curses, not lowd but deepe, Mouth-honor, breath 
 Which the poore heart would faine deny, and dare not.  (23.1920-29) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
OTHELLO 
 
 
Hating the Moor 
 
 As the twenty-first century witnesses an increasingly global exploration of 
Shakespeare, Bernard Spivack‘s observation in Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil still 
rings true that in the literature of scholarship and criticism, 
…Iago has been rationalized to the last inch of his human similitude.  But the hard and 
literal enigma of Othello‘s fatal ancient remains intractable.  There is still no 
successful mediation between his terrible vividness, as we feel it on the one hand, and 
the blank he presents to our scrutiny on the other. (3) 
  
There is no definitive solution to the problem of Iago‘s "psyche" in terms of clinical 
psychological observation.  Perhaps it is because Shakespeare left enough of his profile 
indeterminate, or under-motivated, that attempts to fathom him to the depths have been 
frustrated.  But as a dramatic functionary, Iago is very straightforward.  He is the means by 
which Othello's mind is ensnared, and he creates the potential to enact the great tragedy 
surrounding the deaths of Othello and Desdemona.  Iago shares the top of the list of 
Shakespeare‘s Machiavels with Richard III, keeping company with such notorious and 
compelling characters as Aaron, Edmund, York, and Hamlet‘s uncle Claudius.  As a character 
type, he traces his lineage back through Barabas in Marlowe‘s The Jew of Malta, Lorenzo in 
Kyd‘s The Spanish Tragedy, the Vice characters of pre-Elizabethan drama, and even to 
associations with the tempters, adversaries and devils of religious dramas and sacred writings.  
There is even evidence of his type in the "clever slave" of classical comedies, which Spivack 
traces so thoroughly in Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil—a fine study of Iago and his 
predecessors. 
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 The intrigue of Iago is built upon a trio of factors which invites much speculation, but 
textually only exists in the reported facts that he: 1) resents Cassio‘s appointment to the 
Lieutenancy over him, 2) hates Othello, and 3) is resolved to get Cassio‘s place because he 
considers it the privilege of his seniority and quality of service amongst the officer corps.  A 
stated reason for hating Othello is that Iago believes he has had sexual intercourse with 
Emilia, a servant to Othello's wife, Desdemona.  The fact that Iago is married to Emilia 
explains the justification for a possible hatred, but even if Iago is mistaken, he engenders the 
conceit of this infidelity in the thought of the audience.  In any event, Iago does not require 
proof of the transgression to nurse his animus:"I, for meere suspition in that kind, / Will doe, 
as if for surety" (3.667-668). 
 Othello is a less spectacular treatment of the effects of fascination, but it is no less 
compelling or horrible than Macbeth.  The audience views scenes which take place indoors 
with more frequency than in Macbeth, and the mood of Othello seems to be more suffocating 
in its intensity as we see Iago's plot wind around and bind itself to Othello's imagination like a 
constricting snake. Othello uses snake imagery to support the "poison" (4.978) of Iago's 
malice, "Where is that Viper" (15.3188), so the suffocating theme carries some internal and 
external metaphorical suggestions.  This sits in contrast to the feeling that Macbeth unfolds 
with more unbridled speed, slashing from one danger to another.  Ironically, however, though 
the audience is placed in an aesthetically close proximity to Othello, we are not given that 
type of access to his inwardness that Macbeth provides.  We are meant, perhaps, to see the 
operation of fascination more from the external evidence of behavior and public speech than 
from Othello's "thinking" or private meditations. 
 Othello gives the audience little reason to hate him until he actually kills Desdemona.  
Because this happens at the end of the play, we can entertain a kind of hope that Othello 
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might dispel the fascination of his thought and discern the true reality of what has been 
happening on Cyprus.  Macbeth earns our opprobrium early in his story and we as auditors 
experience a kind of fear in both plays—generally a fear of what Macbeth will do, and a fear 
for what Othello might do.   
 Iago seems to be the only character in the play that truly hates Othello.  We know this, 
because he tells us directly.  Othello offers the audience more access to the projector of the 
maleficium than to the victim of the fascination.  We see the internal operations upon the 
subject of the process of mesmeric bewitchment in Macbeth, and we see the external 
operations upon the subject in Othello, because we have access to the internal mechanics of 
Iago's demonstration of "evil eye" projection.  In the early scenes, Iago has yet to reveal a 
specific plan, if he has already preconceived one against Othello, but he clearly states that he 
has conceived a malice which will almost certainly find a way to hurt Othello: "Tho I doe hate 
him, as I doe hell paines, / Yet for necessity of present life, / I must shew out a flag, and signe 
of loue, / Which is indeed but a signe" (1.157-60).  Later he repeats that he hates Othello, but 
shares more of the passion behind it:  
 …I doe suspect the lustie Moore, 
 Hath leap'd into my seate, the thought whereof 
 Doth like a poisonous minerall gnaw my inwards, 
 And nothing can, or shall content my soule, 
 Till I am euen'd with him, wife, for wife: 
 Or failing so, yet that I put the Moore, 
 At least, into a Iealousie so strong, 
 That Iudgement cannot cure;   (4.976-83) 
 
In this play it is Iago who represents the issue of premeditated villainy, though it is not as 
specific early on as Macbeth's premeditated concept of regicide.  It is similar, though; for all 
intents and purposes Othello holds a version of sovereign power once the army arrives in 
Cyprus and Iago has already mounted a campaign against him.  
Iago likes power.  He speaks of war as his trade, and there is no reason to assume that  
 167 
he follows or cares for any other.  With all of his hopes for advancement, status and fortune  
bound up in the army, his being passed over for Othello‘s lieutenancy is a difficult check to  
accept.  It is exacerbated by the fact that the chosen officer is a ―bookish Theorique,‖ (1.23) 
and not as experienced in the field as Iago.  Othello has seen Iago‘s proof at Rhodes and 
Cyprus before, and his promotion of Cassio over Iago is a bitter disappointment.  In addition 
to this professional slight, Iago mentions that there is a rumor that Othello has cuckolded him 
with Emilia.  These two circumstances, one actual, the other unprovable by textual evidence 
and technically imaginary, combine to create a sense of grievance in an ambitious officer like 
Iago.  If it is true that Iago despises most of mankind for living lives which do not, 
 Keepe yet their hearts, attending on themselues, 
 And, throwing but shewes of seruice on their Lords, 
 Doe well thriue by 'em, and when they haue lin'd their coates, 
 Doe themselues homage,  (1.51-54) 
 
then it is easy to suppose that he would crave power over others who he regards as unworthy, 
and would chafe at the power they might exercise over him. 
 There may be a good reason for Othello‘s promotion of Cassio over Iago, however.   
Does Othello recognize Iago‘s talent and mastery of tactics, but not his abilities or mastery of 
strategy?  Is Cassio any more qualified in these matters?  There is no textual evidence to 
suggest it, but there is a feeling that Iago, though perceived by others as honest and fairly 
reliable in battle, is perhaps not the stuff of the higher ranks.  This is borne out in the play by 
the fact that Iago, in some degree like Lady Macbeth, does not foresee the greater 
consequences of his actions.  It is important to remember that in the world of the play, Iago 
has two major objectives: to make money by gulling Roderigo in a hopeless effort to win 
Desdemona, and to redress his sense of injury against his commanders by simultaneously 
supplanting Cassio and shaking Othello‘s confidence in his new marriage by the suspicion of 
being cuckolded by Lieutenant Cassio.  That is as far as Iago contrives until the scene shifts to 
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Cyprus.  He does not initially plot the death of Desdemona, Othello, or even Cassio.  He 
embarks on a devious tit-for-tat campaign to gain an office he covets and to induce what he 
conceives to be needful suffering in his two adversaries from a projection of malice that 
"Doth like a poisonous minerall gnaw my inwards" (4.978). 
At the opening of the play, Iago is serving in the command of the foreign mercenary 
general, Othello, as the ensign, or standard-bearer.  Othello has been accommodated into 
Venetian society, but perhaps he has not yet been fully accepted.  He has just eloped with the 
daughter of a wealthy and powerful senator, Brabantio.  The elopement is significant because 
Desdemona is a Venetian, and Venetian ladies as Iago says, are capable of being "super 
subtle" (3.641).  Desdemona is later accused directly of "Lechery, by this hand: an Index and 
obscure prologue to the history of lust and foule thoughts:" (4.939-40), but there is no 
verification of the assertion that Desdemona would accept the role of someone‘s mistress.  So 
the disappointment Iago may have with Othello and Desdemona‘s elopement would tend to 
center more on the fact that it upsets his efforts to secure a match between Desdemona and 
Roderigo—who is desirous of the hand of Brabantio‘s daughter—rather than as a 
circumstance that interferes with his own designs on Desdemona.  Iago has been taking 
money from Roderigo to effect a match with Desdemona, but it seems that neither 
Desdemona, nor Brabantio want any part of the deal.  It may matter little to Iago, as he clearly 
states that he is more interested in prying money from Roderigo "Thus doe I euer make my 
foole my purse:" (3.661), than he is in providing him service. 
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge was baffled by the apparent lack of motivation for Iago's 
malice.  Other critics have also expressed surprise that Iago does what he does from some 
apparently specious and fantastical justifications.  But we are not dealing here with a real 
person.  Even if we were, modern and historical records contain many instances of people 
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committing comparable crimes to those found in Othello, and sharing less information about 
the motivating forces.  In the argument for the operation of fascination, valid psychological 
impulses are somewhat irrelevant because they do not need to be present.  Causality is 
observed in the process of Conceit  Imagination unchecked by Reason  reality 
transcendence  distortion of perception and consequence  Action.  The cause of the 
resultant action proceeds from a perceived need to alter the status quo.  In Macbeth the need is 
to ensure that Duncan's death creates a vacancy on the Scottish throne and that Malcolm does 
not directly succeed him.  In Othello, the perceived need is also to create a vacancy for a 
coveted office and for Iago to purge the malice of resentment onto the two objects of his envy: 
Othello and Cassio.  The preliminary actions conform almost exactly to the profile of a person 
emanating malocchio, or "evil eye" maleficium.  
 The core of Iago‘s initial plan is rather simple: bring Cassio into disrepute by 
exploiting his human weaknesses, rather than mount a smear campaign or directly attacking 
his person.  If Cassio is to fall and make a place for Iago, Iago must be seen to be innocent of 
connivance and appear a shining example—one which Othello should have chosen in the first 
place.  The plot against Othello is also simple: use Othello‘s human weaknesses defined by 
what he is susceptible to and what may be suggestible to him.  To compound Cassio‘s 
humiliation, advancing the supposition that Cassio has slept with Desdemona is almost 
irresistible.  Once introduced, the concept that Othello has been betrayed and deceived by the 
seemingly virtuous Desdemona will not leave his imagination. Iago‘s so-called ―evidence‖ 
recalls some of the imagery that Othello has of his courtship with Brabantio‘s daughter—her 
ability to hide from her father the fact that Othello had won her heart and her hand, and their 
success in concealing their subsequent marriage from Brabantio. 
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Upon the arrival of the Venetian army in Cyprus, Othello is seemingly secure in his 
position as a respected commander and the new husband of one of the most beautiful ladies of 
Venice.  Othello‘s military training and habit would be to investigate any assault against him 
or his forces.  He is very capable, so in order to ensnare him, an attack must have all 
appearances of truth.  Iago does not have the advantages of royal power or supernatural 
amazement to aid him.  He must use actual circumstance and convention and reinterpret them 
for Othello.  He must also change Othello's perception of himself and his environment; the 
altered perception must be a supposititious substitute, an alternate view aptly suggesting what 
is behind or underneath that which Othello is experiencing directly with his senses.  Toward 
that end, he reinterprets Othello's experience of Cassio's deference to him as a mocking 
display of respect from one who has made him a cuckold.  Desdemona's playful embrace of 
her own sexuality and social confidence becomes revisioned for Othello as a cover for 
lecherous availability.  When the two of them appear together, Iago brings every look and 
behavior into question, making direct suggestions to Othello's thought in order to advance the 
necessary reality transcendence that will carry Othello past the point of an easy mental 
recovery. 
Othello‘s ―otherness‖ is a point of vulnerability that Othello himself is conscious of—
a Christianized Moor married into Venetian society.  He is also vulnerable because of his 
inexperience in love and marriage.  But the most potent weak portal for Othello is his trusting 
nature.  He ―is of a free and open nature, / That thinkes men honest, that but seeme to be so;‖ 
(3.677-78).  Iago also asserts that ―These Moores are changeable in their wills:‖ (3.632) so 
that the opportunity he must create is one which preys upon Othello‘s native insecurities and 
takes advantage of his willingness to be led to the truth.  A general relies on accurate 
intelligence to inform his maneuvers and it is just this propensity that leaves him susceptible 
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to suggestion and supposition. If the operation and effects of the fascination of Othello‘s 
thought are seen and understood by the audience, their sense of Othello's tragic fall is 
intensified not only by the nearly bestial transformation he undergoes within his obsession, 
but by the gossamer-thin essence of the web spun to ensnare him. 
 
Doubt and Reputation 
 
 Cassio comes into Iago‘s web not so much as a conspirator for Desdemona‘s 
affections, but as a disgraced comrade who has lost all sense of direction and purpose through 
the humiliation of being demoted for dereliction of duty.  Before his disgrace, it would have 
been next to impossible for Iago to work upon Cassio.  Cassio is ―a proper man,‖ and shows 
innate tendencies to affect a moral and social superiority to his fellows in the army.  Such is 
his concern with reputation that he guards it jealously and is not initially susceptible to the 
efforts of someone such as Iago.  But that does not prevent Iago from creating a weakness in 
Cassio‘s defenses.  By seizing on a physical flaw, Cassio‘s low tolerance for alcohol, Iago 
constructs a simple but effective trap to destroy Cassio‘s precious self-image. Once Cassio 
has disgraced himself and has been cashiered by Othello for being drunk on watch and 
inciting a brawl (all carefully stage-managed by Iago), the playwright highlights the issues of 
reputation and doubt in the purview of the audience's thought.  Cassio leads the illustration 
with 
 Reputation, reputation, reputation, Oh I ha lost  
 my reputation: I ha lost the immortall part of my selfe, 
 and what remaines is beastiall, my reputation, Iago, 
 my reputation.    (6.1262-65) 
 
What we come to see later is that Iago's plot against Othello touches the heart of Othello's 
greatest susceptibility and the soldier's central vulnerability: the loss of honor. 
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Iago suggests to Othello what others in the play might believe: that Desdemona is only 
sexually fascinated with him, and when that fascination ends, she will return to her natural 
tastes and cultural biases.  This casual treatment of the marriage sacrament and the seemingly 
low esteem for the abandoned spouse which such an act engenders can be deadly to a soldier's 
sense of honor. Iago‘s insinuations that Desdemona has already taken a lover and that her 
alleged dalliance with Michael Cassio is the result of her ending her infatuation with Othello, 
is one of the elements of the supposititious argument that drives Othello into a passion. 
 Othello does not appear to be overly jealous with regard to the sexual element of the 
provoking cause: 
 I had bin happy if the generall Campe, 
 Pyoners, and all, had tasted her sweete body, 
 So I had nothing knowne: O now for euer 
 Farewell the tranquile mind, farewell content: 
 Farewell the plumed troopes, and the big warres: 
 That makes ambition vertue: O farewell, 
 Farewell the neighing Steed, and the shrill Trumpe, 
 The spirit-stirring Drumme, th'eare-peircing Fife; 
 The royall Banner, and all quality, 
 Pride, pompe, and circumstance of glorious warre. 
 And O you mortall Engines, whose rude throates, 
 Th'immortall Ioues dread clamours counterfeit; 
 Farewell, Othello's Occupation's gone.  (9.1797-1809) 
 
Obviously adultery would bother most men, but the greatest pain for Othello seems to stem 
from the public knowledge of an alleged affair and the subsequent humiliation, damage to his 
reputation and the loss of a personal sense of honor.  Indeed, he ends this speech convinced 
that his entire career is destroyed, and perhaps with it his sense of identity. 
 Othello's circumstances, a Moor in a European environment, a converted Christian, a 
commanding general, a viceroy or territorial governor, a black man who has eloped with his 
beautiful, upper-class white bride, might all combine to groom his thought to be hyper-
sensitive to any imprecations of his public persona—as it would in most people outside of the 
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theatrical stage.  The audience can project their own assumptions about Othello's inner 
negotiations by noting the dilemma Shakespeare has presented to his tragic hero and then 
reflect or meditate upon the possible consequences and actions a man jealous of his honor 
might pursue. 
 The argument here is never to say that Othello is not provoked to sexual jealousy, but 
that his need to salvage his perceived loss of honor and reputation is the driving force within 
his fascinated thought.  Damage to Othello's reputation is perhaps recoverable in that it 
involves the repair of the outward perception of his public appearance.  Damage done to 
Othello's sense of honor is an internal issue that permanently disfigures his understanding of 
his own identity.  Regardless of the validity of Iago's suppositions, Othello is trapped into 
perceiving himself either as a cuckolded gull, or by acting upon insufficiently interrogated 
surmises and insinuations with disastrous final effects—an incompetent general and a tragic 
fool. 
 
"The Mischief of The Envier When he Envieth" 
 
Essay IX: ―Of Lyers‖ 
 
Verily, lying is an ill and detestable vice.  Nothing makes us men, and no other 
meanes keeps us bound one to another, but our word; knew we but the horror and 
waight of it, we would with fire and sword pursue and hate the same, and more justly 
than any other crime.‖  I see all men generally busied (and that verie improperly) to 
punish certaine innocent errours in children, which have neither impression nor 
consequence, and chastice and vex them for rash and fond actions.  Onely lying, and 
stubbornnesse somewhat more, are the faults whose birth and progresse I would have 
severly punished and cut off; for they grow and increase with them:  and if the tongue 
have once gotten this ill habit, good Lord how hard, nay how impossible it is to make 
her leave it? (Montaigne, 47) 
 
Even if virtue and truth build strong defenses, the assault of intractable hatred will 
seldom rest until it is destroyed.  Montaigne cites stubbornness and lying as two traits that he 
would have severely and universally punished.  These are also two of the traits that Iago 
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displays in his campaign of undermining the domestic happiness of Othello and Desdemona, 
the aspirations of Cassio, and the hopes of Roderigo.  A lie has no power other than what is 
given to it by human thought and action.  Usually it is impossible to operate against the 
bulwarks of strong defenses.  Therefore, the lie must alter the perceived reality in order to 
bypass the natural mental objections and resistance.  It must make strength seem weak, 
established fact appear dubious, and virtue to seem corrupt.  Only then can it proceed with 
division and conquest.  Iago works the entry of Chaos into Othello‘s newly happy world with 
his ingeniously effective practice of deceit and supposition. 
 Though he makes no direct invocations or supplications to familiar spirits (as in the 
case of Lady Macbeth), it is interesting to compare Iago‘s behavior to that of a sorcerer.  In 
many ways, he resembles the lay practitioner of sorcery which Jeffrey B. Russell 
characterizes in A History of Witchcraft as one who might employ 
…the use of magic,… in order to harm those whom one hated for no just reason.  
Sorcery was a form of unjust aggression springing from jealousy, envy, greed, or other 
base human desires. (21) 
 
Even in pagan societies, there was a distinction made between good magic and evil magic,  
similar to the Judeo-Christian traditions of angels and angelic human works, and demons and  
diabolical human works. What intrigues the thought, and engages the moral centers of the 
spectator are the behaviors—both mental and physical—of the victims of his machinations.  
Iago, unlike Othello, apparently does not gain any insight from his actions.  He looks into 
people and situations with a marvelous sagacity for personal weakness, but never addresses 
his own fascination with envy.   
 The comparison of Iago to a sorcerer is not a new idea.  He has been described as 
many different incarnations of the Devil, the Vice character from the Morality plays, a 
Machiavel, the unrequited lover of Othello, and other characterizations.  But the methodology 
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of military undermining to ―level‖ those he has cause to hate finds some currency with 
perception theory as it relates to a surface stability that does not exhibit the fatal weakening of 
elemental foundations.  Iago says that he will  
   …diet my reuenge, 
 For that I doe suspect the lustie Moore, 
 Hath leap‘d into my seate, the thought whereof 
 Doth like a poisonous mineral gnaw my inwards, 
 And nothing can, or shall content my soule, 
 Till I am euen‘d with him, wife, for wife: 
 Or failing so, yet that I put the Moore, 
 At least, into a Iealousie so strong, 
 That Iudgement cannot cure; (4.975-983) 
 
 Iago is neither rich nor powerful in his status as Othello‘s ensign.  He is a common 
soldier who has proven himself on the battlefield, yet seemingly exhibits traits or tendencies 
that retard his advancement in the officer ranks.  He exists in the midst of his society.  He has 
command of others, yet is commanded by many higher officers.  He is married, but not 
wealthy.  His wife is a servant to his general‘s wife.  He is known, but not famous, generally 
trusted, but not generally admired.  He is a typical man of his time; outwardly, he is too 
mediocre, unremarkable, and even a bit crude.  By revealing his internal thoughts, 
Shakespeare gives us one of the most indelible dramatic character profiles of the Devil as 
Everyman.  This is not to assert that Iago is a devil.  Both he and Aaron see themselves as 
completely human.  They merely engage in what can be interpreted as diabolical behavior.  If 
it is argued by some that they do the Devil‘s work, then it must be stated that they do so 
independently of any sense of obligation to him.  They both satisfy their needs by pursuing 
their personal agenda and priorities.  The audience never sees either of them bind themselves 
to supernatural forces, as Lady Macbeth does to spirits, or Edmund in King Lear does to his 
goddess: Nature. 
 Othello identifies the root of Iago‘s power in act three: 
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 This fellowe‘s of exceeding honesty, 
 And knowes all qualities with a learn'd spirit 
 Of humaine dealings: (9.1710-12) 
 
It is this appearance of integrity that Iago exploits in his attack on Othello‘s peace and 
harmony.  Othello implies that Iago has a keen facility for observation, and that he is astute in 
the matters of human behaviors and motives.   Iago would know better than most that it is 
near-truths and suggested probabilities that fascinate the imagination more effectively than 
outright prevarication, which might only be employed with greater risk and ideally only as a 
last resort.  The powers of suspicion and doubt drive the wheels of a runaway imagination 
better than the fragile workings of a direct lie.  Iago does not need to lie outright and does so 
only when there is no way to gainsay his assertion.  His genius in distorting perception does 
his work so much more effectively and perniciously, at the same time holding open the door 
to escape.  He needs only confess that he was mistaken in his assessment, and that the 
appearances he based his conclusions upon were deceiving.  It would be hard to prove 
malicious intent in that case, and the circumstances would support such a defense better than 
they would an outright fabrication. 
In a dramatically ironic turn, he implants the aggressive suggestion in Othello‘s mind 
that Desdemona is the one who is the deceiving devil.  He perverts Othello's image of 
Desdemona by assigning to her many of the malignant traits that he possesses: breach of faith, 
secret contrivance, unbridled will and dissimulation.  By using the fact that she was willing to 
elope with Othello against the probable wishes of her father, Iago can sow relentless doubt in 
Othello‘s mind concerning her integrity.  Though in all other respects Desdemona may be an 
exemplary woman of virtue, Iago can plausibly seize upon both her own transgression of filial 
propriety, and the general reputation of Venetian women to suggest convincingly that 
Desdemona is not the paragon of womanhood that Othello conceives her to be.  Once 
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Desdemona is perceived to be just like all other Venetian society ladies, her virtues and 
forthrightness are brought into question and then it is a simple matter of opportunity for Iago 
to misrepresent every instance of Desdemona‘s speech and behavior as an attempt to conceal 
her infidelity.   
It takes time for Iago to work upon Othello because Othello is not predisposed to 
doubt Desdemona.  Suspicions must be generated if they are not already established.  Othello 
does not meditate upon suspicion and doubt, but upon happiness and confident security.  Once 
the suspicions are embraced and subsequently ―confirmed,‖ the distorted perception and 
behavior needs only to be supported and maintained until the ends are achieved. 
 Othello‘s sense of Desdemona‘s true devotion to him is both an asset and a weak 
portal.  It is an asset as long as Othello has no reason to doubt it.  However, if a doubt can be 
made to insinuate itself and grow like a virus—Iago‘s ―poison‖—then it is a devastating 
breach in Othello‘s defenses.  M. R. Ridley describes it thus in the second Arden edition: 
‗ I know our country disposition well‘ (as you do not); ‗In Venice they do let God  
see the pranks…‘  by this he [Iago] not only increases Othello‘s suspicions, but also 
does all he can to avert a direct challenge from Othello to Desdemona.  If to a 
Venetian lady of quality adultery is no more than a ‗prank‘, Othello dreads some such 
answer as ‗It is not so; but what an if it were?‘, or in other words ‗My dear Othello, 
why are you making such a pother about a trifle?‘  And he dare not risk that.  Iago 
then attacks Othello‘s possible sense of inferiority, or at any rate unsuitability, 
suggesting that Desdemona may have been only temporarily swept off her feet and 
may now ‗fall to match you with her country forms, And happily repent‘, and finally, 
the leperous distilment now safely poured into his victim‘s heart, he leaves it to 
corrode, with pretended counsels of moderation, ‗let me be thought too busy in my 
fears.‘  (xliv) 
 
 
Handkerchiefs and Ocular Proofs 
 
Iago uses suggestion, supposition and Othello's susceptibility on the issues of 
reputation and honor to poison mentally what is from all accounts a truly loving relationship.  
He separates the affections of the two lovers by destroying Othello‘s hopes that he can settle 
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securely into Venetian society with his innocent young bride.  Iago engineers some 
circumstances and employs people to cross purposes, but he accomplishes nearly all of his 
maleficium solely with words— and one flimsy, yet potent, physical object: Othello‘s 
wedding gift to Desdemona, the strawberry-embroidered handkerchief.  Iago metaphorically 
lays siege to a strong tower and with little more than words and wit, he manages to undermine 
the whole structure, and bring it crashing down.  Unfortunately for him, he is also crushed in 
the wreckage. 
 There has been so much written about this play that it can easily be forgotten that a 
large part of what Iago causes to happen is not the result of his ingenious master planning.  He 
skillfully takes advantage of opportunities, and seeks them out; but he also takes great risks, 
and succeeds by unforeseen lucky chances (dramatic devices?) that no expert planner would 
rely upon.  Othello makes the decision to kill Desdemona.  Iago is sufficiently carried away—
fascinated in his own scheming—to abet the deed and lead Othello‘s murderous bias towards 
a fatal retribution in suggesting the manner of her death.  Iago is forced by circumstance to 
arrange the elimination of Roderigo and fortuitously sees a way to quell Cassio at the same 
time.  But this plan is ultimately a failed plot, and Iago must himself intervene to kill 
Roderigo and attempt the same on Cassio.  At the end, he cannot control Emilia, and kills her 
as well, but not before she unmasks him, and brings about his downfall.  Able officers are 
sometimes required to improvise in a campaign, but skillful planning and preparation reduce 
the effects of chance and provide greater opportunities for success.  The success of Iago‘s plot 
is largely the result of his ability to capitalize on presented opportunities, rather than on the 
relentless and calculated planning of someone like Richard III. 
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 It is Othello‘s ―wak'd wrath‖ that turns Iago‘s initial plot on its head.  It is doubtful 
that Iago anticipates the intensity of Othello‘s aroused passion, or the unexpected physical 
attack accompanied by Othello‘s lines: 
  (taking Iago by the throat) 
Villaine, be sure thou proue my Loue a whore, 
  Be sure of it, giue me the oculer proofe, 
  Or by the worth of mine eternall soule, 
  Thou hadst bin better haue beene borne a dog, 
  Then answer my wak'd wrath.    
 
IAGO    Ist come to this? 
 
OTHELLO 
Make me to see't, or at the least so proue it, 
That the probation, beare no hinge, nor loope, 
To hang a doubt on: or woe vpon thy life. 
 
IAGO 
My noble Lord. 
 
OTHELLO 
If thou doest slander her, and torture me, 
Neuer pray more, abandon all remorce. 
On horrors head, horrors accumilate: 
Do deeds, to make heauen weepe, all earth amaz'd, 
For nothing canst thou to damnation ad 
Greater then that.  (9.1810.1-1825) 
 
From this moment, Iago realizes just how far his plan has gone.  He is now in personal 
danger.  Before this, he might have been able to equivocate or retreat.  Now he is fully 
exposed as another target for Othello‘s anger and he has no choice but to ―prove‖ what is 
ultimately unable to be proved.  He can no longer insinuate, he must graduate into active 
fraud and deception—depending  upon Othello‘s thought being so fascinated with the 
disgrace that the alleged, fantasy love affair will have on him, that Othello will not discern the 
truth of Desdemona‘s and Cassio‘s innocence.  Once Othello decides to confront either 
Desdemona or Cassio directly, and test the validity of Iago‘s assertion, Iago is finished.  His 
alarmingly thin plot will instantly be discovered, and he will be ruined past all recovery. 
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 Iago bears little verifiable ill-will specifically to Desdemona, but in desperation to 
save himself, he is willing to let her be sacrificed along with Cassio, who, he now realizes, 
must die, and quickly fans the flame of Othello‘s anger towards him.  It is during this scene  
that Iago makes his most brilliant move.  Forced to show Othello tangible proof of 
Desdemona's disloyalty, he demurs that it is impossible to catch them in the act.  This is a 
certain truth, leading Iago to invite Othello to consider the imagery of what is a devastating, 
yet wholly fictitious scene: Cassio making love to Desdemona in his sleep.  Othello is just 
distracted enough not to interrogate the fact that the action is performed in a dream and retold 
by one of the most unreliable of narrators: 
 IAGO 
  …I lay with Cassio lately, 
  And being troubled with a raging tooth, 
  I could not sleep.  There are a kinde of men 
  So loose of soule, that in their sleepes 
  Will mutter their affaires, one of this kinde is Cassio: 
  In sleepe I heard him say, Sweete Desdemona, 
  Let vs be wary, let vs hide our loues; 
  And then sir, would he gripe and wring my hand, 
  Cry oh sweete creature, then kisse me hard, 
  As if he pluckt vp kisses by the rootes, 
  That grew vpon my lips, laie his leg ore my thigh, 
  And sigh, and kisse, and then cry, cursed fate, 
  That gaue thee to the Moore. 
 
 OTHELLO O Monstrous, monstrous. 
 
 IAGO Nay, this was but his dreame. 
 
 OTHELLO 
  But this denoted a fore-gone conclusion. 
 
 IAGO 
  Tis a shrewd doubt, tho it be but a dreame, 
  And this may helpe to thicken other proofes, 
  That doe demonstrate thinly. 
 
 OTHELLO    I'le teare her all to peeces. (9.1865-83) 
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Once Iago has cleared himself some space from immediate personal danger, he 
resumes his effort to plant what little physical evidence he can offer to show Cassio and 
Desdemona as lovers.  Already in possession of the handkerchief, Iago lies about it being in 
Cassio's hands—presumably because it is a love token given to Cassio by Desdemona.  
Knowing that no one but he can produce the "evidence" of the handkerchief, Iago becomes 
secure that Othello has now crossed the line into a fascinated passion that Reason will have 
great difficulty in removing: 
 OTHELLO 
  Now doe I see tis true, looke here Iago, 
  All my fond loue, thus doe I blow to heauen,—tis gone.  (9.1896-97) 
 
After they commit themselves to the fatal course of Othello's mad passion "In the due 
reuerence of a sacred vow" (9.1911), Othello crosses over into criminal conspiracy: 
     I greete thy loue: 
  Not with vaine thankes, but with acceptance bounteous, 
  And will vpon the instant put thee to't, 
  Within these three dayes, let me heare thee say, 
  That Cassio's not aliue. 
 
 IAGO     My friend is dead: 
  Tis done at your request, but let her liue. 
 
 OTHELLO 
  Dam her lewd minks: O dam her, dam her, 
  Come, goe with me apart, I will withdraw 
  To furnish me with some swift meanes of death, 
  For the faire diuell: now art thou my Leiutenant. 
 
 IAGO I am your owne for euer.   (9.1919-29) 
 
To focus attention on Othello‘s vanity, his impaired reasoning and his desire to assert 
more authoritative control over his domain as a result of his insecurity, is to discover the real 
need within the outward forms of his struggle and to mitigate the idea that he is simply a 
jealous man.  The fascination of betrayal works him into a jealous passion, but he is not 
predisposed to jealousy by a tragic flaw—regardless of the general stereotypes Iago puts into 
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the atmosphere concerning Moors.  True, the Moor was a theatrical figure renowned for 
embodying qualities such as jealousy, wrath, caprice and usually carrying the dramatic weight 
of villainy.  But Shakespeare broke new ground with the character of Othello, consciously 
giving him lines and stage presence in direct opposition to the stereotype.  The beauty of the 
tragedy is that despite the repositioning and ennobling of Othello, Shakespeare shows us this 
hero who descends into the behaviors of the reductive stereotype once his imagination has 
been bewitched by Iago's mental malpractice.  When Othello recovers his reason at the end of 
the play, he realizes that he has no hope of recovering his honor, reputation or place because 
his temporary devolution into the behaviors and thinking of the archetypal Moorish stage 
villain has destroyed everything he has worked his whole life to achieve.     
Having been taken in by an obsessively mesmeric deception—being made a fool in the 
eyes of his men and society—seems to be the stronger justification for the almost complete 
fixation that Iago‘s premise has on Othello‘s conscious thought. Ironically, of course, there is 
no deception proceeding from the object of Othello‘s wrath, Desdemona.  Perhaps this is what 
maddens him; there is no deception there to detect.  Like the maneuvers of the Turkish fleet, 
Iago has feinted in one direction—loyal honesty to his commander—to ensure the success of 
his attack on other targets altogether: Cassio and the Lieutenancy.  However, unlike the 
Venetian Senate, Othello does not discern the deceptive tactic because his thought is 
preoccupied with the ramifications that Desdemona‘s supposed betrayal will have for him 
personally.  Macbeth may lose the faculty of sleep because of his struggle with a fascinated 
state of mind, but nowhere in the Shakespeare canon is the fascinating element at work in so 
powerful a manner as it is with Othello.  At times, it literally produces a complete paralysis. 
 The epileptic fit, "trance," catatonic state—whatever form it takes onstage—is a 
completely debilitating overload of the mental processes, which in the early modern medical 
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model, serves to throw the alignment of all the vital spirits, animal spirits, humors and sensive 
motions out of order and function.  The seizure of Othello's body through the temporarily 
derailed mind/body relationship has only one textual precedent: 
 OTHELLO 
…It is not words that shake me thus, (pish)  
Noses, Eares, and Lippes: is't possible.  Confesse?    
Hadkercher?  O diuell. 
 He fals downe in a traunce 
 
 IAGO 
  Worke on, my medicine workes: thus credulous fooles are caught, 
  And many worthy and chaste dames, euen thus 
  All guiltlesse, meete reproach; What ho my Lord, 
  My Lord I say, Othello,— 
   Enter Cassio 
      How now Cassio. 
 
 CASSIO  What's the matter? 
 
 IAGO 
  My Lord is falne into an Epilepsy, 
  This is his second fit, he had one yesterday. (11.2170-76) 
 
It may be that Othello suffers from a medical pathology such as epilepsy, but close reading of 
the text discovers that it only manifests itself in Cyprus, and only after Iago has begun his 
mental malpractice against Othello. 
Iago knows how powerful the bewitching obsession is, perhaps from his own struggles 
with it, and it increases the viewer‘s sense of trepidation that he uses it to madden and destroy 
a soldier as powerful as Othello.  Again, there is a sense of progression put before the 
audience that follows, in some manner, Macbeth's path to the throne.  If Iago gains the 
Lieutenancy, and Othello subsequently becomes incapable, the lieutenant will take the reins 
of power.  Indeed, this is what actually happens in Othello.  But unfortunately for Iago, Cassio 
is made the commanding officer in the end because Lieutenant Iago follows General Othello 
in discharge, disgrace and, presumably, death. 
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 In order for the marriage of Othello and Desdemona to be rent asunder by suspicion,  
Othello‘s fundamental understanding of his place in society and his relationship to his wife 
must undergo a radical change.  Othello asks Iago to ―give me the ocular proof‖ of 
Desdemona‘s supposed breach of faith.  E.A.J. Honigman outlines an interesting, but by no 
means definitive, element of Othello‘s composition.  On page nineteen of his introduction to 
the third Arden edition of Othello, he asserts: 
Shakespeare seems to suggest that Othello sees less clearly than Iago, that he depends 
on Iago‘s eyes… Othello‘s lines can be played straight, without any hint of defective 
eyesight; an ageing Moor with failing vision gives them added point, partly explains 
his general dependence on Iago, and puts more sting into taunts such as ‗Look to her, 
Moor, if thou hast eyes to see‘ and ‗Look to your wife, observe her well with Cassio‘ 
(1.3.293, 3.3.200: a deliberate echo?).  Othello‘s own psychic need for ocular proof 
(‗Make me to see‘t‘, 3.3.363ff.) may be related to his unacknowledged infirmity. (19) 
 
This is an apt conjecture, but Othello can still be "blind" and retain perfect physical vision.  
The overload of imagery, combined with the phenomenon of reality transcendence within a 
fascinated mental state, perhaps carries more dramatic weight by enriching the complexity of 
Othello's situation than a simple defect like myopia. 
There are a number of ways in which the interpretation of the role of Othello can be 
taken that will diminish his grandeur as a dramatic creation, and all of them should be 
avoided.  He is not a ―gull‖, ―dolt‖, ―murderous coxcomb‖, or ―fool‖ as Emilia tags him.  He 
is cruel and passionate in his actions, a result of his martial prowess aroused and improperly 
focused upon innocent targets—driven by a misguided sense of redress.  But he is no fool—
until he orders Cassio's death and kills Desdemona.  Then he becomes Iago's puppet.  He, like 
Macbeth, has accepted intelligence from what he considers an unimpeachable source—his 
own conclusions based upon what he thinks he has witnessed.  Like Macbeth, he is provoked 
by a seeming prophecy; in a more subtle form in this case, Brabantio‘s lines ―Look to her, 
Moor, if thou hast eyes to see:/She has deceived her father, and may thee,‖ (1.3.286) can serve 
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as a constant source of funding for his suspicion that Desdemona has cuckolded him with 
Cassio.  Also in coincidence with Macbeth, Othello‘s confirmation of what has become the 
suggested reality manifests itself in the form of an ―apparition:‖ Cassio‘s discussion with Iago 
about Bianca.  This ―false show‖ appears to confirm Iago‘s insinuations regarding Cassio and 
Desdemona to Othello‘s susceptible thought: 
 I, let her rot and perish, and be damb'd to night, 
 For she shall not liue: no, my heart is turn'd to stone; 
 I strike it, and it hurts my hand: O the world hath not  
 A sweeter creature, she might lie by an Emperours side, 
 And command him taskes.   (11.2303-09) 
 
 It is important to see the necessity for maintaining the high status of the tragic hero, 
and not let critical relativism bring the argument either to flights of poetic hyperbole, or 
needlessly deconstructive impulses.  However Othello is played by the actor, Iago‘s practice 
upon him should be clearly seen as a maneuver of deceptive appearances, an echo of the 
tactics of the Turkish fleet that the Venetian Senate recognizes: ―tis a Pageant, / To keepe vs 
in false gaze‖ (3.305-6).  The substitution of appearances for reality, as mentioned previously, 
is one of the chief artifices of the operation of fascination. 
 Othello is deceived on a grand scale by Iago, and in one important moment by Emilia.   
The consequence of Emilia‘s lie in scene ten, has enormous impact later when Othello asks to 
see the handkerchief: 
 DESDEMONA 
  Where should I loose that handkercher, Emillia? 
 EMILLIA I know not, madam.        (10.1952-3) 
 
Emilia knows exactly where the handkerchief was misplaced, and to whom she gave it, even 
if she cannot testify exactly to its current whereabouts.  When Othello demands the 
handkerchief, Desdemona does not lie to him, in effect, though she cannot produce the one he 
asks for.  Her vaguely equivocal response is that she has somehow lost possession of it 
 186 
temporarily, but that it is not lost to her forever.  She sees it as a condition that will be 
remedied by a thorough search.  This idea compounds the tragic sense within the experience 
of Othello's audience: why does Othello not adopt the same strategy for his lost sense of trust 
in Desdemona?  He might conduct a thorough search through the so-called evidence and 
redeem the whole situation. 
 The true lie in the scene comes from Emilia‘s silence.  Shakespeare‘s decision to leave  
her onstage to witness the exchange between Othello and Desdemona compounds the 
intensity of suspense that the audience feels.  If Emilia comes forward at this point to declare, 
―My lord, Iago has the handkerchief.  He asked me to procure it for him, and so I did, not 
knowing his intent,‖ then the plot is soon uncovered, the fascination with Desdemona‘s 
faithlessness is quickly dispelled, and the play turns in a completely different direction.  
 In the introduction to the second Arden edition of Othello, M.R. Ridley makes the  
observations that Othello 
 …has some vulnerable, and in certain circumstances very dangerous, weaknesses.  In  
the first place his intellectual power is nowhere near on a par with his other qualities.   
―Whenever he thinks he is a child‖ and not even a very intelligent child. (54)  
 
Whenever Othello trusts his instinct he is almost invariably right (―If she be false, oh 
then Heaven mocks itself.  I‘ll not believe it‖); whenever he thinks, or fancies himself 
to be thinking, he is almost invariably and ruinously wrong…He cannot endure to feel 
baffled, and, when he does, passion not only assays to lead the way but succeeds. (55) 
 
The power of that passion is enormous. Othello‘s decline is horrific.  He descends from a 
noble general to a virtually inarticulate beast that roars after its quarry.  Othello makes the 
nearly complete transition into the fearful demon that Brabanzio takes him for.  It is not 
without a certain irony that when Othello is called to account for his and Desdemona‘s 
deception of Brabanzio, he willingly submits himself to the Doge and the Senate.  He 
correctly trusts that these representatives of judgment will discern the truth of the matter, and 
save him from lynching or exile.  Yet when the case of Desdemona and Cassio‘s alleged 
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deception is brought before Othello, he does not let proper probity and judgment decide.  Why 
does he demonstrate such a large departure from reason?  It is because he is obsessed with an 
erroneous supposition.  Added to that is his position as the martial governor of Cyprus; he is, 
in effect, The Law.  He is also supposedly the wronged party.  He is misled in his thinking 
that he can act as an objective prosecutor and executor of justice in Cyprus—his military 
domain.  While that may be true in the case of Cassio‘s breach of the peace, his jurisdiction 
does not extend to punishing either Cassio or Desdemona for adultery—at least without a 
proper court martial.   
His fascinated thinking is responsible for drawing the fatal conclusion that he must 
bring justice to himself, by himself and for himself, under the guise of acting for the good of 
the colony and company.  The obsession that permeates his thought is arguably more 
responsible for the final ruination than Ridley‘s more simplistic observation that Othello‘s 
native intellect is unable to cope with Iago‘s assaults.  It is more a result of the erosion of a 
lifetime of self-image construction that fixes his thought to attempt, violently, to redeem the 
perceived damage done to it.  His thought processes suffer more from a temporarily 
overwhelming confusion than from the lack of natural function to discern or interpret data.  
The data that Othello is led to examine is corrupt, not his ability.  The only possible way 
around that is for Othello to take the lead and run a thorough investigation, but even then 
suspicion and doubt are so ingrained at this point, they might affect the interpretation of 
Othello's own evidence. 
 With the possible exception of revenge, jealousy is the worst of all scenarios to find  
oneself bound to.  To practise upon another person‘s identity via their concept of self-worth or  
security of place is to strike them hard and cut them deeply.  The great tragedy of jealousy is 
that it not only seems to effect a pernicious and almost unbreakable hold on thought, because 
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so much of our identity is defined by our interpersonal relationships, but the loss of the ability 
to self-reference can vacate the governance of reason and judgment.  In the extremes of the 
obsession, even corrective information can be dismissed by the sufferer because the state of 
reality transcendence has reached the point of reducing the subject to the reactionary traits of 
an animal.  Othello certainly descends to this mental quagmire as his speech becomes more 
monosyllabic and guttural in Cyprus—departing from the lofty eloquence he exhibits in 
Venice. 
Iago is adept at exploiting the passions of his victim.  The revolving obsession he 
nurtures in Othello that Desdemona was capable of deceiving her own father, and can easily 
deceive Othello is unshakeable as a sort of prophetic curse to the prepossessed imagination of 
a husband who was an equal sharer in the guilt of a seemingly innocent deception whose 
ramifications are now beginning to make themselves known.  Othello, loved of Desdemona, 
as Brabantio was once loved of her, now feels acutely his father-in-law‘s loss, as he 
contemplates losing Desdemona to the supposed affections of his own subordinate.   
Hamlet begins with a Ghost roaming Castle Elsinore.  King Lear opens with a king 
unnaturally dividing the kingdom.  Macbeth unleashes storm, war and witches within the 
initial action of the play.  Othello quietly, yet relentlessly breaks holes in the atmospheric 
harmony to admit Chaos by presenting a fourth example of what would earlier be seen as 
unnatural order: miscegenation.  The mixed-race marriage provokes a stir in the play's 
environment, littering the theatre with racial epithets, but the fundamental magnet for the 
malice directed towards Desdemona and Othello is the fact that they married quickly and in 
secret.  It undermines the credibility of both of them to some degree because they knew the 
marriage ceremony would be controversial.  They deliberately shunned transparency and 
familial courtesy. 
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Brabantio perhaps viewed Othello as an inferior in race, faith, and social position; the  
language he chooses during his prosecution of Othello before the Doge of Venice supports the  
profile.  Can Othello now escape the same thoughts in regards to Cassio?  There is great credit 
in the idea that Othello would be mortified to be cuckolded by a subordinate officer that he 
has to publicly cashier for creating a disturbance of the peace and seriously wounding 
Montano, the former Governor of Cyprus.  Whether Iago realizes it consciously, his plot 
against the lovers will have its maximum effect in the auspicious timing of their re-adjustment 
of personal identity in the context of their elopement.   
 
The Murder of Desdemona & Final Revelations 
 
As his scheme gathers momentum, Iago baits and harries Othello, ―practising vpon his 
peace and quiet, / Euen to madnesse‖ (4.991-92).  The power of fascination works on long 
after passion has been invoked.  After Iago‘s campaign to madden Othello and supplant 
Cassio has succeeded, the pathology of Othello‘s artificially generated jealousy might well 
carry on into his murder of Desdemona.  But Shakespeare does not trace this scenario in a 
neat and tidy formula by having Othello kill Desdemona at the height of his passion.  When 
he finally smothers her, he is distracted, fascinated, but he is not passionate.  He is cold, 
resolved, and even courteous—allowing Desdemona to pray so that he ―would not kill thy 
vnprepared spirit, / No, heauens fore-fend, I would not kill thy soule‖ (15.2930-31). 
 The evidence is presented by the change in Othello after he recovers from his fit in 
scene eleven.  This is the nadir (or apex?) of his passion and is one of the devices that 
Shakespeare utilizes to create an even more horrific climax to his play.  The heinous murder 
that Othello commits is not a crime of passion; it is an act of madness.  It is a madness 
induced by a fascinated obsession for the need to execute a personal sense of justice.  When 
Othello recovers from his fit, he becomes a far more deadly and frightening figure because his 
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thought is fixed; there is now no room in his thought for discussion of if, there is only room 
for the discussion of how.  Granted, the conclusions that he has drawn from Iago‘s ―evidence‖ 
are erroneous and he quickly receives yet more erroneous ―oculer proof‖ when Iago 
―interrogates‖ Cassio about his relationship with Desdemona in full view—but not within the 
full hearing—of Othello, who watches from a concealed location.  The audience begins to 
come to the realization that though his passion has subsided, he is no less determined to do 
away with the supposed lovers—and now, in an even more chilling presentation of murder, it 
will be performed in cold blood.  The effort to move Othello‘s thought back to Reason and 
Order would now have to be massive and no one but Iago and perhaps Emilia, possess enough 
of the facts to be able to persuade Othello away from this fatal course.  Othello‘s enactment of 
an honor killing upon his innocent wife demonstrates that Chaos has enveloped the scene 
once again—not just in Othello‘s mind, but in the physical space he occupies. 
The horror of the final scene stems not from sudden, lamentable passion, but rather 
from Othello‘s obsessive brutality: ―For nought I did in hate, but all in honour‖ (15.3198).  
David Bevington makes a series of observations in his introduction to the play, in the fourth 
edition of his The Complete Works of Shakespeare that provide a fitting summation of this 
fall.  But they also point to the redemptive power of Othello‘s final ironic and tragic 
realization that he had been right to love and trust Desdemona: 
Othello‘s tragedy is not that he is easily duped, but that his strong faith can be 
destroyed at such terrible cost.  Othello never forgets how much he is losing.  The 
threat to his love is not an initial lack of his being happily married, but rather the 
insidious assumption that Desdemona cannot love him because such a love is 
unnatural.  The fear of being unlovable exists in Othello‘s mind, but the human 
instrument of this vicious gospel is Iago. (1118) 
 
The horror and pity of Othello rests, above all, in the spectacle of a love that was once 
so whole and noble made filthy by self-hatred…Despite the loss, however, Othello‘s 
reaffirmation of faith in Desdemona‘s goodness undoes what the devil-like Iago had 
most hoped to achieve: the separation of Othello from his loving trust in one who is 
good.  In this important sense, Othello‘s self-knowledge is cathartic and a 
 191 
compensation for the terrible price he has paid…His greatness appears in his 
acknowledgment of this truth and in the heroic struggle with which he has confronted 
an inner darkness we all share. (1121) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
FALSE EVIDENCE APPEARING REAL AS MENTAL MALPRACTICE 
 
 
 
And fassion not your selues like vnto this world, but be yee changed by the 
renewing of your minde, that yee may prooue what that good, and acceptable 
and perfect will of God is. 
 
Be not ouercome of euill, but ouercome euill with goodnesse. 
        —Romans 12:2, 21 
 
I would we were all of one minde, and one minde good: 
        —Cymbeline, 27.2803-2804 
 
 
 Whether supposedly evil forces are at work upon them, or the tragic heroes exhibit the 
human failings common to all of us who might find ourselves confronted with a life-and-
death dilemma, the need to be a competent navigator through such challenges is paramount.  
As seen in the tragedies, mental ―malpractice,‖ through a fascinated fixation of the thought, 
conspires against harmony and security. 
In constructing the argument along paths from superstition to suggestion theory, 
regarding the pervasive yet mostly unreconciled phenomenon of fascination as the specific 
cause of metaphysical malpractice, the attempt has been to highlight forcible imaginings as 
the transformative power that moves individuals to re-identify themselves in ways that cause 
an inner conflict with the developed notions of personal sense. Applied to the Shakespearean 
tragic hero, the onstage destruction is instructive to the audience as a means to recognize the 
operation of the perils of accepted suggestion and uninterrogated belief as coercive forces 
within the daily negotiations of non-theatrical existence.  As fascination began its redefinition 
away from the superstition of the evil eye within sixteenth and seventeenth-century England, 
it began to appear more as a phenomenon of pathology, rather than as an operation of magic, 
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and thereby becoming increasingly identified with one of the negative operations of the 
faculty of imagination.  From the treatises of the early modern writers who took up the study 
of Renaissance ―psychophysiology,‖ there emerges the contemporary postulation that these 
chaotic operations of imagination create a certain type of disorder in the microcosm—a 
disorder in the court of the mind, perhaps. 
If these imaginings are allowed to gravitate into an obsession, which, to reiterate the 
theory of Baudouin, ―is nothing more than a mental fascination, a fascination by images, 
memories, ideas, from which we cannot free the mind, simply because we think we cannot 
free it‖ (87), there exists the potential danger that such disorder will burst forth into the 
macrocosm of society with ruinous effects.  Shakespeare‘s placement of idealized, yet 
accessibly human and susceptible protagonists at the center of his dramatic arguments 
portrays the negotiations of being a sober and watchful porter at the door of thought for an 
early modern audience in ways that the pulpit might find difficult to compete against.  Indeed 
the nascent power of theater to fascinate and tempt people to attend the spectacle of these 
arguments engendered an almost obsessive reaction in the campaigns of the ―anti-
theatricalist‖ writers to permanently censor the playhouses altogether. 
Yet the genius of figures like Macbeth and Othello rose so far above the rude 
―intisments‖ decried by the antitheatricalists, that even today they provide a basis for 
discourse both within an early modern understanding of the prevalent issues and within the 
complexities of twenty-first century encounters with the dilemma of separating fact from 
fiction.  We can still be led by Shakespeare to understand the dangers of ignorant or malicious 
suppositions, even while we sometimes find ourselves obsessing over the question of acting 
upon them. 
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Shifting the responsibility for such provocations from the human psyche to the 
influence of a force such as the Devil provides little comfort when it is realized that no matter 
what the stated source of the temptation, seduction or suggestion, it is the wrestling with the 
promptings that becomes the essence of the causality of our action.  The caveat is to become 
more aware of the perceived ―evil‖ that plays havoc with structures of our own subjectivity.  
Nathan Johnstone argues well for the fact that this is both a modern concern, and perhaps one 
significant issue of early modern Protestantism—at least in Shakespeare‘s England: 
…the prevalence of internal temptation is suggestive of a potential for an even more 
complex concern over subjectivity.  Since the Devil‘s intrusions into the mind were 
effectively disguised as ordinary thoughts, the individual could be hoodwinked into 
sin by believing them to be an expression of his inner nature.  To the godly who felt 
temptation most keenly, and to the moralists who used it to construct didactic 
narratives of human frailty, the Devil threatened to turn the inner self into the traitor to 
the soul.  If the logic of temptation was followed, the internal self could no longer be 
trusted to be the true self. (291) 
 
 Viewing these two plays in performance provides a vivid experience of how 
that "internal self" undergoes radical changes under such challenges—whether or not the 
Devil could be proved to be behind those challenges.  Shakespeare allows his audience to see 
many beliefs in action and many possible rationales, but he is particularly apt in showing the 
individual being determinate in all final effects.  The theatre is a useful tool to consider more 
closely the question of the very existence of evil.  Even if philosophy should prove 
conclusively that evil does not, in fact, exist, there will still be an ongoing internal struggle 
with reconciling what could be termed ―relative good.‖  The degree to which we influence our 
surroundings, and make an impact—constructively or destructively—on our understanding of 
the ―outward,‖ will be bound to the direction of where the ―inward‖ leads us.  Montaigne 
muses upon this in his ―Essay XL: ‗That the Taste of Goods or Evils Doth Greatly Depend on 
the Opinion we Have of Them.‖  His central point is worth reiteration: 
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If that which we call evill and torment, be neither torment, nor evill, but that 
our fancie only gives it that qualitie, it is in us to change it: and having the choice of it, 
if none compel us, we are very fooles, to bandy for that partie, which is irksome unto 
us: (269) 
 
The clearest mental discernment, as the preceding experiences of Shakespeare‘s tragic 
heroes show, is ultimately above what material evidence is able to provide.  Even in the face 
of compelling ―oculer proofs,‖ the judgment must be made against a shifting (hopefully a 
progressively), evolving inner standard of truth and goodness.  The theatre can aid in that 
reflective effort, but can only go so far, as Huston Diehl points out: 
Rejecting any simple dichotomy between theatre and truth, Shakespeare‘s 
tragedies raise provocative questions about inwardness and theatricality, plainness and 
cunning, truth and illusion.  How can inward truths manifest themselves except 
through visible signs and externals?  Does plain speaking itself constitute a theatrical 
performance?  How can someone know the difference between the authenticity of a 
virtuous person and the fraudulent posture of a villain like Iago, who maliciously 
poses as a plain-speaking and honest man?  Can a fiction convey the truth?  Can a 
theatrical illusion serve a moral purpose?  Shakespeare provides no simple answers to 
these questions, but his interest in them like his interest in authority, scepticism, faith, 
magic, false belief, and despair, indicates how fully his tragedies engage the religious 
controversies spawned by the Protestant Reformation. (101) 
 
When the theatre is engaged in provoking such questions, it requires its audience to 
engage the fascination-defeating faculty of insight.  Real proofs of the realities behind the 
appearances only come into focus when suggestion has been dispelled by inspiration or true 
perception.  The ideal condition, such as total perception, is frequently impossible.  It is a 
convenience of the theatrical interrogation that the audience is privy to so much information.  
In real-life constructs such perspicacity is seldom achieved without a sustained and rational 
effort.  As Montaigne says, evil itself is a perception—one that can be incredibly engaging.  
But usually it proceeds from a perceived lack of some thing: truth, loyalty, respect.  Rarely is 
it a something that motivates from its own potent reality.   
Evil for evil's sake is the essence of demonology, but even in that tradition it is, due to 
the Fall from Heaven, dependent for its genesis upon the frustrated efforts and the perceived 
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lack of advancement that Lucifer claimed he was owed.  The more frequent, demonstrable 
human evil is often a window for Chaos created by ignorance and false belief.  Alex Aronson 
concurs with such an argument by summarizing the point in his opinion that, 
The moral evil resulting from such a lack of insight, Shakespeare implies, does not 
necessarily reside in ―nature.‖  Neither the body nor the mind is a priori evil.  It is 
―man-made‖ and can be explained as originating in a false sense of security (―I see, 
therefore I am‖), an inflated self-confidence that puts all trust in the physical ability to 
perceive, to measure, to calculate, to establish an ocular proof of ―truth‖ which in 
effect is not open to such visual measurements at all.  The refusal to face a truth that 
ought to be confronted in terms of imaginative awareness only is the undoing of the 
tragic hero. (421) 
 
Finally, do we not take away from the experience of these two tragedies a heightened 
awareness of the manifold and subtle influences that subject our thought to assumptions that 
we must constantly prove or disprove?  The evolution of the inner nature will never be free 
from this process, yet there exists the choice, as Montaigne argues, to see ourselves as masters 
of such assertions.  The price paid for that mastery is more or less eternal vigilance and 
discernment—the primacy of perception‘s quest to discern the real.  Burton says we should 
take up this task without fear.  However it is approached, the false ―evidences‖ appearing real 
to the thought largely comprise the sense of fear felt within some of these negotiations.  But 
that falsity itself is reason to allay the fear.  We might just hear Lady Macbeth, of all voices, 
telling us ―O proper stuffe: / This is the very painting of your feare:/…shame it selfe, / Why 
do you make such faces?" (15.1083-1090).  Indeed, if evil is a misconception of good—the 
supposed absence of order and the imagined rule of chaos—why should we stare fascinated at 
nothingness? 
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